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Crossing Borders
Rethinking the European Union’s Neighborhood Policies
by Almut Möller (ed.)
• The European Union is in the middle of  developing policies for dealing with the 
countries in its neighborhood. The ongoing series of  events in the EU’s south-
ern neighborhood create the need to answer a challenging question: If  the stra-
tegic answer to the fall of  the Iron Curtain was enlargement, what then is the 
European Union’s strategic response to the Arab Spring?
• Since the accession of  Bulgaria and Rumania in 2007, the integration capacity 
and the transformative power of  the Union have been disputed. Governments 
and citizens are increasingly skeptical about further enlargement. There is 
no convincing rationale for enlargement (why is Turkey on the list, and not 
Ukraine?), and the financial, economic, and sovereign debt crises have made the 
EU more introverted. Most of  the Western Balkan countries will not become 
EU members any time soon. And a self-confident Turkey is less and less inter-
ested in joining the club.
• The ENP, on the other hand, a framework concept that was launched as a 
response to the 2004/2007 enlargements, has not yet developed into an attrac-
tive policy or an alternative to EU accession. Countries that want to join the 
Union regard it as a “policy of  rejection.” For countries that do not want to 
join the Union, the ENP has not delivered the results that the EU was hoping 
for in its “Wider Europe” concept of  2003: stability, peaceful cooperation, and 
prosperity.
• There are clear reasons why ENP and Enlargement Policy exist as separate 
approaches, the most obvious explanation being that the countries covered 
by Enlargement Policy will join the Union, while the ones under the ENP will 
not (or at least not for the foreseeable future). However, this separation of  (to 
be) “ins” and “outs” is not helpful. The EU needs a policy somewhere between 
Enlargement Policy and ENP.
• This set of  chapters suggests that the EU turn the European Commission’s 
concept of  the “Three Cs for enlargement” into a new concept for the whole 
neighborhood: (1) Conception: The EU should embrace its neighbors with a 
more daring approach of  selective areas of  functional and regional integration; 
(2) Communication: There is a lot of  room for improvement in the EU’s way of  
communicating with its neighbors; and (3) Cooperation: The EU must be selec-
tive with regard to partners, and it needs to develop a real spirit of  partnership.
• The European Union will be a lot more successful if  it manages to blur the 
boundaries on the European continent by creating overlapping spheres of  par-
tial integration with its neighbors. By “crossing borders,” the Union will also 
strengthen its ability to function as a network; a quality that will be a major asset 
in a multipolar, interconnected world.
Summary
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Grenzen überschreiten
Die Nachbarschaftspolitiken der Europäischen Union  
neu denken
von Almut Möller (Hrsg.)
• Die Europäische Union steckt mitten in der Weiterentwicklung ihrer Politiken 
für die Staaten in ihrer Nachbarschaft. Die andauernden Ereignisse in der 
südlichen Nachbarschaft der EU machen dabei die Beantwortung einer ent-
scheidenden Frage notwendig: Wenn die strategische Antwort auf  den Fall des 
Eisernen Vorhangs die Erweiterung war, was ist dann die strategische Antwort 
der Europäischen Union auf  den Arabischen Frühling?
• Seit dem Beitritt Bulgariens und Rumäniens im Jahr 2007 werden die Integra-
tionskapazität der EU und ihre Fähigkeit, Transformationsprozesse anzuschie-
ben, immer stärker angezweifelt. Unter den Regierungen und Bürgern der 
Mitgliedsstaaten wächst die Skepsis über weitere Erweiterungsrunden. Hinter der 
Erweiterung steckt kein überzeugendes, logisches Grundprinzip (warum erhält 
die Türkei Kandidatenstatus und nicht die Ukraine?). Zudem führt die Finanz-, 
Wirtschafts- und Schuldenkrise dazu, dass sich die EU stark mit sich selbst 
beschäftigt. Der Großteil der Staaten des Westlichen Balkans wird auf  kurze 
Sicht kein Mitglied der EU. Die selbstbewusste Türkei ist immer weniger daran 
interessiert, dem Club beizutreten.
• Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik hat sich noch nicht in eine attraktive 
Politik oder gar zu einer Alternative zum Beitritt entwickelt. Staaten, die der EU 
beitreten möchten, betrachten sie als eine »Abspeisungspolitik«. Für Staaten, die 
dies nicht anstreben, hat die ENP bisher nicht die Ergebnisse erreicht, welche 
sich die EU in ihrem »Wider Europe«-Konzept aus dem Jahr 2003 erhofft hatte: 
Stabilität, friedliche Kooperation und Wohlstand.
• Es gibt zwar klare Gründe, warum die ENP und die Erweiterungspolitik als 
separate Ansätze existieren. Die offensichtlichste Erklärung besteht darin, dass 
diejenigen Staaten, die von der Erweiterungspolitik abgedeckt sind, auch der EU 
beitreten werden, während die Staaten der ENP diese Perspektive nicht (oder 
zumindest nicht in absehbarer Zukunft) haben. Jedoch ist die klare Trennung 
von »dabei sein« oder »nicht dabei sein« nicht sehr hilfreich. Die EU braucht 
eine Politik zwischen Erweiterung und ENP.
• Die vorliegende Publikation empfiehlt, dass die EU das Konzept der »drei C’s 
für die Erweiterung« der Europäischen Kommission aus dem Jahr 2005 zu 
einem neuen Rahmen für die gesamte Nachbarschaft weiterentwickelt. Dieser 
sollte auf  drei Pfeilern aufbauen: (1) Konzept: Die EU sollte ihre Nachbarn mit 
einem mutigeren Ansatz selektiver Felder funktionaler und regionaler Integration 
gegenübertreten; (2) Kommunikation: Es gibt viel Luft nach oben in der Art 
der Kommunikation der EU mit ihren Nachbarn; und (3) Kooperation: Die 
EU muss hinsichtlich ihrer Partner selektiv sein und mit diesen tatsächliche 
Partnerschaften eingehen.
• Die Europäische Union wird erfolgreicher sein, wenn sie es schafft, überlap-
pende Felder einer teilweisen Integration mit ihren Nachbarn zu schaffen und 
so die Grenzen auf  dem europäischen Kontinent zu verwischen. Ein solches 
»Überschreiten der Grenzen« wird die Fähigkeit der EU stärken, als Netzwerk zu 
agieren; eine Qualität, die von besonderer Bedeutung in einer multipolaren, ver-
netzten Welt ist.
Zusammenfassung
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Preface
Europe is a patchwork continent where borders 
have a particular meaning: The European Union 
aims at tearing down borders to grant mobility to its 
citizens and facilitate exchange and trade. Over time, 
the borders between EU members have therefore 
become blurred. But by becoming more integrated 
internally, the Union creates new external borders 
with the countries in its non-EU neighborhood.
The European Union’s “neighborhood” is thus 
very complex. The EU surrounds the countries 
of  the Western Balkans, which form a little non-
EU “enclave” (for now). To the east, the European 
Union shares borders with autocratic Belarus, as 
well as Moldova, Ukraine, and the vast Russian 
Federation. Its southeastern neighbor, EU acces-
sion candidate Turkey, would extend the Union’s 
borders to Syria, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, and Georgia, 
if  it becomes an EU member. On the other side 
of  the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region has—despite hopes for 
democracy—embarked on a path of  insecurity. For 
good or bad, its geography has a big impact on the 
shape of  the European Union.
Enlargement Policy and European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP) are the two main approaches 
that the Union has developed for its neighboring 
space. With these policies, the European Union has 
set the ambitious goal of  changing its neighbor-
hood, supporting the countries on its eastern and 
southern borders to become more peaceful, more 
prosperous, and indeed more like itself, and making 
the neighborhood more secure and more accessible 
to the EU’s economic interests. While promoting 
change worked much better leading up to the suc-
cessful enlargement rounds of  2004 and 2007, both 
the subsequently launched ENP and Enlargement 
Policy have since then proved to be a lot less suc-
cessful in transforming the countries in the EU’s 
neighborhood. On the contrary: When the rulers 
that the EU and its members had worked with over 
decades were swept out of  power by the citizens 
of  Tunisia and Egypt this year, Europeans were 
mere observers instead of  transformers and sup-
porters of  freedom, democracy, human dignity, and 
a better life.
This set of  chapters covering both the Union’s 
enlargement and neighborhood policies explores 
the links between the two and comes up with sug-
gestions as to how the European Union can give its 
relations with its neighbors more clout again. With 
this, we hope to make a contribution to an ongoing 
debate.
Each of  the three overarching chapters—Enlarge-
ment (I), the Eastern Dimension of  ENP (II), and 
the Southern Neighborhood (III)—can well be read 
as blocks separate from each other with an introduc-
tion and “Lessons Learned” paragraph, giving read-
ers a quick overview about the current debates in 
each respective area. At the same time, the chapters 
are put under a joint analytical umbrella, allowing for 
shared conclusions in the end that entail both cross-
policy and cross-regional aspects. We hope that 
crossing the borders of  one’s expertise into another 
geographic area or moving between enlargement 
and ENP will pay off  for our readers, as it did for 
the team of  authors, when they worked together on 
their chapters in several successive workshops.
The chapters in this volume reflect the expertise 
of  the DGAP’s staff  on questions related to the 
EU’s neighborhood, with most of  the research-
ers working not from a regional, but from an EU 
perspective. The issues covered in this publication 
are therefore by no means exhaustive. Areas that 
would deserve greater attention in the context 
of  EU neighborhood policy include, among oth-
ers, case studies for the countries in the southern 
Mediterranean, in particular those in transition, to 
explore the impact of  the changing political land-
scape on cooperation with the European Union; 
the cases of  Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 
the eastern dimension; the often problematic nexus 
between the European Union’s foreign and security 
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policy and its enlargement tools, for instance in 
the Western Balkans; the role of  Russia and Turkey 
in “their” neighborhood; the emerging role of  the 
European External Action Service in the Union’s 
immediate neighborhood; and the multitude of  
other regional or sub-regional approaches such as 
the Council of  the Baltic Sea States, in which Ger-
many holds the presidency in 2011/2012, the Black 
Sea Synergy, the Strategy for Central Asia, or the 
Northern Dimension, that have been developed 
over the last years.
What distinguishes this publication from other 
neighborhood assessments though is that it delib-
erately takes a joint approach to both Enlarge-
ment Policy as well as the southern and eastern 
dimensions of  ENP in order to deal with the EU’s 
neighborhood in a more comprehensive manner. 
The key to a successful neighborhood policy might 
lie somewhere between ENP and Enlargement 
Policy—hence “Crossing Borders”—or indeed in 
something entirely new.
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Ger-
man Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), whose 
ideas have inspired this project, and who have 
contributed chapters to this collection. Colin 
Adams supported the editing process and Tilmann 
Chladek put the pieces together into a combined 
layout. Finally, our thanks go to the Alfred Freiherr 
von Oppenheim-Stiftung for generously supporting 
this publication.
Berlin, July 2011 Almut Möller
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The European Union is in the middle of  develop-
ing policies for dealing with the countries in its 
neighborhood. The new external boundaries of  
the Union took shape with the 2004/2007 rounds 
of  enlargement, and as recently as early 2011 the 
Arab world witnessed unprecedented upheavals that 
triggered historic shifts in the Union’s southern 
neighborhood. We are therefore looking at a rela-
tively young set of  policies that must respond to a 
changing environment.
The European Union and its members chose 2011 
well before the Arab Spring as the year to review 
and reform its neighborhood policies. But while 
the High Representative and the European Com-
mission drafted an initial ENP review paper in May 
2011 and expectations are high for the Polish EU 
Presidency in the second half  of  2011 to come 
up with political initiatives, the ongoing series of  
events in the EU’s southern neighborhood create 
the need for an even more in-depth debate: If  the 
strategic answer to the fall of  the Iron Curtain was 
enlargement—what then is the European Union’s 
strategic response to the Arab Spring?
While enlargement proved to be a successful means 
of  peaceful transformation until 2004, the acces-
sions of  Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 in many 
ways marked a caesura. The enlargement discourse 
has changed since then: The “integration capac-
ity” of  the Union has become disputed by its 
members, as has the EU’s “transformative power;” 
both governments and EU citizens are increasingly 
skeptical about further enlargement rounds; there 
is no convincing “enlargement rationale” (why is 
Turkey an accession candidate, and not Ukraine?); 
and the impact that the financial, economic and 
sovereign debt crises had on many EU members 
further reduced the appetite to shoulder the costs 
of  another round of  enlargement.
On the other hand, the European Union and its 
member states have already granted new acces-
sion prospects, most notably to Turkey and the 
countries of  the Western Balkans. Accession nego-
tiations with Croatia are expected to be formally 
concluded later in 2011 and the country is likely to 
become the Union’s 28th member in 2013. How-
ever, for a variety of  reasons, most of  the other 
Western Balkans countries will not become EU 
members any time soon. And an increasingly self-
confident Turkey seems to be less and less inter-
ested in joining the crisis-ridden club. Continuing 
the enlargement process reveals that the Union is 
losing its transformative power, but it is also clear 
that the EU cannot simply leave what it has created 
as a framework of  cooperation without being nega-
tively affected.
The ENP, a framework concept that was launched 
as a response to the 2004/2007 enlargements, has 
not yet developed into an attractive policy or an 
alternative to EU accession. Countries that want 
to join the Union tend to regard the ENP as a 
“policy of  rejection.” For countries that do not 
want to join the Union, the ENP has not deliv-
ered the results that the EU was hoping for in its 
“Wider Europe” concept of  2003: stability, peaceful 
cooperation, and prosperity. On the contrary, fol-
lowing the Arab Spring, the European Union was 
widely criticized for having cemented the autocratic 
regimes of  the south rather than transforming the 
countries to make them politically more stable. The 
fundamental question about what the EU wants to 
achieve with its policies vis-à-vis its neighborhood 
(market access? transformation towards democracy 
and a social market economy? stability? security? 
new spheres of  influence? conflict resolution?) has 
been fueled again, as has the question about what 
kind of  incentives will drive neighboring countries 
to cooperate (or not) with the Union.
There are clear reasons why Enlargement Policy 
and ENP exist as separate approaches, the most 
obvious explanation being that under the cur-
rent set-up the countries covered by Enlargement 
Policy will join the Union, while the ones under the 
ENP will not (or at least not for the foreseeable 
future). But is this division and the definition of  
(soon to be) “ins” and “outs” helpful? The current 
problems that both Enlargement Policy and ENP 
face suggest that it makes sense to put the current 
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neighborhood debate into the wider perspective 
of  the EU’s external relations with its neighbors. 
Widening the scope of  analysis allows one to look 
at the EU’s relations with its neighbors in a more 
comprehensive manner, which might help to over-
come the current deadlock. This is what this publi-
cation seeks to accomplish.
Marcel Viëtor sets the stage for what he describes as 
the “inclusion-exclusion dilemma” that comes with 
European integration, a question that is essentially 
about the very identity of  the Union: “At every 
Council meeting and in every negotiation round 
between the EU and non-EU countries, hard facts 
and economic, political, and judicial considerations 
are at stake—but the question of  ‘European iden-
tity’ is also present in a subliminal, albeit decisive 
way. […] While the question of  who is ‘European’ 
and who is not will never be settled, the disagree-
ment interferes with the Union’s policies towards 
its neighbors and makes life difficult for both 
sides” (see page 11). To acknowledge the pres-
ence of  assumptions about “Europeanness” in the 
European Union’s daily business is one thing. The 
author then goes further and suggests strategies 
for both the Union and its neighbors to overcome 
the dichotomy of  “in” and “out” to find a healthier 
way of  co-existence.
Lucas Lypp then gives an overview on the state of  
affairs of  the EU’s Enlargement and Neighbor-
hood Policy. He points out the connectivity of  
Enlargement Policy on the one hand and ENP on 
the other, a nexus that comes with pitfalls. Fun-
damentally, as the author describes, “there is an 
asymmetry that underlies the EU’s relations with 
its neighbors, a center-periphery logic by which the 
EU—a norm-creating actor that has experienced 
decades of  economic prosperity—is accompanied 
by a periphery that is much less developed both 
politically and economically. This logic puts Brus-
sels in the position of  granting assistance and 
formulating conditions, and the prospect to govern 
even beyond its 27 members in which EU legisla-
tion is applied. This unequal arrangement of  rela-
tions has resulted in the growth of  a latent deficit 
of  legitimacy within the context of  EU engage-
ment […]” (see page 17). Also, the EU is still in 
the process of  developing the new policy approach. 
But so far, the ENP is often seen as an instrument 
of  indecision by the neighbors, a new form of  inte-
gration or association, settled somewhere between 
Enlargement Policy and foreign policy, that some-
times creates confusion.
The introductory reflections are followed by three 
chapters covering (I) Enlargement, (II) the East-
ern Dimension of  ENP, and (III) the Southern 
Neighborhood.
The first chapter, entitled “Revisiting Enlargement,” 
entails three papers on the state of  play in the 
Western Balkans (Natasha Wunsch), Iceland (Marek 
Souček), and Turkey (Natasha Wunsch). In a com-
parative perspective, Cornelius Adebahr and Natasha 
Wunsch conclude that “the enlargement process no 
longer represents a binding engagement between 
the EU and a candidate country. In the Western 
Balkan states, it is the EU’s waning commitment to 
their eventual accession, along with the often-prob-
lematic internal situations in many countries of  the 
region that has resulted in a rather sluggish trans-
formation, which frustrates actors on both sides of  
the negotiating table. In Iceland, the commitment 
problem is actually located on the candidate’s side, 
with the EU’s lack of  flexibility putting the success-
ful conclusion of  accession negotiations in doubt. 
Finally, in the case of  Turkey, both sides appear 
unsure as to whether they want to go through with 
a formal commitment to full integration, resulting 
in a stalemate in accession talks. […] This devel-
opment reduces the leverage the EU traditionally 
wields over aspiring member states through the 
enlargement promise, thereby diminishing its ability 
to contribute to the successful transformation of  its 
neighborhood” (see page 43). The authors suggest 
that in order to counteract the current devaluation 
of  the accession promise, a number of  concrete 
changes should be undertaken: 1) Communicate 
enlargement both inside and outside; 2) Enhance 
the consistency of  the EU’s messages; 3) Strengthen 
civil society in the target countries; and 4) Shift the 
accession process from governments to societies.
The Eastern dimension, introduced by Irene Hahn, 
looks at the cases of  Moldova (Stefan Meister), 
Belarus (Marie-Lena May), and Ukraine (Ulrike Stern). 
These chapters focus on complementing the Euro-
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pean Union’s perspective with the expectations and 
interests of  partner countries—a change of  per-
spective that reveals the extent to which the Euro-
pean Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) has been 
“Euro-centric” so far. Despite the limitations of  the 
EaP, as Marie-Lena May and Stefan Meister point out 
in their “Lessons Learned” chapter, “the EU still 
has a chance to develop ties with the parts of  soci-
ety in these countries that are open to its policies. 
[…] In addition to a dialogue with the elites of  EaP 
countries, the EU should identify target groups 
that are open to its approaches and that could be 
potential cooperation partners for comprehensive 
social and economic modernization.” (see page 
65) These are, first and foremost, civil society, the 
youth, and small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Another aspect that the authors point out 
in their “Lessons Learned” chapter is the role of  
Russia: “Russia’s goals often contradict the EU’s 
interests because Moscow has no interest in con-
flict resolution, economic competition, or transpar-
ent political and economic structures. Russia only 
has limited intentions to solve the conflicts in its 
neighborhood, because without these conflicts, it 
would lose a main instrument to prevent these 
countries from integrating with the EU. Thus, the 
EU cannot avoid conflict with Russia regarding its 
policies towards Eastern Partnership (EaP) states” 
(see page 67). The issue, as Irene Hahn suggests, is 
not about blaming Russia for what the Europeans 
perceive as a “sphere of  influence policy,” but 
to accept that Russia, as the EU, quite naturally 
engages in “her” neighborhood. However, there 
are different opinions on how to deal with Russia. 
Ulrike Stern takes a different approach: “An impor-
tant precondition for the success of  the Eastern 
Partnership is the EU’s relationship with Russia. In 
the post-Soviet space, the EU should not act as a 
direct opponent of  Russia. Instead of  aiming for 
an exclusive partnership with Ukraine, its proximity 
to Russia should be accepted—despite divergent 
aims and beliefs, even though this might be chal-
lenging. This will help support the EU’s own rela-
tionship with Russia” (see page 62).
While the MENA region is still in a process of  
change following the toppling of  President Ben Ali 
of  Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak of  Egypt, 
Claire Demesmay, Carsten Främke, and Katrin Sold 
give an initial assessment of  what the upheavals in 
the southern Mediterranean mean for the Euro-
pean Union and its policies vis-à-vis the respective 
countries as well as the region as a whole. While 
the authors underline that there are good reasons 
for strengthening the bilateral ENP approach in 
an ever more heterogeneous region, they argue for 
continuing to engage in a complementary multilat-
eral framework as provided by the Union for the 
Mediterranean. The authors conclude: “Applying 
the principle of  complementarity would lead to 
the development of  a more coherent and efficient 
Mediterranean policy—not only in regard to coop-
eration between the EU’s actors, but also to the 
use of  existing instruments. Since both the multi-
lateral and bilateral approaches have their specific, 
individual strengths, the answer is not an either/
or choice. But in order to avoid creating the same 
counterproductive, competitive situation between 
the two framework concepts that exist today, a 
needs-oriented, targeted application of  each indi-
vidual approach is needed” (see page 74).
Finally, Almut Möller and Cornelius Adebahr take a 
comparative look at chapters I–III. They indicate 
that the ongoing review of  the ENP is unlikely 
to produce a fundamental change in the EU’s 
neighborhood policies. But even without a more 
fundamental overhaul, there are still areas in 
which the European Union can become much 
better by rethinking the underlying rationale of  
cooperation with its neighbors. Against this back-
ground the EU should further develop the 2005 
European Commission concept of  the “Three Cs 
for enlargement” (Consolidation, Conditionality 
and Communication) into a new concept for the 
whole neighborhood. The three Cs for the 2011 
neighborhood reform should thus be: (1) Concep-
tion; (2) Communication; and (3) Cooperation. 
Because of  its geography, the authors argue, the 
EU is bound to cooperate with its neighbors—a 
fact that will make greater depth and strategic 
impetus a requirement for its neighborhood 
policies in the future. Strategically speaking, the 
European Union will lose its clout if  it decides 
to cement clear cut boundaries between the “ins” 
and the “outs,” as it tends to do at the moment. 
The “fortress of  Europe” is not a sustainable 
model for the European Union. In the long term, 
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the European Union will be a lot more success-
ful if  it manages to make the boundaries between 
the “ins” and “outs” more permeable. The time is 
not yet ripe for a more fundamental overhaul of  
the Union’s neighborhood policies, but regional 
as well as global trends suggest that the future of  
the Union lies in continuing to tear down borders, 
not only internally, but increasingly in its external 
relations. By crossing the EU’s external borders 
and creating overlapping spheres of  integration, 
the Union will strengthen its ability to function as 
a network—a major asset in an increasingly inter-
connected and competitive world.
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At every Council meeting and in every negotia-
tion round between the EU and non-EU countries, 
hard facts and economic, political, and judicial 
considerations are at stake—but the question of  
“European identity” is also present in a sublimi-
nal, albeit decisive way. For many current member 
states, the notion of  “European identity” suggests 
there are clear limitations for certain countries to 
join the Union—countries that, under the formal 
criteria laid out in the treaties, consider themselves 
to be eligible for membership. While the question 
of  who is “European” and who is not will never 
be settled, the disagreement interferes with the 
Union’s policies towards its neighbors and makes 
life difficult for both sides. This essay addresses the 
Union and its neighbors and seeks to offer alterna-
tive approaches that can help overcome what has 
turned into a deadlock situation. It does so based 
on a theoretical account and current examples 
of  how the question of  “European identity” has 
both determined and interfered with the European 
integration process and the EU’s enlargement and 
neighborhood policies.
The Dilemma of European Integration
In the Treaty on European Union, the EU evokes 
the aim of  “creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of  Europe.” It omits, however, that 
becoming a closer union on the inside simultane-
ously implies becoming a closed union towards the 
outside. This is the dilemma of  European integra-
tion, which, as with every process of  integration, 
contains both the dimensions of  inclusion and 
exclusion. The development of  and continued 
differentiation between the EU’s two approaches 
towards the countries on its borders—enlarge-
ment/inclusion and neighborhood/exclusion 
policies—reflect this dilemma. The EU does not 
regard its neighborhood policy as exclusionary, 
claiming that it is designed to prevent the emer-
gence of  new dividing lines. Yet countries beyond 
the EU’s eastern and southern borders that aspire 
to membership such as Georgia, Ukraine or, in the 
past, Morocco, perceive the fixed differentiation 
between enlargement and neighborhood policies as 
exclusionary since the EU’s neighborhood policy—
irrespective of  the benefits that it provides—does 
not offer the prospect of  membership.
A country that wants to join the European Union 
must fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.1 It has to meet 
political and economic preconditions, it has to be 
able to adopt the full body of  EU law (acquis com-
munautaire), and it needs to obtain the EU’s politi-
cal consent to initiate the accession process—the 
oft-quoted integration capacity of  the EU and its 
underlying institutional and financial constraints 
being in fact issues of  political judgment and 
will. The fundamental precondition for member-
ship, however, is a “European identity,” i. e. to be 
accepted by the EU as one of  its own: “Any Euro-
pean State […] may apply to become a member of  
the Union,” as the Treaty puts it.
If  the EU does not recognize the interested coun-
try as “European,” it need not deal with the other 
criteria, as was the case when it quickly turned 
down Morocco’s application in 1987.2 If  the EU 
fears internal resistance due to limited integra-
tion capacity or potentially negative outcomes in 
referenda in member countries, it might indeed be 
reasonable not to grant the interested country the 
prospect of  membership. Yet countries that are 
not offered membership, or even the possibility of  
membership, by the EU get the impression that it 
does not accept them as being “European”—or 
“really European,” “European enough”—and it 
thus denies and rejects their expressed identity.
Interested countries may well claim their “Euro-
peanness” and aspiration for accession as Georgia 
and Ukraine did after the Rose and Orange Revolu-
tions in 2003/2004, but this has not induced the 
EU to offer them the prospect of  membership. 
Putting the Neighborhood on the Map
Ever Closer, Ever Closed? Enlargement, Neighborhood, and the 
Question of “European Identity”
by Marcel Viëtor
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Indeed, the way the EU differentiates between 
its enlargement and neighborhood policies is not 
based on how the target countries express their 
identity, but on the extent to which the EU’s 
perception of  the target countries’ (expressed) 
identity overlaps with the EU’s perception of  its 
own identity. The two policies are hence the EU’s 
political attempt to answer the centuries-old ques-
tion of  what makes “European identity.” And it 
has remained a question with many answers, since 
a look at a map neither identifies what “Europe” is 
nor how “European identity” comes about.3 How, 
then, is this identity formed?
Identity Formation and Eastern Enlargement
Identity formation is best explained by the concept 
of  differentiation.4 A group of  people develops an 
identity as a certain community by differentiating 
between the inside of  a community and the outside, 
between the Self  and one or more Other(s) (mean-
ing that A is A because A is not non-A). Com-
munities are imagined—constructed—since the 
differentiation is made independently from “fac-
tual” similarities or dissimilarities between the Self  
and the Other(s), for instance between “Europe” 
and “non-Europe(s).” However, communities pro-
claim their identity by marking the differentiation 
through certain signals of  identity. Narratives often 
draw on language, religion, culture, ethnicity, his-
tory or geography as such signals; but in fact any 
differentiating factor is conceivable.
Indeed, the boundaries between the Self  and the 
Other(s) are not drawn because certain differen-
tiating signals of  identity exist “factually.” Rather, 
certain identity signals are deemed relevant because 
they fit an underlying (political) interest in including 
someone into or excluding someone from the Self. 
For instance, it is not because of  given geographi-
cal, religious or cultural facts that some people do 
not see Turkey or Russia as part of  Europe; it is 
the other way around: Those people that do not 
want to see Turkey or Russia as part of  the EU—
for political reasons such as the concern that Tur-
key as a big state would gain too much influence 
within EU institutions, or for religious or other rea-
sons—argue that certain exclusionary concepts of  
geography, religion or culture should be regarded 
as relevant signals of  “European identity.”
The differentiation between members of  a Self  and 
non-members also obscures remaining “factual” 
differences within the Self, such as between rich 
and poor or between pro- and anti-nuclear coun-
tries as well as the oft-denied sense of  belonging 
for minorities such as the Roma or adherents of  
Islam and other faiths in society. It does so in stark 
contrast to the EU’s slogan of  “unity in diversity” 
that celebrates differences, but only within the EU. 
Similarly, Poland might have more in common with 
neighboring Ukraine than with far-away Portugal, 
but it is Poland and Portugal that are regarded as 
part of  one Self—the EU—while a boundary is 
drawn between Poland and Ukraine.
The Self  usually views itself  and those associated 
with it positively, trying to reduce the distance 
between them. In contrast, the Self  regards the 
Other(s) in a neutral or negative way in order to 
maintain or increase distance. A vivid example 
for this valuation cum alienation is the “Central 
European” narrations of  the 1980s, in which writ-
ers such as Milan Kundera from Czechoslovakia, 
Czesław Miłosz from Poland, or György Konrád 
from Hungary claimed their countries’ “Central 
European identity” and thus their belonging to 
(Western) Europe in pursuit of  political indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union. They did so mainly 
based on cultural and religious arguments and thus 
distanced themselves from unloved (Soviet) Russia, 
which they described as “Eastern European” and 
thus not “really European.” The values attached 
to this process of  inclusion and exclusion can be 
observed in the formulation: “Central Europe 
takes all the Dichter und Denker [poets and think-
ers], Eastern Europe is left with the Richter und 
Henker [judges and hangmen].”5 Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary and other countries were success-
ful in claiming their perceived “European identity” 
and were offered the possibility of  membership 
in the EU. That prospect set off  their “return to 
Europe,” and after implementing the necessary 
reforms according to the Copenhagen criteria, they 
were finally accepted as members of  the European 
Union in the EU’s 2004 Eastern Enlargement.
When looking at relations between the EU and 
the countries in its vicinity, how should we assess 
the EU’s latest round of  enlargement? It is true 
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that Eastern Enlargement enabled the peaceful 
unification of  new and old member states under 
the umbrella of  the European Union and thereby 
breached the intense dividing line that had sepa-
rated the feuding Western and Eastern political 
blocks for decades. Nonetheless, Eastern Enlarge-
ment did not change the fact that inclusion is not 
possible without exclusion; that European integra-
tion cannot but divide those inside and outside of  
the EU’s borders. Indeed, Eastern Enlargement 
saw the physical transfer of  border installations 
further east, but this merely shifted the old dividing 
line elsewhere.
In this regard, Eastern Enlargement was a typi-
cal enlargement process. But it was different from 
earlier enlargement rounds because the EU saw its 
integration capacity being at stake. Therefore, the 
EU has made it clear that—besides those com-
mitments6 already made on its southeastern flank 
and the relatively easy-to-absorb members of  the 
European Free Trade Association—it is unwill-
ing to consider further enlargement. Since “any 
decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate 
on the ultimate geographic limits of  the Union,”7 
countries that aspire to membership, but have not 
been granted the prospect of  membership fear that 
the current outer borders of  the EU might become 
fixed. To them, being subjected to the EU’s neigh-
borhood policy is to be denied the opportunity to 
enter one day from the “Forecourt of  Paradise” 
into the “Fortress of  Europe.”
What to do as a target country of the EU’s 
Neighborhood Policy?
So what can you do with all of  this theoretical 
knowledge, if  you are a target country of  the EU’s 
neighborhood policy? You can, of  course, play along 
and cooperate with the EU in as many policy fields 
as you judge beneficial. For instance, if  you are a 
post-Soviet country you could use the EU’s policy 
offers in order to bargain with and balance against 
your other big neighbor, Russia. This approach is 
fine as long as you do not want to join the Euro-
pean Union. But what if  you do want to become a 
member? Then there are two major options.
The first option is to maintain hope and try to 
convince the EU to finally accept you as one of  its 
own by granting you membership. This could be 
accomplished by following the example of  how the 
new Central European member states substanti-
ated their “Europeanness.” In essence, this means 
choosing arguments—i. e. signals of  identity that 
you have in common with the EU but that differ-
entiate you from “non-European” countries—and 
using these arguments to denounce other states as 
“non-European.” If  you work hard to implement 
reforms and become a model democracy cum mar-
ket economy, trying to get as close to EU standards 
as you can get without (yet) being granted the pros-
pect of  membership, you could argue that it is the 
Copenhagen criteria that constitute your and the 
EU’s common “Europeanness.”
If  you are not convinced that taking on the acquis 
and the hardships of  reform will translate into 
membership, you might as well stick to geographi-
cal, religious, cultural or historical arguments. If  
you are Belarus or Ukraine for example, you could 
try to alienate Russia as “non-European” while 
claiming a “Central European” identity for yourself  
by drawing on your former membership in the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. If  you are Algeria, Tunisia or 
Morocco you could try to alienate sub-Saharan 
countries by drawing on your Roman heritage—the 
Mediterranean Sea did not separate the Roman 
Empire, it united it—and a “Mediterranean identity” 
that you share with countries like France and Spain, 
whose territories extended or still extend into your 
country. That you would essentially downgrade 
your relations with non-EU neighbors is bother-
some, but these relations would deteriorate anyway 
once you become a new outpost of  the EU. (The 
benefits of  membership might well exceed the 
negative impact on relations with your neighbors, 
as is the case with Poland and Russia. Poles who 
have felt political pressure from Russia can feel 
more secure as a member of  the EU, and thus take 
a more relaxed stance towards their large neighbor.) 
However, you might indeed regret alienating your-
self  from your non-EU neighbors, if  your desire 
for membership is ultimately in vain.
The second option emerges once you give up hope. 
It involves turning away from the European Union 
and developing an identity distinct from that of  the 
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EU. You might seek rapprochement with non-EU 
neighbors, for instance with Russia in the case of  
Ukraine or Moldova. Or you might decide to stand 
on your own feet and develop an identity as a non-
belonging Self  and a center of  gravity in your own 
right. This is a good alternative for Turkey, whose 
prospects for membership are in doubt; it is also a 
good choice for Russia which, though not seeking 
membership, feels repelled by an EU that regards it 
as a constitutive “Other.” All of  these cases entail 
no longer being enthusiastic about “Europe” and 
the EU—and it might put an end to the EU’s pre-
tensions of  spreading an umbrella over the “whole 
of  Europe” and instead give way to the emergence 
of  a “multipolar Europe.”
What to do as the European Union?
And what do you do if  you are the EU? If  inclu-
sion is not possible without exclusion—accompa-
nied by valuation and alienation—does this mean 
that this dilemma is unavoidable? Once again, two 
alternative approaches emerge.
The first would be to do away with “European 
identity” as a precondition for membership in 
the EU. You would then be able to decide about 
accession based purely on measurable and verifi-
able factors such as the Copenhagen criteria, which 
means that a country aspiring to join your club 
would know that it can accede if  it meets certain 
expectations. You could still tighten these condi-
tions if  necessary—for instance if  your integration 
capacity is limited—although this should only be 
done when absolutely necessary and not merely to 
prevent a promising country from fulfilling the cri-
teria. And if  there comes a point when you want to 
end enlargement—because you regard the amount 
of  x or y member states as the perfect size for the 
Union—you could simply say so, even to a model 
democracy cum market economy, rescinding any 
criteria for membership.
In all of  these cases, you would retain your own 
identity (an “EU identity” unrelated to any “Euro-
pean identity”); you would continue to differ-
entiate between insiders and outsiders, between 
enlargement and neighborhood policies; you 
would continue to become an ever closer and 
closed union. But you would do so based on mea-
surable and verifiable criteria or on an explicit lack 
of  interest in enlargement, so that you would not 
have to reject an interested country’s expressed 
(European) identity since it would be irrelevant 
to the membership question. And an interested 
country could either work harder on fulfilling the 
criteria for accession or accept your unwillingness 
to enlarge without forsaking its own (European) 
identity. By doing away with “European identity” 
as a precondition for membership you would 
reduce the risk of  damaging bilateral relations 
as well as affronting and alienating an interested 
country’s people.
The second alternative approach would be to do 
away with yourself, or at least with the monolithic 
block perceived from the outside, even including 
the concept of  “concentric circles” around a con-
stitutive core. Instead, you could promote multiple 
versions of  “you” in the form of  overlapping 
communities detached from EU membership and 
transcending the EU’s borders. The Schengen area 
and NATO are examples of  such communities that 
already transcend the EU’s borders with both EU 
and non-EU member states taking part. Neither the 
EU’s neighborhood policy in its current form nor 
the euro zone or the EU’s “enhanced cooperation” 
mechanism would satisfy this approach since they 
do not transcend the EU’s borders. However, you 
could expand these communities—subject to the 
fulfillment of  measurable and verifiable criteria—in 
a way that transcends the EU’s borders and com-
bines the idea behind internal enhanced cooperation 
with the external neighborhood policy. They could 
also be accompanied by new communities based on 
close cooperation on relevant political issues.
Thus, Georgia, Ukraine and Morocco may or may 
not all become members of  the EU, but perhaps 
Ukraine and Morocco would one day join the 
Schengen area, Georgia together with Egypt and 
Israel might become euro zone members, while 
NATO might also comprise Tunisia, Ukraine and 
Russia along with Australia and Japan, etc. Combin-
ing internal enhanced cooperation with the external 
neighborhood policy could also mean that your 
southern members form a community with your 
southern neighbors united by a common southern 
agenda (a “real” Union for the Mediterranean), 
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while your eastern members may do the same with 
your eastern neighbors (a Union for Central and 
Eastern Europe and/or Unions for the Baltic and 
Black Sea Regions). This approach is not about 
cherry picking, but about breaking up the dual-
ism of  enlargement/inclusion and neighborhood/
exclusion policies. As a result, this approach would 
allow for the formation of  hybrid identities that 
are at the same time inside and outside of  overlap-
ping communities. It would renounce the idea of  
an ever-closer union—but also that of  a closed-off  
union.
There are ways out of  the current dilemma of  
European integration. The Union simply has to 
adopt alternative approaches.
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The European Union’s Neighborhood and Enlargement Policies:  
State of Affairs 2011
by Lucas Lypp
Despite the EU’s successful 2004/2007 expan-
sion and its first steps toward cooperation with its 
neighbors, there is currently much dissatisfaction 
both within and beyond the EU’s borders with EU 
policies regarding its neighboring space. This per-
tains to both the EU’s Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
and its Enlargement Policy. Eastern European EU 
aspirants, as well as Turkey, feel they are getting the 
runaround. Financial resources—compared to the 
ambitions of  the Europeans—seem inadequate, 
and the finality of  the ENP remains unclear. The 
EU wants to be in control of  everything, but it is 
internally divided when it comes to the focus and 
purpose of  its own policies: east or south, inclusion 
or exclusion? Furthermore, the EU still possesses 
few ideally suited tools that could be used to deal 
with violent conflicts in its neighborhood, such as 
in Georgia, North Africa, and the Middle East. In 
order to optimize Brussels’ instruments, it is neces-
sary to look at the circumstances of  their creation 
and above all the intentions and logic that form the 
basis of  the EU’s approach to its neighborhood.
The Center and the Periphery:  
Managing Asymmetry
Despite the Union pointing out that cooperation 
with partner countries is based on shared inten-
tions, both Enlargement Policy and ENP predomi-
nantly follow an agenda molded by the European 
Union. Essentially, EU policies in its neighboring 
space can only be understood as an integral part of  
the EU’s integration project as such. Without the 
Union there would be neither a neighboring space 
nor the possibility of  expansion. The formation 
of  relationships with its neighbors has thus always 
been about the identity of  the European Union. 
Because of  this, there is an asymmetry that under-
lies the EU’s relations with its neighbors, a center-
periphery logic by which the EU—a norm-creating 
actor that has experienced decades of  economic 
prosperity—is accompanied by a periphery that is 
much less developed both politically and economi-
cally. This logic puts Brussels in the position of  
granting assistance and formulating conditions, and 
the prospect to govern even beyond its 27 mem-
bers in which EU legislation is applied.
This unequal arrangement of  relations has resulted 
in the growth of  a latent deficit of  legitimacy 
within the context of  EU engagement, as it begs 
the question: To what extent does EU policy meet 
the demands and expectations of  its neighbors? 
Engagement with partner countries ranges indeed 
from the recognition of  opportunities to influence 
EU policies to the acceptance of  Brussels’ guide-
lines to the point of  disinterest. Some countries 
consider themselves to be at eye-level with the 
Union, for example due to the EU’s dependence 
on them for energy. Managing this asymmetry 
appears to be essential for EU neighborhood coop-
eration. Brussels has emphasized the need to take 
the interests of  its partners into account by apply-
ing the ownership principle. The participation of  
these neighbors should promote their identification 
with neighborhood policies and lead to stronger 
support for the ENP. However, joint ownership for 
a number of  reasons has not come that far yet.
Enlargement Policy: The “Classic” of 
European Integration
The EU confronts its surrounding space with 
multiple regional strategies: on the one side with 
specific instruments of  foreign policy coopera-
tion such as the ENP and on the other side with 
Enlargement Policy. With the exception of  Turkey 
and Croatia, which are both members of  the so-
called “Union for the Mediterranean” as well as 
candidates for EU accession, each EU neighbor 
belongs to only one of  these categories so far. 
Compared to the ENP, the Enlargement Policy is 
the more traditional and comprehensive policy field 
for the EU, aiming at a full adoption of  the EU’s 
laws in the accession country. From the beginning, 
the Union was set up as an open integration proj-
ect. Before signing a membership treaty with the 
EU, a candidate country must go through a multi-
year pre-accession process that provides a number 
of  comprehensive rights and duties. This is how 
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the original six founding states grew to a union of  
27 countries after five rounds of  expansion. A new 
Directorate-General in the European Commission 
was founded in 1999 to administer the “Big Bang 
Enlargement” of  2004/2007. Since this round of  
accession, the EU has described itself  as an eco-
nomic and political architecture in which, although 
not completely, Western and Eastern Europe have 
found a place. A number of  other Eastern Euro-
pean states now aspire to join the EU. The official 
candidates include countries in the Western Balkans 
such as Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as 
well as Turkey and Iceland. But these countries 
encounter a change of  attitude in the EU vis-à-vis 
its Enlargement Policy.
Opportunities and Limits for the EU:  
The Post-Enlargement Era
The past logic of  EU expansion, in other words 
the natural, frequent bestowal of  membership on 
new states, has come to an end. Especially since 
the historic round of  enlargement in 2004, count-
less actors and analysts have urged for a more 
restrained use of  this instrument and have pointed 
to the necessary geographic finality of  the EU. 
Fears of  a loss of  prosperity and security, as well 
as an assumption of  overexpansion, have given 
rise to the idea of  “enlargement fatigue” in politics 
and society. The Union’s institutional performance 
could not keep pace with the expansion process.
Defining the territorial boundaries of  the Union—
in addition to the natural outer borders such as 
the Mediterranean Sea or the border with a large 
actor such as Russia—due to internal motives has 
become the official political agenda of  many mem-
ber states and has been adopted by EU organs, too. 
The EU’s accession criteria contain a restrictive 
aspect that has become more prominent since the 
last round of  enlargement: According to this out-
look, the Union determines the readiness of  can-
didates for accession according to its own internal 
conditions. The Union must be able to guarantee 
a sustainable financial framework, affordable com-
munity policies, and efficient institutions. Further-
more, if  only one member refuses, an aspiring 
state’s application for membership is declined. The 
European Union is thus becoming more and more 
of  a closed shop. In the new post-enlargement era, 
there will only be cautious expansion for a few new 
members. In contrast, the pressure is building on 
the EU to hone its foreign policy profile in relation 
to its neighboring space.
New Frontiers: Between Integration and 
Foreign Policy
Through the ENP, the EU seeks to offer its neigh-
bors cooperation without taking further steps 
toward enlargement, working together with its 
neighbors on questions that interest both sides. 
The Neighborhood Policy became a self-contained 
policy over the course of  the last round of  enlarge-
ment and has since become one of  the strategic 
priorities for the EU. In theory, the ENP can be 
described as an instrument of  indecision settled 
somewhere between Enlargement Policy and for-
eign policy. There is much to be said for the fact 
that the ENP has established itself  as an approach 
sui generis, as a new form of  integration or associa-
tion, settled between full membership on the one 
hand and the non-membership of  other third-party 
countries on the other, and that should not be 
labeled prematurely.
The conceptual and structural proximity to Enlarge-
ment Policy is indeed obvious. Both policies pos-
sess much common ground. They refer to the same 
geographic area in the Union’s periphery. Both 
policies pursue the goal of  stabilizing Europe and 
coming up with strategies to bring partner coun-
tries closer with the Union. To the greatest possible 
extent, they have identical contents and they apply 
the same or similar methods and instruments. If  
nothing else, the ENP essentially builds upon the 
experience of  transformation of  the EU’s Eastern 
European member states. The ENP was designed 
by the architects of  Enlargement Policy and today 
the two are joined in the same Commission portfo-
lio. The ENP could, as a result of  this overlapping, 
become an unintentional instrument of  pre-acces-
sion that leads to the eventual accession of  ENP 
states. But one of  the ENP’s fundamental differ-
ences with Enlargement Policy is that it explicitly 
does not offer partner countries the prospect of  
membership—although it also does not rule out 
the possibility in the future. The concept of  the 
ENP purposely leaves the question of  finality open. 
Rather, it places cooperation in the foreground.
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However, using an instrument with a still unclear 
profile—with similar methods as Enlargement 
Policy, but with an unknown institutional goal—
threatens to interfere with the EU’s capacity to act 
in its neighboring space. Until now, this has relied 
considerably on the logic of  incentives in relation 
to its neighbors—with accession as the crowning 
achievement in a partner’s efforts to modernize. 
The highest offer of  membership is not available as 
an incentive with the ENP, but uncertainty persists 
among the other alternatives. Still, on the part of  
the EU, expectations are awoken and clear require-
ments are provided. It is therefore specific to the 
EU integration process that all actors, both within 
and outside of  the EU, have somewhat become 
accustomed to the use of  the instrument of  
enlargement as would-be EU foreign policy. There-
fore, losing or using this instrument less looks like 
a loss, and often relegates the ENP to a second-
best option in the EU’s toolbox.
The conceptual crudity and openness of  the ENP 
with respect to its finality also leads EU member 
states to bring their respective national interests 
into the policy. This is another factor that impedes 
the effectiveness of  the ENP and the EU’s capacity 
to act in its neighboring space. While most older 
member states and the Commission consider the 
ENP as an alternative to enlargement, a few mem-
ber states on the periphery pursue their own expan-
sion plans as part of  a “hidden agenda” within 
the Neighborhood Policy insofar as they use the 
ENP as an instrument of  pre-accession for “their” 
neighbors.
The ENP Policy Family: A Difficult 
Relationship with an Abundance of Topics
In addition to the intention to create an alternative 
offer of  membership and to give the Union time to 
consolidate, the EU’s Neighborhood Policy aims to 
provide a stable security situation in its surround-
ing space. To this end, Brussels works with its 
neighbors in the areas of  economic and state mod-
ernization, trade, and energy in addition to grant-
ing its neighbors technical and financial assistance. 
Economic cooperation encompasses the macroeco-
nomic stabilization of  neighbor states, stimulation 
through investment and growth, regulatory harmo-
nization, as well as gradual trade liberalization. This 
should lead to free-trade zones for certain sectors 
and eventually to widespread economic integration 
that extends to all four freedoms of  the EU’s single 
market.
In order to safeguard the Union’s energy security—
above all its supply of  fossil fuels—provisions in 
the resource and energy sectors continue to play 
a vital role. Many neighbor states act as important 
energy suppliers for the EU either as energy pro-
ducers or as transit countries. The ENP thus works 
to promote the development of  infrastructure, 
and the topic of  energy is dealt with comprehen-
sively in its economic, legal, and security dimen-
sions. Conversely, the EU offers assistance for the 
improvement of  often-unstable power supplies in 
neighbor states. Political consensus between the 
EU and its neighbor states is strongest in the eco-
nomic and energy sectors as well as with regards 
to infrastructure projects, and cooperation in these 
areas has seen the most progress since the ENP’s 
launch.
Another central aspect of  the ENP is the EU’s 
efforts to support state transformation processes. 
The EU has taken up the cause of  promoting 
value-based reform policies among its neighbors. 
Emphasis has been put on strengthening the rule 
of  law, democracy, and responsible governance, the 
modernization of  public administrations, border 
protection and migration management, as well as 
on fighting corruption, organized crime, and ter-
rorism. This reform agenda provides much room 
for divergence within the partnership.
A security dimension is inherent to all aspects 
of  the Neighborhood Policy. The ENP can be 
understood beyond the domain of  classical secu-
rity policy as a broad and long-term contribution 
toward conflict prevention and resolution. It deals 
with the cause of  conflicts or the factors that could 
lead to the avoidance of  conflict, but the policy has 
actually had little effect on conflict resolution in 
its short existence. The ENP to some extent “bor-
rows” dimensions of  classical foreign and security 
policy from what used to be called the second pillar 
of  the EU’s set up, its common foreign and secu-
rity policy. The security context in neighbor states 
effectively compels the specific, splintered EU 
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structures to cooperate closely on complex prob-
lems that arise from outside. The EU’s approach to 
a joint foreign and security policy admittedly lacks 
the significance and opportunities of  the EU’s 
supranational policies (formerly know as “first pil-
lar”) or of  other security policy actors such as Rus-
sia or the United States.
What is often seen as a thematic overkill in the 
ENP as well as the dominance of  topics suggested 
by the EU has sparked frequent criticism, though 
cooperation with each respective country works 
along a country-specific decision and areas in 
which collaboration happens must necessarily cor-
respond with the European Union’s competencies. 
Important competencies are missing within the 
Neighborhood Policy or are not distinctive at EU 
level, including the area of  classical security policy. 
Therefore, the Union to a large extent attempts to 
realize its main goal of  stabilization of  the regions 
in its neighborhood mostly with civil and “techno-
cratic” instruments.
The Lisbon Treaty contains the first primary law 
provision that describes the neighborhood policy 
field (Art. 8 TEU), underpinning the relevance 
of  the topic. However, the new provision neither 
establishes an ENP department nor does it allocate 
the Neighborhood Policy to a specific EU organ; 
even a detailed to-do list is nowhere to be found. 
Rather, Article 8 TEU formulates general foreign 
policy instructions and allows a wide clearance for 
political and institutional arrangements. The EU 
made its neighboring space a central aspect in its 
foreign policy in the 2003 European Security Strat-
egy and during the last round of  enlargement. The 
Commission’s concept of  “Wider Europe” (March 
2003) as well as the strategy paper that emerged 
from it (May 2004) can be described as the found-
ing documents of  the ENP.
The concept of  Neighborhood Policy serves as a 
framework for a number of  pre-existing measures 
and instruments that the EU uses in its neighbor-
hood such as economic, foreign trade, and devel-
opment aspects, association agreements, as well as 
internal and external security issues. Additionally, 
the ENP possesses instrumental improvements 
such as the so-called “Action Plans” and the Euro-
pean Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) for financing. The ENP is thus a reflection 
of  the structural complexity of  the EU’s foreign 
engagement. The EU Commission has taken 
responsibility for the ENP from the beginning, and 
the Commission has thereby gained competencies. 
Of  course, in light of  the abundance of  topics, the 
Council and the member states also play an impor-
tant role. The interaction of  the EU’s institutions is 
therefore a deciding factor for the functioning of  
the ENP—and a frequent cause of  friction.
Finally, there are a number of  substantial and partly 
irreconcilable contradictions within the ENP: Are 
the values advocated by the EU prerequisites for 
cooperation or should cooperation aim at help-
ing those values to make breakthroughs over the 
course of  working together? How can the logic of  
free trade and the protectionist agricultural policy 
function side by side? How can the conflicting 
goals of  having the maximum possible security 
while maintaining openness in the Union for a 
certain degree of  migration be eased? ENP has to 
deal with a whole number of  questions that need 
constant balancing.
Integrated Platform, Different Subgroups
A geographic logic lies at the heart of  the EU’s 
neighborhood concept in that all countries sur-
round the EU. But there is a basic tension between 
the claim of  delivering a framework for the entire 
European periphery and the fact that the neighbor-
hood is by no means a homogenous space, but can 
be broken down into specific sub-regions. Similari-
ties and comparable questions for target countries 
from Ukraine to Morocco speak to a uniform 
approach under the umbrella of  the ENP. Differ-
ences however make the case for regional differen-
tiations. Therefore, within ENP two regional vari-
ants have been established, the Eastern Partnership 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP/
Union for the Mediterranean). Because of  the 
different geographies and the multitude of  com-
mon topics in the southern and eastern dimension, 
respectively, it is indeed appropriate to establish 
specific policies.
The South-East differentiation is due not only to 
the regional diversity in this space, but is a reflec-
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tion of  tensions within the EU: Since the EU’s 
eastern enlargement, member states have been 
competing for relevance and attention with regards 
to “their” neighbors, and states such as France or 
Poland have become counselors of  the periphery 
“in their backyard.” The rule of  thumb seems to be 
that the Union always follows a southern initiative 
with an eastern initiative. That is what happened 
in 2008 with the founding of  the Mediterranean 
Union under France’s EU presidency, which was 
followed a few months later by the Eastern Part-
nership when the presidency shifted to the Czech 
Republic. The comprehensive approach of  the 
ENP offers protection against the EU’s internal 
particular interests, as member states have to use 
this approach to deal with all of  their neighbors 
instead of  just certain regions.
Just as important for the functioning of  European 
Neighborhood Policy as a balance between the 
EU’s comprehensive approach and its regional 
components is the balance between a bilateral and 
a multilateral dimension, between the principle 
of  differences among individual states and cross-
border multilateralism. The ENP endorses both 
logics: With its tailor-made bilateral approach, the 
EU seeks to accommodate its neighbors’ con-
cerns and differing paces of  modernization. The 
demands and degrees of  cooperation are different 
with every neighbor. This manifests itself  in the 
bilateral country-specific agreements and action 
plans that are the most important instruments of  
cooperation. This differentiated approach allows 
for more rapid progress for countries that are ready 
for and capable of  reform. This also brings a com-
petitive component to the ENP. At the same time, 
the ENP follows the principle of  multilateralism. 
The EU seeks to integrate groups of  countries and 
initiate cross-border cooperation wherever possible. 
The EU sees such intra-state networking as a value 
in itself  due to its own experiences of  integration. 
Despite the heterogeneity of  partners, many coun-
tries experience similar problems and questions. 
The EU thus creates thematic space for certain pol-
icy fields or cross-sector aspects. Thematic cooper-
ation can take place within a regional framework, in 
other words within geographically connected areas 
such as the Southern Caucasus. The basic principle 
of  multilateralism is best expressed through the 
ENP’s finance instrument, which favors multi-state 
measures.
The fact that the ENP endorses both logics—
country-specific as well as multilateral—is seen as a 
strength of  the neighborhood concept in principle. 
But both approaches also face criticism. Critics say 
that the EU differentiates too little and does not 
cater enough to the specific concerns of  partner 
countries. On the other hand, there is the threat of  
strong fragmentation and the break-up of  a joint 
policy approach into mere bilateral agreements. It 
remains to be seen to what extent differentiation 
and multilateralism can complement each other or 
if  long-term contradictions will appear.
Too Strong Conditions and Not Enough 
Incentives?
At its core, the ENP follows a sort of  “develop-
ment policy” approach with the EU’s neighbors, 
who receive financial and technical support from 
the EU to pursue transformation processes and 
legal harmonization. This offer, which can lead to 
extensive economic integration into the European 
Union’s single market, emphasizes that the ENP is 
a much stronger form of  cooperation for neighbor 
states than would be possible with other third-party 
states.
The ENP is financed through the ENPI. Around 
12 billion euro are available for the time period 
from 2007–2013. That means an increase of  about 
one-third compared to the period from 2000–2006. 
Admittedly, the money is for no fewer than 16 
countries over a period of  seven years. But the 
EU mobilizes more funds for the ENP through 
loans from the European Investment Bank and 
the European Development Fund. Moreover, the 
cross-border components of  the ENPI are partially 
funded by the European Fund for Regional Devel-
opment. Likewise, a 700 million euro comprehen-
sive neighborhood investment fund has been set up 
to bolster the ENPI’s reserves—along the lines of  
the existing Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facil-
ity—into which additional money is invested by 
member states. Private donors complete the spec-
trum and should strengthen the leverage of  the 
original funding. But divergences between member 
states emerge, when it comes to the question of  
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financing, since they tend to emphasize different 
regional points of  focus.
One innovation of  the neighborhood approach 
is that assistance is guided according to political 
agreements in the Action Plans. The transmission 
of  these broad political goals and the distribution 
of  ENPI-designated funds to concrete measures 
are served by seven-year Country Strategy Papers 
(2007–2013). Three to four year National Indicative 
Programs function as detailed guidelines used to 
identify and plan projects. In order to emphasize 
the principle of  multilateralism, further geographic 
and thematic instruments are envisioned for the 
Eastern and Southern dimensions as well as for 
intra-state cooperation within the framework of  
the ENPI. However, this assistance is not decou-
pled from the EU’s interests and therefore does 
not come without conditions. It should function as 
an incentive for neighbor states to pursue sustain-
able modernization and to leverage transformation 
according to the principles of  the EU. Therefore, 
partners are obligated to implement reforms in 
return for the aid they receive. Neighbors have an 
interest in sustainable reforms and harmonization 
with the Union, as in the long term they benefit 
from more competitive economic and political sys-
tems, as well as access to the world’s largest single 
market. The EU describes the combination of  aid, 
incentives, and conditions as “positive condition-
ality.” Countries that do not fulfill these duties can 
expect to face sanctions, most notably the with-
drawal of  financial assistance.
The EU’s incentive-conditionality policy is one of  
the main points for criticism of  the ENP. Crit-
ics take Enlargement Policy—that for many years 
the EU has conducted in a generous and positive 
spirit—as a standard when they deal with the new 
neighborhood approach. Compared to Enlarge-
ment Policy, the ENP looked unbalanced for 
many countries interested in cooperation and even 
membership, which was shown in its inadequate 
incentives: The denial of  the prospect of  EU 
membership, critics say, deprived Eastern European 
EU neighbors of  an adequate—effectively seen 
as “natural” and “earned”—European perspective. 
Furthermore, the EU did not come up with pro-
posals below the level of  membership that could 
compensate for the lack of  accession opportunities. 
There were not enough, or in some cases no incen-
tives which results in a lack of  motivation among 
neighbors to reform their countries, or at least 
not in accordance with EU expectations. In many 
countries, modernization only took place with 
external support and with a view toward EU inte-
gration. The principle of  conditionality therefore 
became hard to apply without substantial trade-offs. 
This further reduced the effect of  the ENP, which 
was often accompanied by ill-considered and rather 
diffuse offers and prospects in contrast to the EU’s 
clear stipulations. Indeed, this criticism needs to be 
considered as the effectiveness of  the ENP is cur-
rently quite diminished.
Mitigating the incentive-conditionality problem is 
one of  the ENP’s central projects, and the con-
tent of  the new generation of  association agree-
ments will be decisive in this regard. Reforms in 
neighbor states can be stimulated most notably 
through emphasizing jointly accepted principles. 
Neighbors should be seen as partners with greater 
freedom than in the past in choosing in which 
areas they want to cooperate, and judging the 
progress of  implementation should correspond 
with the respective capabilities of  the neighbors. 
Some countries such as Georgia and Morocco 
have already seized on the EU’s policy offers and 
have thus elevated the effect of  the Neighborhood 
Policy. But the ENP, after less than a decade of  its 
existence and currently facing fundamental changes 
in the Union’s southern neighborhood, is certainly 
an approach that will have a greater effect the more 
cooperative partners act. With unwilling neighbors 
ENP will not flourish. The EU must still find a 
solution to this fundamental problem of  the ENP.
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When it comes to the EU’s ambitions with regard 
to enlargement, the general tone has become less 
and less enthusiastic over the past years. While the 
most profound ambition to extend the EU’s model 
of  integration to the wider continent should be as 
simple as “a Europe whole and free”, today’s think-
ing both in EU capitals as well as on the streets 
of  its member states is more about containing the 
problems that one cannot keep outside. It may be 
telling that the more grandiose lines come from 
non-Europeans, like the previous quote stemming 
from a speech by U.S. president George Bush 
senior in Germany in May 1989. And indeed, with 
the Iron Curtain having been eventually overcome 
thanks to the “big bang” enlargement of  the past 
decade, there are less compelling—or lofty, for 
that matter—reasons to continue the expansion of  
membership to the whole continent.
For all the changes, however, the fundamental 
principles remain the same: the EU rests on the 
fact that it is an “open Union.” According to the 
founding Treaties, “every European state may apply 
to become a member of  the Community” (then 
Article 237). Nowadays, this general openness has 
been complemented by the need for the applicant 
country to respect the EU’s values (Article 49 of  
the Treaty on European Union, TEU).
The effect of  this openness has been immense: less 
than 30 years after the foundation of  the European 
Communities in 1957, membership had doubled 
from the original six to twelve, with Spain and 
Portugal the most recent entrants in 1986. Strictly 
speaking, the doubling of  membership occurred 
in only 13 years, as it took until 1973 to settle—at 
least in theory—the debate between “widening or 
deepening” and to overcome French resistance to 
British membership. In a little less than 20 years 
since 1986, the EU once again increased the num-
ber of  its member states twofold, mostly thanks 
to the Eastern Enlargement in 2004. Now it is a 
Union of  27 with at least nine countries waiting 
to join, i. e. all seven remaining countries from the 
Western Balkans (including Croatia, the hopeful 
new member by 2013) plus Turkey (a long-standing 
applicant and now candidate country) and, most 
recently, Iceland.
Given this impressive track record of  expanding 
to ever new countries and regions, it is no surprise 
that enlargement is often dubbed “the EU’s most 
effective foreign policy.” While it seems legitimate 
to consider enlargement a foreign policy in the 
sense of  projecting one’s power to make others 
play by one’s rules, it is interesting to note that up 
until the 1990s, enlargement was never an actual 
policy, let alone a strategy. Instead, it occurred 
because third countries were attracted by the EU’s 
model of  development and integration. Any rules 
governing the accession process were designed 
along the way, rather than following a predefined 
pattern or model. It is not until the definition of  
the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 as a reaction to 
the fall of  the Wall and the ensuing prospect of  
membership applications from a large number 
of  Central and Eastern European countries that 
enlargement eventually became a policy. Remark-
ably, the post of  Enlargement Commissioner was 
only created under the first Prodi Commission, 
with Günter Verheugen being the first to occupy it 
from 1999 to 2004.
Two things stand out about this now firmly estab-
lished policy field: its transformative character and 
the oscillation between its technical and political 
dimension. First of  all, enlargement is about trans-
formation; it is about making accession candidates 
“European” in the sense described in Marcel Viëtor’s 
chapter.8 This is where the principle of  condition-
ality kicks in, by virtue of  which certain benefits are 
granted in return for an alignment with EU rules 
and practices. The exercise of  conditionality marks 
the core of  the inherent asymmetry of  enlargement 
with the bigger, more powerful side determining 
the conditions of  entry for the other—usually 
Chapter I: Revisiting Enlargement
European Ambitions
by Cornelius Adebahr and Natasha Wunsch
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weaker—side. Enlargement thus changes virtually 
the whole political and economic system as well as 
the societal structures of  a given country, in a pro-
cess referred to as “Europeanization.” This expres-
sion also applies to existing members and the way 
they react and adapt throughout the process of  
continuous integration. Hence, transformation is 
not completed upon accession, but instead repre-
sents an ongoing process that continues to touch 
the Union and its member states themselves—at 
the latest once new members are taken in.
The other aspect is the political nature of  the 
enlargement process. When the EU’s interest in 
a stable neighborhood becomes greater than the 
respective countries’ appetite to pursue the necessary 
reforms for membership, over-arching foreign policy 
considerations may take precedence over what is 
considered to be a purely technical process. This has 
been the case for Bulgaria and Romania, where the 
thought of  completing the Eastern Enlargement of  
2004 as well as the EU’s commitment to an even-
tual accession either in 2007 or in 2008 overruled 
a strict assessment of  whether the two countries 
had fulfilled the criteria. Likewise, when the EU 
pursues not only enlargement negotiations, but is at 
the same time engaged in actual state-building—as 
is the case for some of  the Western Balkans coun-
tries—Enlargement Policy itself  becomes politicized 
(as Natasha  Wunsch demonstrates in her chapter on 
this region). A similar development can be seen 
in Turkey, where the enlargement negotiations are 
dominated by political considerations.
Finally, the current crisis of  enlargement adds 
another possible layer of  politicization to this 
policy area. With the full and equal integration of  
Romania and Bulgaria still pending, and a gaping 
hole of  promising candidates once Croatia will 
have become a member, successful enlargement 
could become a goal in itself. The EU might feel 
pressured to take on new members if  only to dem-
onstrate that it is still capable of  transforming out-
side countries and subsequently integrating them 
into its structures. Clearly, however, enlargement 
for the sake of  enlargement would be dangerous 
and not in line with the above-mentioned principle 
of  an “open Union.” Nonetheless, the “enlarge-
ment fatigue” in existing member states—and the 
resulting diminishing prospect for actual integra-
tion—threatens to damage the EU’s ability to trans-
form countries in its neighborhood, thereby weak-
ening its overall attraction and political clout. The 
contributions to this chapter therefore address the 
three pending enlargement dossiers in turn, seek-
ing to point out ways of  revitalising the accession 
process while preserving the overall credibility of  
the EU as a foreign policy actor and a model for 
regional integration.
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For a long time, enlargement was considered the 
EU’s most effective foreign policy tool. By offer-
ing the “golden carrot” of  membership, the EU 
succeeded in fostering a substantial transformation 
of  accession candidates’ policies, institutions, and 
political practices. As a consequence, EU stan-
dards and values were spread across the continent, 
contributing to the stability and prosperity of  the 
European integration project. As discrepancies 
between established member states and candidate 
countries increased, conditionality became an effec-
tive mechanism in ensuring that candidate states 
were sufficiently well prepared for EU accession. 
Despite initial concerns, the “big bang” enlarge-
ment round of  2004 thus resulted in the surpris-
ingly smooth integration of  ten new EU members. 
Although a number of  concerns remain with 
regards to the rule of  law in Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, the post-accession verification mechanism 
devised for these two countries has allowed the 
EU to maintain some leverage over the coherent 
implementation of  the EU acquis in these newest 
member states.
The success of  Enlargement Policy is less obvious, 
however, in the case of  the Western Balkans, where 
the slow progress made by Albania and the succes-
sor states of  the former Yugoslavia appears to chal-
lenge the image of  Enlargement Policy as an effec-
tive motor of  change. Not only has the mantra of  
“enlargement fatigue” come to dominate the dis-
course of  a growing number of  EU member states, 
but it finds itself  mirrored by “reform fatigue” on 
the side of  the accession candidates. Overall, the 
prospect of  EU membership no longer appears 
sufficiently attractive, or perhaps sufficiently tan-
gible, to trigger deep reforms in several of  the 
current aspirants. The success of  the membership 
perspective as the ultimate incentive for transfor-
mation has therefore been called into question. Is 
EU Enlargement Policy reaching its limits?
The EU’s dual approach
From the start, the Western Balkans was a particu-
larly hard nut for the EU’s transformative power 
to crack. Not only do the countries of  the region 
need to undergo the triple transition of  democrati-
zation, marketization, and state consolidation that 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) 
were faced with following the changes of  1989. In 
addition, their biggest challenge lies in handling the 
legacy of  the wars of  the 1990s. Until today, the 
violent disintegration of  Yugoslavia represents a 
heavy burden upon relations between the successor 
states and has required sustained state- and nation-
building efforts throughout the region.
Aware of  this double challenge of  post-war con-
solidation and Europeanization, the EU has chosen 
to operate a dual approach which is embodied in 
the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). 
Through the SAP, the EU tries to stabilize the 
countries of  the region, while in parallel progres-
sively associating them with EU policies and sup-
porting them in taking over the EU acquis. This 
two-pronged approach draws not only on the ordi-
nary toolkit of  Enlargement Policy, but moreover 
makes use of  a series of  instruments pertaining to 
a more traditional foreign policy as embodied in 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and its operational arm, the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP).
On the association side, the SAP foresees the 
negotiation of  a bilateral Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreement (SAA) between each Western 
Balkan state and the EU. This agreement lays down 
the key reform priorities and represents a first 
step towards eventual membership negotiations. 
Through regular evaluations as well as financial aid 
and technical advice, the EU supports candidates’ 
reform efforts and remains engaged in the general 
accession process. In terms of  stabilization, the 
EU is present as a foreign policy and security actor 
through the ongoing presence of  CSDP missions 
(EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
EULEX in Kosovo) and EU Special Representa-
tives (BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia) in countries where 
the situation is still comparatively fragile. Moreover, 
the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) since 
March 2011 has been involved in moderating talks 
between Serbia and Kosovo, despite the EU’s fre-
Reaching its Limits? EU Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans
by Natasha Wunsch
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quent emphasis that the recognition of  Kosovo’s 
unilateral secession is not a precondition for Ser-
bian EU membership.
As in the CEE countries, conditionality is supposed 
to guide the EU’s overall approach. In a merito-
cratic spirit, each country is meant to be evaluated 
accorded to its actual progress and then gradually 
upgraded to the next step in the accession process 
as it fulfils the necessary conditions. Yet, the parallel 
pursuit of  stabilization and association has at times 
unavoidably resulted in a certain tension between 
the two objectives, which in turn has rendered a 
consistent application of  conditionality impracti-
cal. Concretely, both in the cases of  Macedonia and 
Serbia, it can be argued that an SAA was signed not 
because the two countries had met the pre-estab-
lished criteria, but in order to defuse a politically 
sensitive situation. In the Macedonian case, the out-
break of  violent confrontations between the Mace-
donian Albanian branch of  the National Liberation 
Army, UçK, and the Macedonian security forces 
triggered the signature of  the SAA in April 2001. 
Inter-ethnic violence and the fear of  yet another 
prolonged war in the Western Balkans, rather than 
compliance with the minimum standards laid down 
as preconditions for such an agreement, therefore 
guided the EU decision at the time. In Serbia, it 
was the coming parliamentary elections of  May 
2008 that resulted in the early signing of  the SAA 
less than two weeks before voting day. With the 
Serbian government having credibly warned of  the 
risk of  the nationalist Serbian Radical Party domi-
nating the legislative body, the EU chose the lesser 
evil and backtracked on its earlier insistence upon 
full Serbian cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Given the fragile political climate in many of  the 
countries of  the region, consistent implementation 
of  the existing conditionality is thus at times not 
feasible politically. Instead, Enlargement Policy and 
foreign policy overlap in the Western Balkans, with 
the former somewhat unsuccessfully seeking to 
compensate the shortcomings of  the latter. Con-
cretely, back in 2000, it was thought that the EU 
perspective would function as the ultimate incen-
tive for a return to sustainable peace and good-
neighborly relations. In the meantime however, the 
amalgamation of  Enlargement Policy and foreign 
policy is increasingly fostering frustration in the 
region. Indeed, the repeated softening of  initially 
fixed conditions for reasons of  stability has under-
mined the credibility of  the EU’s overall approach. 
At the same time, it has led to a certain politiciza-
tion of  the accession process in the Western Bal-
kans, in contrast to the traditionally very technical 
negotiations aimed essentially at the adoption and 
implementation of  the EU’s acquis by aspiring 
member states.
This politicization is both resented and instrumen-
talized by the governments of  the region. While 
politicians do not hesitate to denounce any unfair 
advantages awarded to neighboring countries—the 
signing of  the Serbian SAA for instance caused a 
huge uproar among Bosnian politicians and media—
they are equally quick to use political difficulties to 
demand a speeding up of  their own accession pro-
cess. The specter of  a domino effect of  instability 
spilling over from one country to the entire region 
is particularly widespread and regularly mentioned 
by representatives of  BiH, Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia in declarations towards the EU.
The consistent application of  conditionality is 
further complicated by the multitude of  actors 
involved in the Western Balkans’ accession process. 
While the European Commission often advocates a 
rather progressive stance and has for instance been 
supporting Serbian candidate status since its 2008–
2009 Enlargement Strategy,9 any decision relative 
to the advancement of  a candidate country on the 
enlargement path has to be approved by each of  
the member states gathered in the Council of  Min-
isters. A single member state can thus use its veto 
power to block the advancement of  one or more 
of  the Western Balkan countries. The example of  
Greece opposing Macedonian progress towards EU 
integration because of  the dispute about the coun-
try’s official name is certainly the most well-known 
illustration of  this dynamic. Another prominent 
example of  the varying interpretations of  condi-
tionality lies in the Netherlands’ particularly strong 
insistence upon Serbia’s full cooperation with the 
ICTY prior to the implementation of  the SAA, and 
not only as a condition for the opening of  acces-
sion talks.
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In sum, the combination of  the EU’s dual 
approach in the Western Balkans and the ensuing 
inconsistency in the EU’s application of  condition-
ality has produced a situation in which frustration is 
mounting both inside the EU and among Western 
Balkan states. In many cases, the integration pro-
cess has been transformed from a technical exercise 
in regulatory alignment into a full-fledged state-
building endeavor in which the EU seeks to shape 
the political and institutional set-up of  the Yugoslav 
successor states. Given this monumental objective, 
it is not surprising that the enlargement process has 
been slow to advance. Nonetheless, this sluggish 
advancement increasingly threatens the successful 
reputation of  the EU’s Enlargement Policy.
Mutual deception
When the EU first offered a tentative accession 
perspective to the countries in the Western Bal-
kans in 2000, the reactions on the ground were 
enthusiastic and the expectation was of  a rapid 
democratization process that would soon allow the 
integration of  all the countries of  the region into 
the EU. However, as the reform process dragged 
along and the prospect of  membership became less 
palpable over the years, the initial enthusiasm has 
been replaced by a feeling of  frustration and disil-
lusionment. Hence, while an already low propor-
tion of  34.9 percent of  Croatians surveyed in 2006 
considered EU accession to be an unambiguously 
good thing, this number decreased to 24.8 percent 
by 2010. The Serbian figures show an even stron-
ger relative decrease in approval for EU member-
ship: from 60.8 percent in 2006 to 44.1 percent in 
2010.10 However, rather than blaming their govern-
ments for a lack of  progress on the path towards 
the EU, the populations often think that it is the 
EU who is rejecting their countries and constantly 
inventing new conditions to prevent them from 
joining the club. Politicians across the region, mir-
roring their counterparts in the member states, 
have been quick to recognize that it is in their inter-
est to embrace such a discourse and thereby to 
deflect the guilt from themselves on to Brussels.
On the EU side, enlargement is currently a second-
ary concern, with economic stabilization and the 
internal consolidation of  the Union post-Lisbon 
topping the political agenda. Although several of  
the current member states bordering the Western 
Balkans, such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Greece, 
support further enlargement at least at a declara-
tory level, the United Kingdom is the only large 
enlargement-friendly member state, and it has not 
been able to mobilize a larger coalition in favor of  
pursuing the process. Moreover, Western Balkan 
accession lacks a historic narrative that is widely 
accepted to mobilize more active support by the 
member states. In the case of  the CEE enlarge-
ment round, the ideal of  a “reunification of  
Europe” cementing the fall of  the Iron Curtain 
largely compensated for the relative poverty of  the 
acceding countries and the resulting likelihood of  
high solidarity payments towards these new mem-
bers. In contrast, the fragility of  the Western Bal-
kans and persistent problems between the states of  
the region have created fears of  a “balkanization 
of  Europe.” The symbolic value that lies in not 
only maintaining a peace that has lasted for several 
decades—at least within the EU—but in actually 
pacifying a highly sensitive region through its inte-
gration into the EU has so far failed to become 
widely accepted.
Overall, this mutual deception with the enlarge-
ment process has led to a situation of, if  not 
stalemate, at least of  worryingly slow progress in 
terms of  tackling the major challenges still fac-
ing the Western Balkans. While this is true of  
the most advanced countries in the region, it is 
all the more so for those cases where even the 
most basic foundations of  statehood have yet to 
be achieved. Sixteen and twelve years respectively 
following external intervention to put an end to 
the violent opposition of  ethnic groups on the 
ground, BiH and Kosovo still function essentially 
as international protectorates, with no serious 
internal dynamics visible to overcome this situation. 
Although it is frequently proclaimed that the only 
exit strategy for the international actors must be an 
entry strategy into the EU,11 the accession perspec-
tive has not been sufficiently attractive for politi-
cal actors on the ground to agree to a concerted 
reform effort and to move their countries from 
international tutelage towards responsible self-
administration. Instead, internal disputes dominate 
the political scene, with the prospect of  member-
ship too remote to break this dynamic.
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From the EU’s perspective, the current situation 
is frequently summarized as “we pretend we want 
you, and you pretend you’re trying.” Indeed, as the 
political momentum for enlargement is waning12 
and reform efforts in the region are sluggish, there 
is a need to reflect seriously upon new approaches 
that can revitalize the accession process and rein-
vigorate Enlargement Policy as a successful instru-
ment of  political and economic transformation. Yet 
which concrete steps can be envisaged to insert a 
new dynamic into the enlargement process towards 
the Western Balkans?
A new dynamic for the enlargement process
Accession is not merely a favor granted to candi-
date countries by the EU and its member states. 
Rather, it is the most sophisticated demonstration 
of  the Union’s transformative power in its neigh-
borhood. The accession process requires that a 
candidate country accept radical changes to its 
political set-up, its economic orientation, and not 
least a significant makeover of  a whole range of  
policy areas through the alignment of  its legislation 
with the EU’s acquis. It is therefore in the EU’s own 
interest to successfully complete enlargement nego-
tiations with each of  the Western Balkan countries 
and thereby to further contribute to the stabiliza-
tion and Europeanization of  its near neighborhood. 
Some adaptations of  the current enlargement strat-
egy may contribute to speeding up this process and 
revitalizing the reform efforts made in the region. 
Concretely, the EU needs to undertake three steps 
in order to reinvigorate the enlargement process:
1. Grant candidate status to all countries of the region 
and use the screening report as a transparent to-do-
list.
Since the 2003 Thessaloniki summit, all Western 
Balkan states have an irrevocable accession per-
spective and are considered potential candidate 
states, with candidate status to be awarded once a 
certain number of  conditions have been met. How-
ever, experience has shown that withholding this 
status has not been understood as a further incen-
tive to speed up reforms, but instead as an implicit 
rejection or at least a hesitation on the EU’s side 
when it comes to the sincerity of  the accession 
promise. As long as the accession prospect remains 
“potential,” political leaders see no need to imple-
ment reforms that are painful and that may harm 
their own prospects for re-election.
By granting candidate status to each of  country in 
the Western Balkans, the EU would achieve much 
by doing little. Although candidate status opens 
up new areas for EU funding, it does not imply an 
increase of  overall funding made available to the 
candidate. But the symbolic value of  such a step 
would be huge, as it reaffirms the EU’s commit-
ment to accession and thus reinforces the cred-
ibility and leverage of  the EU in the region. Indeed, 
once candidate status has been awarded, the ball is 
in the candidates’ court, and it is up to the coun-
tries of  the region to demonstrate their readiness 
for the opening of  accession negotiations.
Through the screening report drawn up for each 
candidate state, the European Commission would 
moreover provide a transparent to-do-list for both 
the governments and the public in aspiring mem-
ber states. The screening report therefore repre-
sents a crucial tool for increasing the accountability 
of  governments. By spelling out exactly where the 
deficits of  political and economic reforms lie, civil 
society organizations and the broader population 
can exert targeted pressure upon policy-makers to 
comply by fulfilling the outstanding requirements 
identified in the screening report. In the case of  
Montenegro, the impact of  such a clear to-do-list 
has been notable. The new Prime Minister and his 
administration have elaborated a series of  action 
plans to address the seven key priorities identified 
by the European Commission, and civil society 
is playing a crucial role in monitoring the imple-
mentation of  the envisaged measures. By offering 
a significant improvement in the transparency of  
the accession process, the granting of  candidate 
status could demonstrate the credibility of  the 
EU’s own commitment to the eventual accession 
of  all Western Balkan countries and thereby shift 
the responsibility for reform to the governments 
of  the region.
2. Design intermediary steps with tangible rewards for 
citizens in order to maintain the reform dynamic.
In order to maintain the reform dynamic inside the 
region, the EU needs to define intermediary steps 
on the way to membership negotiations that pro-
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vide tangible benefits to the citizens of  each country. 
Indeed, although increased accountability should 
contribute to a speeding up of  the reform process 
and therefore enhance the mid-term prospects for 
an opening of  accession negotiations, it may not 
be enough for those countries that still have a sig-
nificant stretch of  the path towards integration to 
cover. For instance, the Commission Opinion on 
Albania revealed significant deficits in the demo-
cratic maturity of  the country, and the disappointing 
outcome of  the recent municipal elections makes it 
doubtful that this situation is likely to change in the 
near future.13 It seems likely that a detailed assess-
ment of  reform efforts in Bosnia or Kosovo would 
result in a similarly negative conclusion.
While the symbolic granting of  candidate status 
could still represent an important incentive for 
the population to push for further reforms, inter-
mediary steps are therefore needed to maintain 
or actually create an internal reform dynamic. In 
this regard, the visa liberalization process repre-
sents an encouraging success story. By carving 
out some of  the conditionality contained in the 
membership negotiations and offering a concrete 
reward for its fulfilment, the EU has been able to 
stimulate important reforms in the areas of  border 
control and document security.14 Meanwhile, visa 
liberalization has taken place in six of  the seven 
countries of  the region, and pressure is mounting 
for a similar process to be opened with Kosovo, 
despite its non-recognition by five member states. 
Other intermediary gains as part of  an enhanced 
pre-accession strategy could include limited work 
permits for high-skilled and low-skilled workers. 
Such a step could be tied to progress made in the 
field of  economic modernization, and would allow 
Western Balkan citizens to gain work experience 
abroad and return with improved skills that could 
benefit their countries.
3. Increase the internal coherence of EU policies 
towards the region.
Finally, it is necessary that the EU enhance the 
coherence of  its overall activities in the Western 
Balkans through better coordination of  the dif-
ferent EU actors present on the ground. This is 
paramount in order to reduce the potential for 
contradiction between stabilization and association, 
and thus to enhance the EU’s leverage over the 
countries of  the region. The double-hatting of  the 
EU Special Representative and the head of  the EU 
Delegation in Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo is 
a first step in this direction and should be quickly 
implemented in all three countries. Moreover, coor-
dination between the European Commission and 
declarations of  individual member states should be 
improved in order to prevent contradictory state-
ments and thus weaken the clarity of  the EU’s 
messages.
Overall, Western Balkan enlargement is a test case 
for EU foreign policy. In no other region in its 
neighborhood are the incentives for transformation 
so significant. As a consequence, the failure to suc-
cessfully integrate all Western Balkan states would 
be all the more resounding and would damage the 
EU’s claim to act as a transformative power in its 
neighborhood. The upcoming accession of  Croa-
tia, expected on July 1, 2013, will be an important 
milestone for the Western Balkans’ EU integration. 
If  it proceeds smoothly, it will be an important 
sign for the remaining candidates in the region that 
full membership is indeed a realistic prospect, and 
thus will encourage them to pursue their reform 
efforts in a more determined manner. EU Enlarge-
ment Policy is thus currently at a crucial crossroads. 
The further evolution of  the Western Balkans will 
be decisive not only for the EU’s activities in the 
region, but for the overall credibility of  the EU’s 
claim to be a key player in international politics.
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Unlike the countries of  the Western Balkans or 
Turkey, Iceland in many ways looks like an ideal 
candidate for membership in the European Union. 
Yet, Iceland’s accession to the EU is unlikely to 
happen any time soon. The European Union has 
embarked on what might become yet another case 
of  failure for its Enlargement Policy.
After being severely hit by the banking crisis, the 
government of  Iceland applied to the Swedish 
EU Presidency in June 2009 to join the European 
Union. Based on the Commission opinion from 
June 16, 2010, the Council of  the European Union 
decided to start accession negotiations with Iceland. 
In July 2010 the first intergovernmental conference 
officially initiated these negotiations and both sides 
presented their general positions about the content 
and course of  the accession process. After the 
European Commission screened all acquis chapters, 
the first substantive EU–Iceland Intergovernmen-
tal Conference took place in Brussels on 27 June 
2011. On this occasion, four negotiation chapters 
were opened and two of  them were immediately 
closed.15
After the collapse of  its banking system in 2008 
and the subsequent economic and fiscal problems, 
Iceland finds itself  in a difficult economic situation. 
Public debt has reached 100 percent of  Iceland’s 
GDP; the Icelandic currency is confronted with 
high inflation; unemployment rose to nine percent; 
the banking sector is shattered; Iceland is getting 
loans from the International Monetary Fund with 
strict conditions regarding fiscal stability and the 
functioning of  the economy, and the free move-
ment of  capital is limited. However, the economy 
is slowly recovering (for 2011–2013, growth of  2–3 
percent is expected).16
Paradoxically, apart from these problems, and a cer-
tain amount of  Schadenfreude by those who accuse 
Iceland of  having not considered EU membership 
until it was unable to handle a crisis by itself, Ice-
land can be considered an ideal accession candidate. 
Iceland is a founding member of  NATO and the 
OECD; in 1970 it joined the European Free Trade 
Association and it is party to the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area (EEA) since 1994. Fur-
thermore, it is a signatory to the Schengen Agree-
ments and the Dublin Regulation (EU Asylum 
System). Iceland is an established trade partner for 
the EU: 75 percent of  Icelandic exports go to the 
EU and more than half  of  its imports come from 
the EU. Politically, Iceland is a stable representative 
democracy with strong and functioning institutions. 
It shares the same core values the EU is based on: 
the rule of  law, protection of  human rights, anti-
discrimination, and the protection of  minorities. In 
its report regarding Iceland’s application, the Euro-
pean Commission stated that the country fulfills 
the political and economic criteria for accession 
and has the capacity to cope with competitive pres-
sure and market forces within the Union.17 This 
comment was also repeated in the progress report 
for 2010.18
Regarding the integration capacity of  the EU and 
the functioning of  its institutions, the accession of  
Iceland would not cause serious problems. With its 
319,500 inhabitants, Iceland would become one of  
the smallest states of  the EU, with representation 
and voting weight approximately at the level of  
Malta. Although the government’s statement at the 
opening of  the accession negotiations insisted on 
Iceland nominating its own EU Commissioner—
like all other member states—and thus addressing 
the prospect that the number of  Commissioners 
might be reduced to two-thirds of  the number of  
member states,19 it is unlikely there will be quarrels 
over the institutional impact of  Icelandic accession.
We thus look at a candidate:
– which is politically stable, whose affiliation 
to Europe and common values is doubted 
by nobody, and whose long-term economic 
development is positive in spite of  the current 
problems;
– which would not cause institutional imbalance 
by its accession and would not excessively strain 
EU support programs (it will actually be a net 
contributor rather than a net recipient20);
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– which has cooperated with the EU for a long 
time, is part of  the Internal Market, and is inte-
grated in other fields such as the Schengen area;
– which was still a dream EU accession candidate 
a few years ago (together with Norway and 
Switzerland), a welcome example for the EU 
to demonstrate that the Union is not only an 
attractive model for states looking for financial 
support;
– whose legislation is already fully compatible 
with EU legislation in some areas thanks to 
its membership in the EEA (out of  33 acquis 
chapters, 20 belong fully or partly to the EEA 
agenda).
In spite of  all these “plus factors,” Iceland’s 
accession is a mission with an open ending—and 
might become yet another example of  a failed EU 
Enlargement Policy.
The Credibility of the Process
Perhaps the most important question about Ice-
land’s accession is the credibility of  the process 
itself. Regarding Enlargement Policy, this term 
reflects the real will of  a candidate to accept all 
of  the consequences connected with becoming a 
member. This will expresses itself  on the one hand 
on a political level, meaning the motives for appli-
cation and the political will to act positively regard-
ing the accession process, its instruments, and its 
content (relationship EU–candidate state). On the 
other hand, it is expressed on a democratic level, 
which means popular support for the negotiations 
and for membership (relationship citizens–govern-
ment). The accession process has an explicit formal 
structure—intergovernmental conferences and the 
mandatory chapters—but the credibility described 
above has always a clear impact on the process. 
The case of  Iceland raises some questions in this 
area.
A debate about the country’s role in Europe is 
taking place in Iceland. There is already deep 
cooperation and Iceland particularly integrates 
itself  economically, as well as in other areas, into 
the EU. On the other hand, accession to the EU 
is only supported by a single political party (the 
Social Democratic Alliance-SDA21). The resolution 
to apply for EU membership passed the Althingi 
with a slim majority of  33 votes in favor and 28 
against. The debate about Iceland’s position never 
led to the clear conclusion that Iceland should join 
the EU, but rather to the position that the status 
quo at the moment of  merely applying for mem-
bership was the best solution for Iceland—which 
means close cooperation without accession. But 
Icelanders are not hostile to EU membership per 
se: According to some opinion polls, support for 
joining the EU grew until 2008 (a majority of  citi-
zens were in favor from August 2003 until begin-
ning of  2008), as well as for accession to the euro 
zone (a majority were in favor from August 2006 
until 2007).22
The financial and economic crisis changed this 
potential into the political act of  submitting the 
application. Yet the problem results from the 
fact that submitting the application was the peak 
of  Icelandic pro-EU feelings. The government 
applied, but the only political party left to sup-
port accession is the SDA. Its coalition partner, 
the Left-Green Movement, worries about Ice-
land’s independence, and the strongest opposition 
party—which would probably win, if  elections 
were held today—is even in favor of  an immedi-
ate withdrawal of  the application. Public support 
for accession has dropped since the submission 
of  the application. According to a poll conducted 
in March 2011, 40 percent of  Icelanders support 
and 60 percent oppose EU membership when 
asked: “How would you vote if  the referendum 
were to be held now?” If  the question is posed 
more openly and people are permitted to answer 
“I do not know” about 18 percent of  citizens are 
undecided (31.4 percent say “yes” and 50.5 percent 
“no”).23 More recent trends suggest that the camp 
of  the supporters has slightly grown, but still 
even adding clear supporters and the undecided 
together does not result in a majority for member-
ship. EU accession is simply not supported by the 
majority of  Icelandic citizens and the trend does 
not indicate a significant change of  this situation 
in the near future. The government tries to be as 
open as possible towards citizens by explaining 
its position,24 the course of  the negotiations, and 
every single instrument, but the evolution of  pub-
lic opinion since handing in the application indi-
cates that there is still much to do.
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But there is another interesting aspect that can be 
read into the polls. Despite widespread skepticism 
regarding EU accession, the majority of  the Icelan-
dic people supported the filing of  the application 
and, in particular, starting negotiations. A clear 
majority now favors continuing negotiations and 
are against a withdrawal of  the application.25 It is 
significant that consent is always much larger when 
the word “negotiations” appears in the question. 
The Icelandic people are indeed skeptic, but on the 
other hand they wait with high anticipation for the 
results of  the negotiations in which they expect the 
government to defend Iceland’s interests.
Yet, these expectations are very hard to satisfy in 
the negotiations for EU accession, where a bloc of  
27 states sets the rules and on the other side the 
candidate must follow these rules. Despite already 
being largely integrated economically and Icelandic 
citizens having the right to freely move and settle 
in the EU, some of  Iceland’s key sectors (above 
all fishing and agriculture, but also the hunting of  
certain species) do not conform to EU require-
ments. It is difficult to imagine that the results of  
the negotiations, which necessarily have to lead to 
the Icelandic government accepting EU legislation 
in these areas, could satisfy and convince Icelandic 
voters to leave behind their current skepticism and 
vote in favor of  EU accession.
In sum, the filing of  the application and the con-
tinuing of  negotiations was and is credible and 
legitimate; but the relationship Iceland has with the 
EU is more problematic because of  the Icelandic 
government’s weak position regarding EU acces-
sion and the possibility that the next Icelandic 
government will want to withdraw the application. 
However, the greatest difficulty by far will be con-
vincing Icelandic voters to say “yes” when negotia-
tions are closed one day.
“Enlargement fatigue” and how to 
understand the enlargement process
The beginning of  the enlargement process did not 
just raise questions on the Icelandic side. Since 
1995, the EU has more than doubled its members 
with three waves of  enlargement. This develop-
ment was due to particular historic reasons, which 
does not change the fact that it challenges the func-
tioning and absorptive capacity of  EU institutions 
and policies.
Essentially, previous enlargement rounds had three 
main consequences:
– A need for fundamental change to the primary 
law, which eventually came with the Lisbon 
Treaty, but ended with a practical impossibility 
of  further significant changes to the EU’s pri-
mary law in the next years or even decades;
– A turn from a mostly positive view about 
enlargement towards a discussion about the 
fundamental principles of  Enlargement Policy 
and its limits,
– A rise of  “enlargement fatigue” among both the 
elites and citizens of  the EU.
In the case of  Iceland, the two last points are of  
particular relevance. The discussion about the 
rules and the functioning of  Enlargement Policy 
was motivated by problems that arose during the 
EU’s “big bang” enlargement of  2004 and that 
persisted in the last enlargement round in 2007 
with the entry of  Romania and Bulgaria. This last 
accession round was accomplished by creating 
the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification 
(CVM), which meant nothing else than admit-
ting the fact that both candidates were not fully 
prepared to join the EU at the moment of  acces-
sion, but that this imperfection could be solved 
by a political decision. The CVM did not work 
as intended and, in addition, its existence is used 
as an argument against Bulgaria and Romania in 
other areas (for example their accession to the 
Schengen area) that are not directly related to this 
matter. Today, EU member states are united in the 
opinion that if  the EU does not want to repeat 
these problems, it is necessary to keep the enlarge-
ment process strictly individual and under strong 
conditionality, if  possible without exceptions and 
special regimes and without involving bilateral 
questions.
Regarding “enlargement fatigue,” it would be a 
mistake to understand it as a wilfull boycott of  the 
process or some effort to prevent further progress 
in accession negotiations. “Enlargement fatigue” 
is much more about a substantial change in the 
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understanding of  the Enlargement Policy and its 
importance for the EU. Enlargement is no more 
a value in itself—many members think the EU is 
already big enough and its model of  cooperation 
of  sovereign states is already the most successful 
one in Europe. Other accessions simply would 
not be seen as a big victory or of  the prodigal 
son returning to Europe. Enlargement Policy has 
lost its strong supporters and believers among 
the member states, which repeatedly placed it on 
the agenda in the past and thus maintained the 
dynamic of  the whole process. The readiness of  
the EU to satisfy the interests of  candidate coun-
tries and to find creative solutions to obstacles to 
EU accession has definitely diminished. Today, the 
EU has created a process with clear rules and the 
candidate either does or does not want to fulfil 
them; they are either able or unable to handle 
them—but this is primarily an affair for the candi-
date, not for the EU and its member states.
Iceland’s application for membership hits many of  
those buttons: A candidate who is sending rather 
unclear signals about its willingness to become 
a member and to fulfill all the conditions of  the 
enlargement process in the defined way. A candi-
date whose clear and defined interests in areas such 
as fishing, agriculture, or regional development calls 
for creative solutions and special conditions, which 
could only come from open-minded negotiations, 
but not from the current accession negotiation 
model as the EU and its members understand it.
Key interest: fisheries
As mentioned, Iceland is a candidate that is well 
integrated in many areas. It has already fulfilled 
the conditions for accession in many negotia-
tion chapters. This situation implies three main 
consequences:
First, the negotiation process will have to concen-
trate on the really problematic points without being 
able to spend time on the preparation of  solutions 
while other less problematic chapters are negoti-
ated, as was common practice in other accession 
cases. Second, it remains uncertain if  Iceland can 
still gain enough from the enlargement process 
to compensate sufficiently for what it would lose. 
Third, Icelandic interests are clearly defined both in 
positive (what Iceland wants to gain) and negative 
(what Iceland does not want to give up) terms.
On the positive side, the most important interest 
is financial and economic stability. Obviously, the 
euro is Iceland’s top priority. Second is a stronger 
position in the EU’s decision-making process for 
a country that is already at the receiving end of  
many EU policies without having the chance to 
influence them. The third priority is to ensure 
the strongest possible geopolitical position at a 
moment when its relationship with its long-term 
foreign partner and guarantor, the United States, 
is getting weaker. From the EU’s point of  view, 
these priorities are perfectly legitimate and they 
do not contradict the Union’s policy. More seri-
ous difficulties are represented by the fact that 
Icelanders and their political leadership hesitate to 
say whether the above-mentioned priorities are of  
such big significance to justify joining the EU, and 
on the other hand, they are sure where their red 
lines which they define for the upcoming negotia-
tions lie.
The most sensitive area is, without a doubt, fish-
eries. Iceland is one of  the world’s major fishing 
powers. The importance of  fisheries for Iceland’s 
economy, employment, exports, and science can-
not be compared to any EU member. Iceland has 
a giant exclusive economic zone that does not 
directly neighbor the waters of  any EU member. 
The main goals for Iceland are to keep control over 
the organization and management of  fisheries in 
the Icelandic exclusive economic zone, including 
the possibility of  prohibiting the catching of  local 
fish stock by foreign fishing vessels within this 
zone. Other goals are the ability to limit the invest-
ments of  foreign parties in Icelandic fisheries, con-
crete rules for fishing (such as the ban on discard-
ing), and to reserve the right to negotiate fishing 
issues at the international level as much as possible. 
Most of  these goals do not conform to the cur-
rent state of  the EU common fisheries policy, and 
Iceland expects to find solutions over the course of  
negotiations that are in line with its expressed inter-
ests. In reality, these expectations are hard to realize 
for two reasons. First, for Iceland, a compromise 
has to be close to its own proposals.26 Second, in 
contrast to the Icelandic understanding, the EU 
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expects that Iceland will adjust its legislation to the 
acquis, not the other way around.
We can naturally dispute how reasonable it is to 
apply the current accession mechanism to an area 
that has much larger significance for one negotiat-
ing party than for the other, particularly now, when 
the EU is discussing a far-reaching reform of  
the common fisheries policy in recognition of  its 
failure up until now. Maybe it would be helpful to 
search for an inspiration for the future EU fishery 
policy in the current Icelandic situation. The fact is, 
as was mentioned above, the readiness to seek spe-
cial solutions for the needs of  candidate countries 
is lower now than ever before. At least at this start-
ing phase of  the negotiations, the opinion prevails 
among EU members that it is not the task of  the 
EU to offer special treatment to candidates, but it 
is up to each candidate to fulfill the requirements 
if  it wants to join the EU. There is no better proof  
of  the different understandings of  the accession 
process than in the general positions regarding 
the obligation to apply the acquis communautaire 
presented by both sides at the opening intergov-
ernmental conference. While the EU declared that 
“Iceland will have to apply the ‘acquis’ as it stands at 
the time of  accession,”27 Iceland announced that 
the acquis as it stands at the time of  accession “con-
stitutes the basis for negotiations.”28
ICESAVE—a bilateral problem?
In talking about Iceland’s accession to the EU, one 
cannot pass over the ICESAVE topic. The core 
problem is the 3.7 billion euro that were re-paid 
after the crash of  Landsbanki by the United King-
dom and the Netherlands to the customers whose 
accounts were kept by Landsbanki branches in these 
countries. The responsibility of  the member states 
of  the EEA towards the customers of  banks that 
get into difficulties to fulfill their obligations is 
regulated by the Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-
guarantee schemes. Iceland bases its argument on 
the following theses:
– The directive was implemented by Iceland. 
Deposit insurance was established, with which 
according to the government of  Iceland the 
requirements of  the directive were fulfilled. The 
fact that this fund did not dispose of  sufficient 
money to compensate the bank’s customers 
at the time of  the crash is obviously not con-
nected to the directive.
– The directive and its resulting responsibilities 
include the situation of  a single financial institu-
tion facing problems, but not the case of  the 
collapse of  the whole banking system.
The UK and the Netherlands understandably do 
not accept these arguments and insist that Iceland 
compensate them for the financial resources they 
used, because Iceland did not fulfill its obligations. 
More relevant is the fact that the ESA (the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority—the institution, which 
supervises non-EU member states in fulfilling 
their responsibilities resulting from being member 
of  the EEA) also agreed with this point of  view 
and rejected Iceland’s arguments. ESA started the 
procedure for failure to comply with its obliga-
tions against Iceland by sending a letter of  formal 
notice on May 26, 2010, in which it expressed the 
opinion that Iceland is obliged to compensate the 
losses of  the UK and the Netherlands. At the same 
time, it announced that it would not take further 
steps out of  consideration for the current negotia-
tions between Iceland and the UK/NL, and would 
wait for the results of  these negotiations before 
proceeding. Previous negotiations show that the 
real issue is not so much financial compensation 
itself, but the question of  principle as to whether 
Iceland is obligated to repay or if  it just depends 
on its good will to do so, allowing it to interpret 
the definition of  circumstances of  the repayment 
(for instance regarding interests or the repayment 
period).29
The three countries have already twice agreed on 
a way to compensate and Icelandic voters twice 
rejected these solutions in a referendum. The first 
time, on March 6, 2010, in a very turbulent atmo-
sphere (a new concept with more favorable condi-
tions for Iceland was already on the table) only 
two percent of  voters were in favor. By the second 
vote on April 10, 2011, 40 percent were in favor, 
but the concept still did not pass. The UK and the 
Netherlands expressed their disappointment about 
the rejection of  the agreement. A harsh statement 
that illustrated the correlation between the rejec-
tion of  the agreement and the accession process 
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was made by Sylvester Eiffinger, an economic advi-
sor to the Dutch government, who said “I think 
at this moment there is no way to get Iceland 
to join the EU. In that there is no option.”30 At 
the moment, the trilateral negotiations regarding 
mutual compensation are not expected to continue. 
It is likely that once the Icelandic government 
has answered to the letter of  formal notice, the 
ESA will continue with the infringement proceed-
ings and the case will end up in the EFTA court 
with a binding decision. But the court’s task is 
only to decide if  Iceland fulfilled its obligation to 
implement the relevant EU law into its own legal 
system. The verdict might be a strong support-
ing argument for whether Iceland is obligated to 
repay—but it will not define the conditions of  the 
repayment.
The ICESAVE case illustrates one general aspect 
regarding the enlargement process as a whole. 
According to the current understanding of  the 
accession process in EU capitals, bilateral disputes 
between a member state and a candidate country 
should not affect an accession negotiation process. 
However, it is very easy to involve these disputes, 
and the accession process is one of  the last real 
opportunities for a member state to effectively 
pressure an accession candidate. Accession and all 
important negotiation steps fall under the prin-
ciple of  unanimity, which means that each EU 
member state has the power to delay or to stop 
the accession process at any time. Accession nego-
tiations touch upon almost all important political, 
economical, and social areas to an extent that far 
exceeds the competencies of  the EU towards its 
own members. A combination of  these two fac-
tors offers EU members a unique opportunity 
to pressure a candidate and persuade it to make 
concessions that are not primarily related to the 
subject of  negotiation. Good examples of  this are 
the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, 
the name dispute in the case of  FYROM/Macedo-
nia, and the discussion about the so-called Beneš 
decrees during the progress of  negotiations with 
the Czech Republic.
One can assume that the UK and the Nether-
lands will also try to use this opportunity during 
the ongoing accession negotiations. This means 
that they might attempt to place Iceland in an 
unfavorable position by focusing on some of  the 
corresponding negotiation chapters. One pos-
sibility is to refer to the Letter of  formal notice 
by the ESA stressing the fact that Iceland has not 
fully implemented the Directive 94/19/EC. This 
should affect negotiations regarding financial 
services or the functioning of  the banking sector. 
It would then be relatively easy to draw a con-
nection between the bilateral issue of  repayment 
and the multilateral negotiation process. Before 
Iceland provides compensation, the UK and 
the Netherlands could claim that some negotia-
tion chapters are not yet ready to be closed. The 
UK and the Netherlands could also easily use 
all other issues regarding Iceland to impede its 
progress even if  they are not directly related to 
the accession process. The ICESAVE case which 
is primarily a bilateral topic by all the involved 
parties will not be a crucial issue of  the Icelandic 
accession process, but it could make things more 
complicated.
Conclusions
There are still many steps to take for Iceland’s 
accession process to become a success story. Both 
the EU and Iceland must accept the necessity of  
two key elements in enlargement negotiations: First, 
there is a clearly defined negotiation framework 
and conditions that have to be fulfilled by all acces-
sion candidates without exception. Second, the pro-
cess has to be flexible enough to make it possible 
for candidates to fulfill the conditions of  accession. 
Indeed, both elements almost sound contradictory 
and, in the specific case of  Iceland, efforts on both 
sides to reconcile them are needed:
The task of  the EU as the creator and definer 
of  the process is to find a balance between the 
binding framework and the “same for all” condi-
tions and an individual approach which takes into 
account the particular positions and interests of  
each candidate. The EU must admit that negotia-
tions with a state whose fishery production is equal 
to 40 percent of  the entire EU’s fishery production 
calls for a special approach. For Iceland, the con-
stellation is perfect for an attempt at innovation: 
At the same moment when the EU is discussing a 
fundamental reform of  its common fishery policy, 
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an accession candidate has a well functioning 
fishery management system and pursues a fishery 
policy with the same main principles and targets as 
the EU. To make use of  this opportunity, the EU 
should do two things:
– Iceland should be involved as much as possible 
in the discussion about the reform.
– The EU should look to the Icelandic fishery 
system, above all at the way the country man-
ages and controls fishing.
This approach could work in two ways: first, it 
would be proof  for Icelanders that Iceland will 
not lose control of  its key economic sector after 
accession. Second, it would send a signal that the 
EU treats Iceland as an equal partner who is not 
only the recipient of  common rules, but also their 
co-creator. Both signals could have a significant 
influence on the Icelandic decision in the accession 
referendum.
At the other end, Iceland has to accept its role as 
a candidate that wants to enter the club. That is to 
say, some principles are the same for each candi-
date and have to be fulfilled. One of  these prin-
ciples is that it is not possible to choose in which 
areas the candidate would like to cooperate and 
in which it does not want to during the accession 
process. The candidate country will either become 
an EU member with all rights and obligations or it 
will not. The acceding country can be an inspira-
tion for the EU in some areas, but it cannot expect 
to get special treatment in every area. For instance, 
the Icelandic demand to have the ability to limit the 
investments of  foreign parties in Icelandic fisheries 
is hard to accept for the EU because it touches the 
core principles of  the Union.
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Turkey occupies a special place in the history of  
the EU’s Enlargement Policy. No other country 
has been kept in limbo with regards to its acces-
sion prospects for such a long time, and in no 
other case has the legitimacy of  a membership 
bid been discussed so controversially on the EU’s 
side. As several EU member states have spoken 
out against Turkish accession, and Turkey itself  is 
doing little to keep the train on track, the accession 
process has reached at least a temporary deadlock. 
However, to merely ignore this state of  play, or to 
engage in a blame game over who is responsible 
for the current stalemate, is short-sighted and in 
the interests of  neither Turkey nor of  the EU. 
Instead, both parties should reflect upon mutually 
beneficial forms of  cooperation that could help 
improve and deepen relations at a time when the 
political will for a pursuit of  full EU integration is 
lacking.
A long-standing relationship
Turkey is the EU’s longest-standing accession can-
didate. Having launched its membership bid back 
in 1963, Ankara had to wait until 1999 to obtain 
candidate status. Accession negotiations were 
opened in 2005, but have since progressed slug-
gishly. Out of  a total of  35 negotiation chapters, 
only 13 have been opened, and a single one, on Sci-
ence and Research, has been closed.31 Eight chap-
ters are blocked following Turkey’s refusal to imple-
ment the Ankara Protocol and to grant Cypriot 
vessels access to its ports. A further four remain 
closed due to France’s opposition to the opening 
of  chapters that may eventually imply full member-
ship, as opposed to a form of  “privileged partner-
ship.” Six additional chapters remain unopened due 
to a veiled veto by Cyprus. In total, this leaves only 
four negotiation chapters that may potentially be 
opened: public procurement, competition policy, 
social policy and employment, and other issues.32 
While the latter is usually opened only at the very 
end of  an accession process, the other three are 
highly complicated negotiations chapters, with the 
Commission’s screening report suggesting signifi-
cant progress was still required on each of  them.33 
The previous Belgian rotating EU presidency was 
the first since 2005 that failed to open a single 
chapter during its six months of  office, in a move 
that confirms a steady deceleration of  membership 
negotiations with Ankara.34 With other priorities 
topping the EU’s agenda, it seems unlikely that 
Poland, who holds the rotating Presidency in the 
second half  of  2011, will fare better.
While the Turkish side shares its part of  responsi-
bility for the current stalemate, the legitimate con-
cerns the EU has formulated with regards to press 
freedom and freedom of  opinion cannot conceal 
the deeper reservations numerous member states—
and not least their populations—have towards 
Turkish EU membership. The size of  the country 
and its Muslim identity are the two most common 
concerns that have prevented Turkish accession 
from being more widely embraced. These particular 
hesitations are perceived as unfair by the Turkish 
side, and have led Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan to repeatedly speak out against the 
unequal treatment his country is subjected to. The 
governments of  several major EU member states, 
most prominently Germany and France, however 
refuse to change their stance on “open-ended 
accession negotiations,” much to the frustration 
of  Ankara. At the same time, the small coalition 
of  member states in favor of  Turkish EU acces-
sion—essentially made up of  Great Britain, Italy, 
Sweden, and Finland—has so far failed to revitalize 
the negotiation process.
Growing self-confidence
Emboldened by the country’s impressive economic 
growth—standing at 8.9 percent in 2010, second 
only to China—Ankara’s discourse is becoming 
increasingly self-confident. Most recently, Erdogan 
declared in front of  parliamentarians gathered at 
the Council of  Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
that while Turkey might need the EU, “the EU 
also needs Turkey.”35 Discontented by the strongly 
asymmetric set-up of  accession talks, where the EU 
essentially spells out its conditions to any aspirant 
and links eventual membership to full compliance 
with them, Turkey expects to be treated according 
to its actual political and economic weight. With 
EU-Turkey: An (A)symmetric Relationship
by Natasha Wunsch
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regards to visa liberalization for instance, Turkey 
has refused to sign a readmission agreement with 
the EU—which would oblige it to take back illegal 
immigrants that went through Turkish territory on 
their way into the EU—before the EU has made a 
clear commitment to lifting its visa requirement for 
Turkish citizens.
More generally, in what can be understood as a 
reaction to the EU’s implicit rejection of  Turkish 
membership, Ankara has begun to pursue a more 
diversified foreign policy, turning away from an 
exclusive Western orientation and no longer putting 
all its eggs into the EU’s basket. Instead, Turkey 
has begun to launch parallel initiatives, engaging 
actively for example in the ongoing reconciliation 
process in the Balkans. Although EU member 
states tend to eye Turkey’s engagement in this 
region with skepticism, with some fearing a “neo-
Ottoman revival,” Ankara’s efforts in the Western 
Balkans can be considered a welcome complement 
to the EU’s essentially declaratory insistence upon 
good-neighborly relations. In other cases however, 
Ankara actually goes against established EU posi-
tions. Rapprochement with Iran, which the EU 
seeks to isolate on the international stage, is the 
most obvious example of  Turkey going its own 
way; its barely concealed support for the second 
Gaza flotilla is another.
Moreover, the unresolved dispute with Cyprus rep-
resents a major obstacle to further advancements in 
EU-Turkey relations. Following the Greek Cypriot 
rejection of  the Annan Plan for reunification in 
April 2004 and the ensuing EU decision to admit 
only the Greek Cypriot part of  the island as an 
EU member, Cyprus has been using its veto power 
inside the EU to prevent Turkish accession talks 
from advancing. In retaliation for Cyprus’ uncom-
promising stance on its EU integration, Turkey is 
blocking Nicosia’s membership in NATO. This 
mutual blockade is preventing deeper EU-NATO 
cooperation, a situation which is disadvantageous 
for the members of  both organizations.36
In sum, the EU is having difficulties dealing with 
a candidate that no longer seems to fit the estab-
lished scheme of  accession talks and reacts to con-
ditionality and pressure with evasion and at least 
a rhetorical search for alternatives to membership. 
Basically, EU-Turkish relations have reached a dead 
end. While it is highly unlikely that the EU will at 
some point explicitly revoke Turkey’s membership 
perspective, it is similarly improbable that accession 
negotiations will make important progress under 
the current political constellation on both the Turk-
ish and the EU sides. It is therefore all the more 
important to develop cooperation at other levels 
in order to maintain a constructive relationship 
between Ankara and Brussels.
Overcoming the stalemate
Most EU member states view Turkey exclusively 
through the accession lens. This biased perspec-
tive has hampered the EU’s ability to comprehend 
its largest accession candidate as more than just 
another petitioner at Brussels’ doorstep and to 
recognize potential areas for deeper cooperation 
with Turkey. Yet closer cooperation in the fields of  
foreign policy and energy security would be largely 
beneficial for both sides.
Turkey’s increasingly independent foreign policy 
and its occasional decisions to act single-handedly 
and in contradiction with established EU positions 
have been a source of  concern among member 
states and EU bodies. A closer association of  
Ankara with internal EU negotiations on foreign 
policy issues could serve as a basis for more con-
certed action from the two players. This seems all 
the more promising in light of  the current upris-
ings in several of  Turkey’s Arab neighbors. At a 
time when the EU is seeking to reposition itself  
towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbors, 
Turkey could play a crucial role in two ways. First, 
Ankara could act as a mediator between Brussels 
policy-makers and a Muslim world which the EU 
has so far had difficulties grasping. Despite the dif-
ferences in the democratization processes of  Tur-
key and those triggered by the Arab Spring, Turkey 
still shares a lot more with Arab countries than the 
EU does. Second, in light of  this background, Tur-
key could serve as a model for a successful Islamic 
democracy, at once inspiring the young revolu-
tionaries in North Africa and beyond, and perhaps 
calling into question some of  the prejudices EU 
member states hold about Ankara’s democratic cre-
dentials. Finally, such a concrete demonstration of  
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the hitherto vague notion of  Turkey’s function as a 
bridge might provide a suitable narrative to Turk-
ish EU accession, which could in time smooth the 
path towards full Turkish EU membership.
Recognition of  Turkey as a decisive partner for the 
successful reorientation of  the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy could moreover persuade Ankara to clearly 
position itself  and speak out forcefully against 
Arab strongmen at an early stage. Indeed, Turkey’s 
hesitation in criticizing Egypt’s Mubarak, Libya’s 
Gaddafi, and especially Syria’s Assad, seems at least 
in part due to the country’s waning certainty as 
to whether it belongs to the Western sphere. Had 
Ankara joined its voice with the EU’s, the message 
coming from Brussels would have been reinforced, 
and an important signal would have been sent to 
the Muslim populations of  these countries. On the 
contrary, the symbolic exclusion of  Turkey from 
important decisions in the area of  foreign policy, as 
occurred with the non-invitation of  Ankara to the 
Paris Summit preceding NATO air strikes against 
Libya, can only serve to further alienate Turkey 
from the EU.
At the institutional level, Turkey recently sug-
gested the establishment of  a regular dialogue 
with the EU’s Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) ambassadors as well as the establishment of  
informal policy planning talks.37 Such enshrined 
mechanisms could help to install a certain regularity 
in EU-Turkish exchanges on foreign policy issues, 
while simultaneously tying Ankara closer to EU 
decisions and thereby avoiding unilateral steps in 
the future. Moreover, the meetings could function 
as instances of  socialization, through which Turkey 
would become increasingly familiar with the struc-
tures of  EU decision-making and the consensual 
culture that characterizes EU-level cooperation. 
For Turkey itself, an institutionalized mechanism 
of  cooperation would also offer the opportunity 
to engage more deeply with skeptical EU member 
states and to disprove some of  the prejudices they 
may hold against the country.
Besides foreign policy, energy is another area in 
which closer cooperation with Turkey can be of  
great benefit to the EU. Located at a crossroads 
between oil-rich Russia, the Caspian Sea, and the 
Middle East, Turkey’s role as a transit country for 
fossil energy imports to the EU is likely to become 
more and more decisive over the coming years.38 
Already today, seven major oil or gas pipelines 
cross Turkey’s territory,39 and Turkey’s engagement 
is crucial for the EU-designed Nabucco pipeline, 
through which member states seek to diversify 
their energy sources. While Ankara has been trying 
to use its collaboration in the Nabucco project as 
a bargaining chip to speed up accession negotia-
tions,40 it is clear that a constructive stance by both 
parties in this field would set an important model 
for other forms of  enhanced cooperation.
The EU should therefore try to set up energy 
cooperation with Turkey in a similar framework 
as it did for visa liberalization with the Western 
Balkans. By extracting a certain part of  the acquis 
from the overall accession process and attaching 
it to a concrete incentive, namely visa-free travel, 
the Commission succeeded in having a series of  
important reforms implemented throughout the 
Western Balkans. In the case of  Turkey, the reward 
for fully taking over the EU acquis in the field of  
energy could consist of  a privileged position for 
Ankara in EU energy talks. Moreover, a sort of  
energy community modelled upon the existing set-
up in South-Eastern Europe could be conceivable. 
Once again, this type of  deeper engagement would 
also serve to socialize and enhance the trust hesi-
tant member states might have of  Turkey as a reli-
able partner in sensitive areas, thus foreshadowing a 
deeper association in the future.
In sum, any attempt to transpose the classical 
top-down approach of  Enlargement Policy to the 
Turkish case is likely to produce reluctance and 
irk the EU’s partners in Ankara. At the same time, 
given the size and importance of  Turkey, and the 
extent of  outstanding reforms, eventual accession 
appears as a long-term endeavor. In the meantime, 
the EU should practice a partnership approach in 
the sensitive fields of  foreign and energy policy. 
Besides bringing concrete benefits in these two 
fields, closer cooperation would offer opportuni-
ties for the socialization of  Turkey into the EU’s 
structures and tie Ankara more closely to the EU’s 
value system. However, the institutionalization of  
cooperation in the fields of  foreign and energy 
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policy should not be conceived in competition with 
the membership process. Instead, it should serve as 
a preparation for Turkey’s eventual full integration 
at a time when this goal seems difficult to achieve. 
That way, regardless of  how accession talks pro-
ceed, the EU and Turkey will have succeeded in 
forging a deep and mutually beneficial relationship 
that allows both players to complement, rather 
than rival, each other on the European continent 
and beyond.
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The EU’s Enlargement Policy, for a long time a 
crucial element in the simultaneous and comple-
mentary deepening and widening of  European 
cooperation, is at an important crossroads. The 
historical “big bang” enlargement of  2004 and 
2007, which saw twelve new member states join 
the Union, and practically doubled its membership, 
was both the highlight and the turning point of  
the EU’s enlargement process. Despite the largely 
positive assessment of  the hitherto unprecedented 
step forward in terms of  the EU’s geographical 
expansion, both member states and EU institu-
tions have since become more skeptical about 
admitting new members into the EU family. The 
emerging “enlargement fatigue” has transformed 
the nature of  the enlargement process itself, and 
is weakening an approach that was long consid-
ered to be the EU’s most successful foreign policy 
instrument.
As the three preceding analyses have shown, the 
enlargement process no longer represents a bind-
ing engagement between the EU and a candidate 
country. In the Western Balkan states, it is the EU’s 
waning commitment to their eventual accession, 
along with the often-problematic internal situations 
in many countries of  the region that has resulted 
in a rather sluggish transformation, which frus-
trates actors on both sides of  the negotiating table. 
In Iceland, the commitment problem is actually 
located on the candidate’s side, with the EU’s lack 
of  flexibility making the successful conclusion of  
accession negotiations doubtful. Finally, in the case 
of  Turkey, both sides appear unsure as to whether 
they want to go through with a formal commit-
ment to full integration, resulting in a stalemate in 
accession talks.
The question of  commitment therefore appears 
to lie at the heart of  the current difficulties of  
Enlargement Policy. Indeed, it appears that the 
enlargement process is losing its binding nature 
and is instead becoming an open-ended negotia-
tion game, where the full integration of  a candidate 
country is as conceivable as the failure of  accession 
talks. Yet, the credibility of  accession prospects, 
along with the coherence and consistency of  the 
conditions formulated by the EU for each of  the 
candidates, are vital for creating and maintaining 
a dynamic of  reform in aspiring member states. 
As the euro crisis dominates the political agenda, 
enlargement has become a secondary concern for 
the EU and its member states. This development 
reduces the leverage the EU traditionally wields 
over aspiring member states through the enlarge-
ment promise, thereby diminishing its ability to 
contribute to the successful transformation of  its 
neighborhood.
Despite the differences between the three case 
studies, some common characteristics have 
emerged from the analysis of  the current enlarge-
ment dossiers:
– On the EU side, enthusiasm for enlargement is 
waning, with member states preferring to focus 
on internal consolidation rather than negotiating 
the admission of  new countries. Most impor-
tantly, none of  the 27 member governments has 
made an effort to explain to their citizens the 
benefits of  the past and the actual prospects for 
future enlargement.
– In terms of  the accession process, a special 
focus is put upon real implementation as 
opposed to merely adopting formal rules, which 
often sufficed in previous enlargement negotia-
tions. Hence, the integration process as such 
has become more complex and drawn-out, with 
the hope of  making the actual entry of  a coun-
try less troublesome. It now seems impossible 
to turn a blind eye to a country’s implementa-
tion record for overarching political reasons. In 
short: the criteria for accession have become 
much stricter than before.
– Both within the EU and in candidate countries, 
enlargement remains essentially an elite project, 
with the majority of  the population in both 
member and applicant states not sufficiently 
aware of  the conditions attached to eventual 
accession. Many people are therefore prone to 
manipulation from state-level actors, who put 
the blame for the slow progress of  integration 
Lessons for the Future of the European Union’s Enlargement Policy
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talks—or for the actual existence of  such talks, 
in the case of  enlargement skeptics—upon 
Brussels.
Overall, the EU is struggling to reconcile a for-
mally technocratic process of  rule adoption with 
the increasingly politicized nature of  the enlarge-
ment negotiations. While in the Western Balkans, 
concerns over stability have often led to a softening 
of  initial conditionality and thereby a weakening of  
the EU’s leverage, the strong insistence upon a full 
adoption of  the EU acquis by Iceland is likely to 
result in the Icelandic people rejecting the eventual 
accession of  their country to the EU in a referen-
dum. The debate on Turkey’s accession, meanwhile, 
is mostly dominated by emotional arguments, with 
the actual difficulties in fulfilling the accession 
requirements fading into the background. The chal-
lenge therefore lies in revitalizing the accession pro-
cess and in adapting it to new realities in current 
candidate states.
Strengthening EU Enlargement Policy
Credibility and dialogue are key elements for the 
success of  the EU’s Enlargement Policy. In order 
to counteract the current devaluation of  the 
accession promise, four concrete steps should be 
undertaken.
1. Communicate enlargement both inside and outside
For a long time, enlargement appeared as a natural 
complement to the pursuit of  closer integration 
between the existing member states. With skepti-
cism towards the enlargement process growing 
on both sides of  the negotiation table, it is crucial 
to communicate the benefits and conditions of  
eventual accession in a transparent and honest 
way. Only then will Enlargement Policy be able to 
regain its status as a policy instrument beneficial to 
both sides involved, and will the EU be able to gar-
ner sufficient support, particularly among member 
states, in order to pursue this process successfully.
2. Enhance the consistency of the EU’s messages
The consistency and coherence of  EU statements 
is crucial, especially for candidate countries. Besides 
clarifying the detailed accession criteria, this encom-
passes the wider necessity of  upholding the idea of  
a Union open to all European states that fulfill the 
predefined conditions. This general commitment is 
vital in order to trigger and maintain a sustainable 
dynamic of  reform in the accession states, and to 
remain credible more generally as a foreign policy 
actor that lives up to its promises.
3. Strengthen civil society in the target countries
In recent years, the EU has undertaken significant 
efforts in order to include civil society in the tar-
get countries into the enlargement process. This 
emphasis is decisive not only to ensure the sup-
port of  the local population for sometimes painful 
reform processes and to encourage implementa-
tion, but also represents an investment into the 
long-term transformation of  society in accession 
countries.
4. Shift the accession process from governments to 
societies
Following up on the enhanced role for civil society 
in accession countries, the next step should be to 
broaden these activities to include people-to-people 
contacts across both member and accession coun-
tries. By actively including their own populations 
in the accession process, the EU and its member 
states would play less of  an activating role and thus 
reduce their asymmetric relationship with applicant 
countries’ governments and societies. At the same 
time, they stand to gain a lot from establishing 
deep trans-societal relations that form the basis of  
a sustainable and beneficial integration of  future 
member states. Such a comprehensive Enlargement 
Policy would not only cross geographical borders, 
but also the institutional borders between govern-
ments and societies on both sides of  the—increas-
ingly blurred—dividing line of  membership.
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The origins of addressing Eastern Europe
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
launched in 2004,41 was developed out of  the 
“Wider Europe” concept of  2003.42 It is usually 
seen as a natural consequence of  the EU enlarge-
ment of  2004/2007 and the need to address new 
bordering countries. “Wider Europe” was origi-
nally conceptualized to target Eastern European 
countries and only later merged with the Mediter-
ranean frontier and the Barcelona Process through 
the ENP.43 Accordingly, it is fair to argue that the 
“Eastern Partnership” has its origins in the initial 
idea of  “Wider Europe,” finally re-emphasizing 
regional foci.
From the beginning, critics of  the ENP denounced 
it for its overarching approach, arguing that it 
would not take regional differences and strategic 
impetus into account—let alone varying circum-
stances in target countries. During its EU Presi-
dency in 2007, Germany produced a non-paper 
on a “new European Eastern Policy” (“neue EU-
Ostpolitik”) by conceiving it in terms of  three 
pillars. The first concerned EU-Russia relations. 
The second pillar was called “ENP-Plus,” which 
aimed for a tailored East European agenda within 
the ENP and was to offer the respective countries 
enhanced sectoral cooperation through binding 
adoption of  the acquis communautaire with a political 
upgrading of  official relations. Finally, the third pil-
lar related to the EU Central Asia strategy. Poland 
and Sweden took up the ENP-Plus idea and cre-
ated a proposal for the creation of  an “Eastern 
Partnership” in May 2008. Moreover, the focus on 
this region and the political need to frame strate-
gies was enhanced inter alia by the Georgia-Russian 
crisis over South Ossetia in 2008 and the Russia-
Ukrainian gas dispute in 2009.
Consequently, in May 2009 the Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) was constituted to be a crucial part of  
the broader framework of  the ENP, incorporating 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine. Taking into account that some of  
these countries relate their “Europeanness” to the 
EU (especially Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), 
the debate on whether the ENP was a way to 
keep them at arm’s length or whether they might 
be granted the prospect of  membership is crucial, 
with Poland and Sweden as leading advocates of  
the latter and Germany and France preferring the 
former. Initially, statements on the matter were 
deliberately neglected. However, the conclusions 
made by the Foreign Affairs Council on the lat-
est Communication by the European Commission 
and the High Representative reviewing the ENP44 
read: “The Council acknowledges the European 
aspirations and the European Choice of  some 
partners.”45
Association policies within the framework of  the 
ENP, however, follow the same mechanisms as 
integration policies within the EU enlargement 
structure, since the former developed its instru-
ments out of  the latter. In terms of  approach, a 
strict partition of  policies was never in place, with 
all parties being aware of  Art. 49 of  the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) that offers every European 
state the opportunity to apply for membership. The 
official acknowledgment of  these aspirations thus 
remains a symbolic gesture. Accordingly, the central 
question is how much money the EU is willing to 
invest in the transformation processes of  third-
party (European) countries, since the Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) offers more aid 
than the European Neighborhood Policy Instru-
ment (ENPI) (in the financial framework 2007–
2013: 11.5 billion euro for 9 states vs. approxi-
mately 12 billion euro for 16 states, or 0.6 billion 
euro being allocated for the EaP-Countries in 
2011–2013).46 New financial instruments have been 
announced following a recent Polish proposal for 
Chapter II: The Eastern Dimension of the 
Neighborhood Policy
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a European Endowment for Democracy (EED) 
and a Civil Society Facility. Specific details on how 
these two initiatives are to be organized have yet to 
be defined.
The EU’s objectives for addressing Eastern 
Europe
With stability, peaceful cooperation, and pros-
perity being the declared objectives of  the EU, 
the EaP sends a message to partner countries 
to reinforce their transformation processes 
through reforms. This should create new impe-
tus for underpinning sustainable political, social, 
economic, and regional development. It aims 
at strengthening mutual relations with partner 
countries that have generally progressed towards 
democracy over the past decade, including some 
who have experienced regime changes. The new 
strategy of  the ENP stresses functioning democ-
racy, respect for human rights, and the rule of  law 
as fundamental pillars of  the EU’s partnership 
with its neighbors.
Due to lessons learned from recent events regard-
ing the evolution of  democracy and re-authoritari-
anism (such as in Ukraine after the Orange Revolu-
tion or in Georgia after the Rose Revolution), the 
EU expanded democracy promotion with the term 
“deep democracy,” underlining that democracy 
involves not only official procedures and elections, 
but also political cultures that are able to fill the 
rules with life.47 The region continues to face major 
economic challenges with significant differences 
between countries and with a high susceptibility 
to external factors, which amplifies instability. The 
promotion of  accountable governance, especially in 
the financial sector, is supposed to support regional 
development and social cohesion in order to dimin-
ish socioeconomic differences in and between 
countries.
The EU’s approach for addressing Eastern 
Europe
In order to address both individual countries and 
the region as a whole, the EaP structures coop-
eration with its eastern neighbors on two levels: 
bilateral and multilateral. On the bilateral level, the 
EaP aims to intensify respective contractual rela-
tionships. Negotiations follow conditions in target 
countries and range from country-specific “Action 
Plans” to “Association Agreements” (AA). Among 
others, these include agreements on a visa-free 
regime and a Mobility Partnership, a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DFTA), and 
provide for Comprehensive Institution-Building 
(CIB) programs. Enhanced sectoral cooperation 
is supposed to take place in all sectors relevant to 
the EU’s internal market, with a particular focus 
on knowledge and innovation, climate change and 
the environment, energy, transport, and technol-
ogy. The degree to which partners have addressed 
key elements of  the EaP varies. As a result, the EU 
submitted the “more for more approach,” where 
partnerships are to be more strongly oriented 
according to neighbors’ needs, capacities, and 
reform objectives. EU support is supposed to be 
customized accordingly, dependent on progress 
made in building and consolidating democracy and 
respect for the rule of  law, meaning more aid with 
more conditionality.
On the multilateral level, four thematic platforms 
(democracy and good governance, economy, 
energy, and people-to-people contacts) provide for 
twice-yearly sessions to identify common projects 
among partner states and the EU. Until now the 
EU Commission, or as of  late the External Action 
Service (EAS), has taken the lead in that matter. In 
line with the renewed ENP to focus on engage-
ment with different stakeholders and links between 
societies, additional institutions such as the Coun-
cil of  Europe, OSCE, EIB, EBRD, as well as 
civil society are invited to the dialogue. This has 
resulted in the creation of  EURO-NEST by the 
European Parliament for parliamentary coopera-
tion in May 2011, regional actors cooperating with 
the Committee of  the Regions, business leaders 
taking part in the Eastern Partnership Business 
Forum, and, last but not least, civil society and 
social partners building on the Eastern Partnership 
Civil Society Forum (CSF, Brussels 2009/Berlin 
2010/Poznan 2011). Every other year, summits 
between heads of  state take place, a practice that 
began in Prague in 2009. The second summit in 
September 2011 in Warsaw will involve discussions 
on differentiation, democratization, sectoral coop-
eration, increasing the visibility of  the EaP, and 
strengthening civil society.
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Remaining challenges for addressing 
Eastern Europe
Besides local conditions in partner countries, the 
biggest challenge of  the EaP is relations with Rus-
sia. Initially, Russia was invited to become involved 
in ENP structures, but it rejected the idea of  being 
incorporated into a comprehensive approach and 
claimed a special position in its relationship to 
the EU as well as to the countries of  the Com-
monwealth of  Independent States (CIS). From an 
EU perspective, Russia is interfering with the EU 
Partnership process by providing incentives like its 
recent attempt to constitute a separate Customs 
Union with the respective countries. To avoid this, 
it must be convinced of  “win-win” constellations. 
In order to achieve mutual understanding, Poland 
initiated the informal “Group of  Friends of  the 
EaP,” now renamed as the “Information and Coor-
dination Group.” Interestingly enough, Russia has 
demonstrated its will to get involved, along with 
Turkey, the United States, and Japan. But Russia 
still declares its skepticism officially. How these 
relations will evolve remains one of  the pivotal 
questions for the Eastern Partnership.
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The change of  government in Moldova after the 
parliamentary elections in July 2009 opened a new 
window of  opportunity for fundamental domes-
tic reforms and integration with the European 
Union.49 With its clear pro-EU policy the new 
government coalition, the Alliance for European 
Integration, differs from other post-Soviet elites 
(excluding Georgia) that mostly follow a policy of  
balancing between the EU and Russia. The main 
challenges for the Moldovan government are the 
need for fundamental reforms to change the exist-
ing political, social and economic reality and the 
reintegration of  the separatist region of  Trans-
nistria. Moldova could be a success story for EU 
neighborhood policy. It is small, it currently has 
a pro-EU elite and it has a non-ethnic resolvable 
conflict with Transnistria. Yet in order to succeed 
in its neighborhood approach, the EU has to seri-
ously engage in the Transnistrian conflict and it 
must develop a real partnership for reform with 
Moldova.
Moldova’s post-Soviet transformation path
In contrast to other countries in the post-Soviet 
space, Moldova lacked strong presidential power 
in the 1990s and became the only parliamentary 
republic in the Commonwealth of  Independent 
States (CIS). Nevertheless, the pluralism of  the 
political system in Moldova was not based on 
democratic values, but was the result of  weak 
political institutions. No player was able to change 
the rules of  the game with the result in a balance 
of  power between the different interest groups. 
This changed in 2001, when the Party of  Commu-
nists of  the Republic of  Moldova (PCRM) won the 
parliamentary elections. With a majority in parlia-
ment, their leader Vladimir Voronin was elected 
president. Voronin established a political system 
that attempted to consolidate authoritarian rule 
by controlling business and the media through an 
absence of  the rule of  law and an informal system 
of  rule.50 This non-transparent and limited com-
petitive political system failed to implement neces-
sary political and economic reforms and polarized 
society. Despite this, Voronin was not able to con-
solidate his political rule.
Following increased dissatisfaction among the elec-
torate, the blatant manipulation of  the April 2009 
parliamentary elections led to mass protests. Voro-
nin had to call for new elections in July because of  
his inflexibility in reaching a compromise with the 
opposition. The result was a narrow victory for the 
coalition of  the Liberal Democratic Party of  Mol-
dova, the Liberal Party, the Alliance Our Moldova 
and the Democratic Party of  Moldova, the so-
called Alliance for European Integration (AEI). But 
because it lacked a qualified majority, the AEI was 
not able to elect a president. It had to again call for 
elections that took place in November 2010 and 
that confirmed a narrow victory for the coalition 
and continued the deadlock with the PCRM. The 
situation in parliament illustrates the split in Mol-
dovan society resulting from a division over three 
main issues: the model of  political power, national 
identity and the country’s geopolitical orientation.51 
Citizens have become frustrated about the failure 
of  the political leadership to reform Moldova and 
to give its people brighter prospects for the future. 
Moldova’s citizens don’t trust political parties or 
state institutions and there is no functioning legal 
system in the country. An opinion poll conducted 
by the Institute for Public Policy (Chisinau) in 2009 
found out that more than 50 percent of  inter-
viewees felt Moldova was moving in the wrong 
direction. Political parties, the police and the courts 
turned out to be the least trusted institutions in the 
country.52
Weak private entrepreneurship and the state’s huge 
influence in the economy hinder market reforms 
which would lead to more competition and increase 
of  quality of  products. An urban-country-divide 
that leads to a strong influence for the huge rural 
population, and a disproportionately high percent-
age of  elderly people among the whole population, 
makes large parts of  the Moldovan society open 
to a paternalistic model of  state.53 These character-
istics stand in contrast to the younger generation 
and the smaller urban population, which see their 
future in the EU. Many people in this group leave 
the country for work and better living standards. 
However, both groups are united in their disbelief  
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that the political elites will manage a positive trans-
formation of  the country.
The main transformation obstacles for 
Moldova
Without the prospect of  fundamental economic 
transformation, along with its lack of  natural 
resources, Moldova remains one of  the poorest 
countries in Europe. While the CIS as a region 
recovered to the 1992 GDP level by 2003, Moldova 
was only able to reach its 1992 output in 2008, and 
only for a short time. The main driver of  Moldo-
va’s economic recovery over the last ten years has 
been remittances from Moldovans who have gone 
abroad (mostly Russia and the EU), which make 
up approximately one-third of  Moldova’s GDP.54 A 
lack of  economic reforms combined with an inef-
ficient and corrupt system of  state control over the 
economy limit the economic recovery. Moldova 
has been one of  the worst performers in Central 
and Eastern Europe in attracting foreign direct 
investment and in doing business.55 Moldova’s very 
slow and limited economic recovery ended with the 
financial crisis in 2008.
The main obstacle for the development of  Mol-
dova and its further integration in the EU is the 
conflict over the separatist region of  Transnistria. 
The conflict has both economic and political impli-
cations. Since the end of  the Moldovan-Transnis-
trian war in 1992, Transnistria has been ruled by 
the leadership of  the self-proclaimed “Transnistrian 
Moldova Republic.” It has established parallel 
institutions and managed to function as a state-like 
entity independent from Moldova. As a so called 
“captured state,” it is led by a business elite that 
centralizes power in the hands of  “President” Igor 
Smirnov, the head of  the main business group. The 
Transnistrian conflict does not have ethnic roots 
like other post-Soviet conflicts and is therefore 
widely considered to be the “easiest” conflict to 
solve in the whole region. However, over the last 
20 years the Moldovan state has been too weak to 
formulate and implement a viable reintegration pol-
icy. Moldova’s weak economic performance failed 
to attract the population of  Transnistria. But there 
have been signs that supporting the Moldovan gov-
ernment might pay off: In November 2005 the EU 
launched a Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) 
at the border between Ukraine and Moldova. The 
mission helped to fight smuggling and human traf-
ficking along the Transnistrian border and reduced 
the revenues of  the Transnistrian leadership. This 
helped to pressure the Transnistrian elites to find 
compromises to transact trade via Moldovan 
territory.
Competition between Russia and the EU
With their respective political and economic mod-
els, both Russia and the EU have influence on the 
Moldovan leadership. In the “bargaining” typical 
of  post-Soviet states, President Voronin tried to 
balance between Russia and the EU to gain the 
most from both without having to implement fun-
damental reforms. With regard to the EU-Moldova 
Action Plan signed in 2005, the PCRM government 
implemented only those reforms that offered clear 
financial benefits without weakening its political 
and economic power. Only two of  ten priorities 
listed in the Action Plan were implemented, namely 
the creation of  conditions for the granting of  
autonomous trade preferences and a re-admission 
agreement with the EU.56 In successive ENP 
progress reports, Brussels criticized Moldova for 
failing to implement chapters related to human 
rights, freedom of  the media, independence of  the 
judiciary, the fight against corruption, as well as 
an improvement of  the business and investment 
climate.57 The EU is partly to blame since it failed 
to develop a credible mechanism of  conditionality 
that can react to the political situation in Moldova. 
A lack of  clear demands and sanctions as well as 
the EU’s ignorance regarding the political culture in 
Moldova are the main reasons for this failure from 
the EU side. Brussels concentrated on introducing 
new rules and regulations to a political system that 
is largely defined by informal rules and a lack of  
functioning institutions. The EU’s ambitious goals 
(such as fundamental reforms of  the socio-eco-
nomic system) also stands in contrast to the mod-
est funds (approximately 40 million euro) Brussels 
has offered so far.
At the same time, Moldova is much more depen-
dent on Russia than the EU. Moldova gets all of  its 
gas from Russia and the Moldovan economy tra-
ditionally exports most of  its agricultural products 
to Russia. Russia is also Transnistria’s key partner 
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for both financial and political support. It currently 
has around 1200 “peace” troops stationed there.58 
President Voronin tried to cooperate with Russia to 
resolve the territorial conflict over Transnistria and 
to negotiate a withdrawal of  Russian troops from 
the separatist region. A resolution of  the Transnis-
trian conflict, however, would limit Russia’s influ-
ence on Moldova. Therefore, Russia wants Mol-
dova to accept the continued stationing of  Russian 
troops and the federalization of  Moldova, which 
would guarantee a significant impact for Transnis-
tria on Chisinau’s policy. Moscow pressured Voro-
nin to sign the Kozak Memorandum in November 
2003, which aimed at constructing a confederation 
between Moldova and Transnistria without giving 
Chisinau the instruments to influence the domestic 
situation in Transnistria. The memorandum would 
have secured Russia’s military presence in Transnis-
tria for 20 years.59
Aside from the multilateral negotiation format 
that includes Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as 
intermediaries and the EU and the US as observ-
ers (the so called 5 plus 2 negotiations), Moscow 
tried several times to push negotiations in a trilat-
eral framework with President Voronin and the 
leader of  the Transnistrian separatist region. But 
after resistance from the Moldovan opposition and 
pressure from both the EU and the US, Voronin 
decided not to sign the memorandum. In response, 
Russia closed its market for Moldovan agricultural 
products and doubled the price for gas to the 
country in 2005. In March 2006 the embargo was 
extended to wine. The value of  Moldovan exports 
to Russia reduced by almost 50 percent, from 347 
million Dollar in 2005 to 182 million Dollar in 
2006, which worsened the economic situation of  
the country even more. Russia is still Moldova’s 
single most important trading partner, but it is 
closely followed by Romania, a direct neighbor and 
Moldova’s biggest supporter in the EU. All EU 
member states together receive a larger amount of  
Moldovan exports than Russia.60 Moldova is to a 
large extent dependent on Russia, which makes it 
more difficult for the EU to influence the coun-
try. On the other hand, if  the EU and its member 
states were to make a serious effort, they could 
be an attractive alternative for Chisinau. But this 
requires both a serious effort by Moldovan elites 
to implement fundamental reforms (introducing 
of  rule of  law, transparent privatization and condi-
tions for a competitive political system) and the 
will of  the EU to offer Moldova economic inte-
gration, which also means the risk of  coming in 
conflict with Russia.
New approaches for Moldova and the EU
Under its new pro-European coalition, Moldova 
increased efforts towards a rapprochement with the 
European Union. After winning the July 2009 elec-
tions, the AEI specified its common goals in their 
government program such as the restoration of  
the rule of  law and the decentralization of  power. 
The AEI started negotiations on an Association 
Agreement with the EU.61 The long-term goal of  
the new coalition is EU membership for Moldova, 
which the EU has not yet offered. Aiming for EU 
membership, the AEI gave up the balancing policy 
between Moscow and Brussels and concentrated 
its policy towards EU demands. The EU progress 
report from 2010 noted that dialogue with civil 
society has improved and that the transparency of  
the decision-making processes has increased. Prog-
ress was also noted in fighting corruption, reform-
ing the judiciary system and with regard to human 
rights standards.62 Moldova decided to turn towards 
the European Union and in return was rewarded 
with greater financial support. Apart from a 100 
million euro credit from the EU, Moldova received 
580 million Dollar from the IMF in 2009 as well 
as a total sum of  1.9 billion euro from several 
partners (such as the European Commission, the 
World Bank, the IMF and the United States) for its 
reform program “Re-Think Moldova.”63
Implementing reforms, however, within the limited 
capacities of  the bureaucratic apparatus remains a 
big challenge for the new government. After two 
years of  new rhetoric from the coalition, no fun-
damental reforms have been implemented. The 
inability to elect a new president because of  the 
deadlock with the PCRM and diverging interests 
within the coalition have hindered any real prog-
ress. The personal interests of  the coalition’s lead-
ers should be subordinated to the interests of  the 
country. On the other hand, the country needs 
more support from the EU in order to be able 
to modernize its administration. The EU should 
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therefore put greater emphasis on increasing insti-
tutional capacities and help the Moldovan govern-
ment to understand the ways in which the EU 
functions.64 Brussels also has experience in fighting 
corruption and strengthening the rule of  law, and it 
should offer its expertise in both areas.
Visa-free travel within the EU plays a key role for 
the Moldovan government in winning over its 
people for economic and political reforms. The 
EU should explore this option to create better 
incentives for the Moldovan government to reform. 
Visa-free travel could also contribute to the resolu-
tion of  the Transnistrian conflict because it would 
make Moldova more attractive to the people of  
Transnistria.
A German initiative set up in Meseberg in June 
2010 that aims at making Transnistria a test case for 
EU-Russia cooperation is a step in the right direc-
tion, but has brought no tangible results so far.65 
Russia does not want progress in the Transnistrian 
conflict, because then it would lose its tool to influ-
ence Moldovan policy. From the EU side, there 
is a need to take Moldova and the Transnistrian 
conflict more seriously and to develop a real test 
case for engagement. Such a step implies that the 
EU and its members have to be consequent in their 
negotiations with Russia, even if  they risk a con-
frontation with Moscow. As long as the EU accepts 
how Russia uses the post-Soviet conflicts to secure 
the status quo and its own sphere of  influence, no 
breakthrough will be achieved.
Instead of  “imitating integration”66 with its Eastern 
neighbors, the EU should concentrate on those 
countries that have a real interest in cooperating 
with the EU. Moldova is a country in which further 
engagement is likely to pay off. The EU should 
further develop its instruments, aiming at produc-
ing measurable effects. In the case of  Moldova this 
means starting negotiations for a Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and reward-
ing reforms by opening up the European Union’s 
agricultural sector to Moldovan products. Introduc-
ing free movement of  travel and building privileged 
institutional relations should also be part of  the 
package. Brussels should finally put greater empha-
sis on support for civil society by improving access 
to EU programs like cultural and educational 
exchanges, voluntary service and assistance with 
effective civil society organization. On the other 
hand, Brussels should more clearly sanction coun-
tries if  they do not fulfill the announced reforms. 
While there has been progress in Moldova-EU 
negotiations, there are delays in implementing 
major reforms by the current Moldovan govern-
ment coalition.
As Ukraine’s change of  government in the 2010 
elections shows, the main challenge for the current 
Moldovan government is to stabilize its institutions 
against an authoritarian roll back and to implement 
fundamental reforms that actually change the rules 
of  the game. To allow for political competition, 
increasing the media’s independence and strength-
ening civil society are the main tasks of  the govern-
ment’s reform process. The EU should step up its 
support of  this process as well with functioning 
carrots and sticks. Bringing Moldovan society into 
this major reform project would mean breaking 
with the Soviet legacy and allowing Moldova to 
take a real step in the direction of  an open and plu-
ralistic society.
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Belarus is an exception to the eastern dimension of  
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Dip-
lomatic activity with the autocratic regime is close 
to nonexistent, and Belarus is the only country in 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) without a Partner-
ship and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. In 
comparison to the other EaP countries, areas and 
instruments of  cooperation, as well as financial aid, 
are much more limited. Furthermore, the ruling 
autocratic elite in Belarus does not aim at enter-
ing the EU, but at consolidating an independent 
Belarus in close cooperation with Russia. Thus, EU 
accession is neither a long-term goal nor an incen-
tive for change in EU-Belarus relations.
Belarus used to be an island of  stability in the 
post-Soviet area, supported by economic growth 
and social security that was subsidized by Rus-
sia. But this system has been teetering since the 
global financial crisis. Inflation reached 33 percent 
(YOY) by May 2011 after the Belarusian ruble was 
devaluated by over 50 percent.68 600,000 people 
have been temporarily suspended from their jobs69 
and Belarus’ foreign currency reserves are now so 
low that no foreign currency is available for the 
people. To solve these challenges, the regime relies 
on loans from Russia and the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC), thereby becoming more 
dependent on its neighbor to the east.
To develop a new EU strategy towards Belarus, 
the European Union should take a closer look at 
structural developments and processes in Belarus 
and identify new approaches for cooperation. This 
paper begins with an overview of  EU-Belarus 
relations and then explains the challenges Belarus 
is facing at the moment. Finally, it will identify 
two focal groups for a new EU strategy towards 
Belarus: the young pro-EU society and those parts 
of  the elite that have become disappointed with 
the lack of  reforms.
EU policy towards Belarus over the last  
20 years
After gaining independence in 1991, the EU and 
Belarus started negotiating a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement. The process was halted 
in 1997, after President Alexander Lukashenko had 
widened his power by changing the constitution. 
Since then, EU policy towards Belarus has been 
based on isolation and minimizing official contacts 
and diplomacy while at the same time increasing 
support for civil society.
In 2004 Lukashenko initiated a referendum to 
change the constitution a second time. Presidential 
term limits were abolished, allowing Lukashenko 
to continue to run for president. The presidential 
elections in 2006 did not meet OSCE standards 
for democratic elections and were followed by 
mass protests. After five days, they were violently 
dissolved and did not lead to a revolution like in 
neighboring Ukraine.70 A reason for the failure 
of  the protests was a lack of  support from forces 
within the elite.
Following the elections, the EU adopted an isola-
tion policy, but this failed to influence politics in 
Belarus. The authoritarian regime succeeded in 
consolidating its power. Thus, the EU re-thought 
its policy and began a cautious rapprochement, 
which led the EU to include Belarus in the Eastern 
Partnership initiative in 2009. For the Belarusian 
regime, this offer came at the right time, since 
Minsk was under pressure from Russia both eco-
nomically and politically after the global financial 
crisis. Engaging with the EU offered the possibility 
to counterbalance its dependency on Russia.71
The next benchmark in EU-Belarus relations was 
the presidential elections of  December 2010 and 
the violent crackdown of  mass protests on the 
evening of  election day. The severe violations of  
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human and civil rights disgraced EU politicians 
who had advocated for a rapprochement. The 
events also showed that the European Union still 
had no influence on internal decisions taken by the 
Belarusian leadership. In the aftermath of  the elec-
tions, the EU unanimously condemned the actions 
of  the Belarusian regime, called for the release of  
all political prisoners, and introduced sanctions tar-
geting the political leadership. The EU issued visa 
bans for top officials and froze their bank accounts. 
Additionally, in June 2011, embargos were imposed 
on three companies owned by one of  Lukashen-
ko’s main financiers.72
The past twenty years have shown that the EU 
lacks influence and leverage in Belarus. Facing the 
failed attempt at rapprochement, the EU should 
think about a new strategy towards Belarus. For 
this to succeed, it is important to a have a deeper 
insight into the functioning of  the country, to 
understand the underlying processes, and to then 
identify new starting points.
Insights into the Belarusian power system
Having consolidated its power in 2004, the authori-
tarian regime relied on the following three pillars:
Table 1: Pillars of Belarus’ power system since 2004 
(author’s classification)
Pillars of Belarus’ power system
An autocratic system 
with a strong security 
apparatus and con-
trol of  the media
Economic growth 
and social real-
location based on 
subsidies from Rus-
sia: hush-money for 
Belarusians and the 
elite
A foreign and secu-
rity seesaw policy 
between sovereignty 
and dependence on 
Russia
An autocratic system with a strong security 
apparatus and control of the media
The sustainability of  internal power in Belarus is 
based on autocratic centralism with a clear hier-
archy and loyalty towards the President. In addi-
tion, Lukashenko constantly reshuffles powerful 
positions to prevent anyone else from gaining too 
much power. The last rotation took place right after 
the December 2010 elections when he replaced the 
prime minister and other politicians who were con-
sidered “pro-European” and “pro-liberalization.” 
By keeping the economy state-owned and closed 
from international markets, oligarchies were not 
able to develop in the transition period after the 
dissolution of  the Soviet Union. Ironically, what 
has ensured his power for 17 years is now one of  
his main problems: the non-reformed Soviet-style 
industry that produces goods, which cannot com-
pete on the global market.
In recent years, Lukashenko has also established a 
patrimonial system by installing his family in politi-
cal and economic posts. His son Viktor is one of  
his closest counselors. His youngest extra-marital 
son, six-year-old Kolya, seems to be a kind of  
“mascot” accompanying him to social and political 
events. Some voices say that Kolya is meant to be 
his successor one day.
In addition, the Belarusian power system fun-
damentally relies on a well-functioning security 
apparatus. The firm crackdown of  the protests in 
December 2010 and the immediate reactions to 
the metro bombing of  April 2011 and to the on-
going silent demonstrations shows the effectiveness 
of  the police and the Belarusian security agency 
(KGB). The ensuing trials once more revealed the 
judiciary’s lack of  independence and violations of  
human rights in KGB prisons.
Finally, the state-controlled media, which func-
tion as an organ of  the regime, play an important 
role in the autocratic system. After the April 2011 
metro bombing, two independent newspapers 
(Nasha Niva und Narodnaya Volya) were targets of  
searches and were threatened with closure. Out 
of  178 countries, Belarus ranks 154 on the Press 
Freedom Index 2010, the lowest rating in Europe.73 
Essentially, the only source for non-regime-
controlled information in Belarus is the Internet. 
It is widely used by the opposition as well as by 
the wider public. The security apparatus regularly 
obstructs opposition web pages or social networks 
like vkontakte.ru, but has not yet found a function-
ing mechanism against this source.
It is difficult to judge whether there are cracks in 
the Belarusian power system. But there is an obvi-
ous division within the economic elite. Parts of  the 
elite prefer market liberalization to the outdated 
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state-controlled economy. The regime’s hesitant 
efforts to liberalize the economy in the last two 
years have disappointed them. These circles could 
be open to regime change as soon as Lukashenko 
is no longer able to pay them off. Until now, he has 
stifled criticism by re-distributing rewards among 
the elite. Yet if  the economic situation continues to 
worsen, he will not have the means to offer these 
payoffs any longer.
Economic growth and social stability based 
on subsidies from Russia: hush-money for 
Belarusians and the elite
Economic growth has been the most important 
foundation of  Lukashenko’s power. Until the 
global financial crisis, the Belarusian economy 
performed much better than other former Soviet 
countries such as neighboring Ukraine (e. g. in 2008, 
10.2 percent GDP growth in comparison to 1.9 
percent for Ukraine).74 The system relied on sub-
sidies from Russia in the form of  cheap gas and 
loans, as well as on the open Russian market for 
Belarusian products. This allowed Lukashenko to 
guarantee social equality and security and to project 
an image of  being the only warrantor of  stability 
and prosperity for Belarus.
But the global financial crisis has weakened this 
system. Russia experienced economic troubles and 
started an “economization” of  its foreign policy:75 
It raised gas prices and Belarus had to make con-
cessions in order to avoid an even higher price. As 
a result, Belarus sold parts of  its pipeline system to 
Russian investors and joined the Customs Union 
with Russia and Kazakhstan. In addition, demands 
for Belarusian goods in their main markets, Russia 
and Ukraine, fell sharply because of  the economic 
decline in both countries. It became clear that 
Belarusian products are not competitive on the 
global market. In 2009, Belarusian GDP officially 
grew by a mere 0.2 percent. But even this low fig-
ure might be fabricated in order to project (if  only 
marginal) economic growth.
Belarus has not been able to recover from these 
hardships. The rating agency Standard & Poors 
reduced Belarus’ credibility rating from B+ to 
B in March 2011, adding a negative outlook.76 
Economic problems include an increasingly nega-
tive trade balance, excessive credit growth and 
wage increases, and high public spending (which 
Lukashenko needs to secure the loyalty of  the 
people and especially of  the administrative elite 
and the security apparatus). The International 
Monetary Fund gave Belarus loans in 2009 and 
2010, but now warns that Belarus’ net interna-
tional currency reserves are too small after a 20 
percent reduction at the beginning of  2011.77 As 
a consequence, the Belarusian ruble was devalu-
ated by over 50 percent, which resulted in an 
inflation rate of  33 percent (YOY) by May 2011.78 
The shortage of  foreign currency forced 600,000 
people to temporarily suspend their jobs accord-
ing to a statement of  the head of  the National 
Statistical Committee of  the Republic of  Belarus, 
Vladimir Zinovsky.79 This equals an unemployment 
rate of  12.7 percent (the official unemployment 
rate was claimed to be 0.7 percent80). In March 
and April 2011 the prices for fuel, bread, and other 
vital products increased.81 People have started to 
stockpile.
Economic instability will increase widespread wea-
riness among the population and probably lead to 
more social unrest. A growing number of  Belaru-
sians do not see the current regime as being able 
to secure economic stability. In a public opinion 
poll conducted by the Independent Institute of  
Socio-Economic and Political Studies in Vilnius 
in June 2011, 73.4 percent of  respondents stated 
that their economic situation has worsened. Only 
26.9 percent of  respondents answered the same in 
March 2011 and 16.0 percent in December 2010. 
Trust in Lukashenko dropped to 35.7 percent by 
June 2011, from 47.9 percent in March 2011 and 55 
percent in December 2010.82 People have started 
to show their disappointment publicly. There are 
regular “silent” demonstrations organized via face-
book (“Revolution through social networks”) in 
over twelve Belarusian cities. These demonstrations 
are without any political claims, banners, or leader-
ship, which makes it difficult for the regime to react 
against them. Thus, the regime has answered the 
only way it knows: Over 1700 people are estimated 
to have been detained for simply walking on the 
street and clapping.83 The harsh reactions show a 
growing nervousness and lack of  strategy by the 
regime.
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A foreign and security seesaw policy 
between sovereignty and dependence on 
Russia
In its foreign and security policy, Belarus is as 
focused on Russia as it is in the first two pillars of  
the Belarusian power system. But Minsk tries to 
balance Moscow’s influence to safeguard its sover-
eignty. This “seesaw” foreign policy combines four 
strategic measures:
– Integration in multilateral organizations under 
Russia’s influence, like the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization or the Customs Union with 
Russia and Kazakhstan;
– Economic cooperation with former Soviet 
republics, especially Russia and Ukraine;
– Loose cooperation with the European Union, 
the United States, and international (“Western”) 
organizations like the OSCE and the IMF;
– Pragmatic networks with countries like China, 
Venezuela, and Cuba.
This balance is now threatened by changes in 
Russian foreign policy. Russia has clarified the 
conditions under which it is willing to continue 
supporting Belarus with loans: Russian investors 
should have prior access to buy Belarusian pipe-
line systems and industries and Belarus should 
adopt the Russian ruble and thus integrate more 
with Russia.84 Lukashenko’s bargaining position is 
weak. Economic strains are weighing on him, and 
his ability to play Russia and the West against each 
other is limited now that the EU and the US have 
reinstated an isolation policy toward Minsk while 
Russia has become more assertive.
Table 2: Division of Belarusian Society (author’s classification—amended version)
1) The supporters of the current regime, mainly composed of 
three subgroups:
2) The opponents of the current regime, mostly pro-Europe-
an and mainly composed of three subgroups:
a) Active Supporters b) Opportunists c) Passive Supporters a) Active Opponents b) The Socially 
Engaged
c) The Frustrated
Lukashenko cannot look to other partners for help 
either. In June 2011, Belarus signed contracts on 
joint projects with the Chinese Exim Bank that 
are worth one billion Dollar, but cannot be used 
to cover the current deficits. Venezuela offered oil, 
These examples illustrate that Belarusian society 
is split into two camps, supporters and opponents. 
Each camp consists of  subgroups that are worth 
highlighting:
but high transport costs make it more expensive 
than Russian oil. Since Belarus is landlocked, it 
needs access to either a Ukrainian or a Baltic Sea 
harbor to receive Venezuelan oil. Other potential 
partners, such as Cuba or Libya, are struggling with 
their own serious economic and political problems.
Thus, Belarus still needs the EU and Western insti-
tutions to counterbalance Russia’s steadily growing 
influence. Indeed, in June 2011 Belarus started 
talks with the IMF for new loans.
A new EU policy towards Belarus
In light of  the constellation of  power in Belarus, 
the European Union should rethink its strategy. 
Two societal groups are particularly prone to fuel-
ing political change: the pro-European youth (parts 
of  2c in the table below) and the disappointed eco-
nomic elites (parts of  1a).
Getting to know Belarusian society
Belarusian society is divided. An opinion poll pub-
lished in March 201185 shows this: 47.7 percent 
of  Belarusians think that the authorities acted 
correctly on December 19, 2010 when they came 
down hard on the protesters, whereas 42.4 percent 
disagree. The question “A. Lukashenko has become 
president of  the country again. Did you person-
ally want it?“ was answered “yes” by 46.2 percent 
of  respondents while 43.2 percent responded “no.” 
Belarusian society also disagrees on who is seen as 
responsible for the metro bombing in April 2011: 
Regime supporters believe the official interpreta-
tion of  an opposition attack. Opponents, however, 
think the inner power circle faked an insurgent ter-
rorist attack in order to discredit the opposition.86
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The supporters enable the stability of  the current 
regime, although not all of  them actively support 
the regime or would be against regime change. 
Three large groups can be distinguished:
1 a) Active Supporters
The active supporters are the beneficiaries of  the 
system, who gain from financial distributions as 
well as official and unofficial rules. This group 
comprises the administrative and economic elite 
and the security apparatus. If  economic decline 
continues, this group could split due to a lack of  
payoffs and dissent about the political and eco-
nomical direction. The disappointed members of  
the elite are a starting point for the EU.
1 b) The Opportunists
The opportunists benefit from the current situation 
because they have found their own niche where 
they can act independently and live comfortably. 
This group mainly works in state-controlled enter-
prises that take advantage of  unofficial rules, as 
well as in other state-controlled areas like education 
and services. They are used to the current system 
and appreciate the advantages of  stability. If  the 
regime changed this group would likely try to adapt 
to the new rules.
1 c) Passive Supporters
The passive supporters are the neutral, apolitical 
segments of  society that prefer stability and secu-
rity. It is probably the largest group, and includes 
workers, farmers, the elderly, and less-educated 
people without access to independent information.
The opponents of the regime are
2 a) Active Opponents
The active opposition forms a small part of  Belaru-
sian society. After the presidential elections, many 
opponents were detained and some are still in 
prison. These forces have therefore been weakened 
and need time to recover. But the brutal actions of  
the regime could also help to unify and strengthen 
the opposition in the coming years.
2 b) The Socially Engaged
There is an active and heterogeneous civil society 
operating in different fields such as the environ-
ment, social and health issues, and education. They 
are not politically active per se. Their goal is to 
change the situation in a specific area and not to 
actively overthrow the regime. They are tolerated 
because they fulfill important functions for society. 
An important part of  this group aims at mitigating 
the consequences of  the Chernobyl catastrophe, 
which hit Belarus harder than anywhere else.
2 c) The Frustrated
The frustrated are mainly the well-educated mem-
bers of  society that suffer a lack of  opportunities 
due to the country’s isolation. The rigged election 
and the suppression of  protests, as well as the dire 
economic situation, have led to a loss of  credibility 
for the regime. This group wants to end the coun-
try’s isolation and aims for EU integration. In the 
first half  of  2011, opinion polls showed that the 
size of  this group has grown and can be expected 
to increase further.
Charming young, pro-European Belarusians
For the European Union, groups 2a) and 2b) were 
obvious partners for cooperation in the past, and, 
of  course, they will and should remain so in future. 
But the EU should realize that the frustrated, and 
especially the young and well-educated Belarusians 
(group 2c), are an important starting point for addi-
tional engagement. The pro-European members 
of  society could form the future ruling elite. Of  
course, they could just as easily make up future 
pro-Russian elites. However, currently 50.5 percent 
of  Belarusians would rather join the EU than inte-
grate with Russia (31.5 percent).87
The EU would do well to respond to this plea by 
offering attractive programs and promoting the EU 
in Belarus. EU member states should start imple-
menting the post-election promise of  support for 
civil society announced at the February 2011 inter-
national donor conference in Warsaw. German For-
eign Minister Guido Westerwelle promised 6.6 million 
euro for 2011,88 and the European Commissioner 
for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Štefan 
Füle, promised 17.3 million euro from 2011–2013.89 
The European Union might lose credibility, if  it 
now directs all of  its support efforts toward North 
Africa and forgets about its promises to Belarus. 
This includes supporting the EaP’s Civil Society 
Forum with an office of  its own, offering more 
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scholarships for students and young professionals, 
establishing an independent Belarus Fund for Civil 
Society Projects, and introducing visa facilitations.
Making contacts within the disappointed 
elite
The EU should also build reliable networks with 
disappointed forces among the Belarusian eco-
nomic and political elite (parts of  1 a). Because of  
the cautious economic liberalization that started 
two years ago, new independent elites now have an 
opportunity to develop and gain influence in the 
country. Contacts should be made and coopera-
tion should be considered. Excluding Belarus from 
the Eastern Partnership Initiative would send the 
wrong signal because the EaP’s multilateral dimen-
sion offers contacts between executives and experts 
on a low and medium level.
The EU Delegation in Minsk should play a key role 
by expanding its activities and fulfilling the role of  
a lively contact point between Belarus and the EU. 
Germany, together with Belarus’ neighboring EU 
countries (Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania), should 
push to keep the Eastern Dimension high on the 
EU agenda. The upheavals in North Africa pain-
fully revealed how unprepared the EU was as well 
as its lack of  knowledge and contact with non-gov-
ernmental actors in the region. If  it remains inac-
tive and inattentive to Belarus now, the European 
Union risks once again being caught flat-footed by 
change in its neighborhood.
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When looking at the state of  relations between 
Ukraine and the EU, one thing becomes clear: The 
incentives at the EU’s disposal—most notably 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) and visa liberalization—are not strong 
enough to influence Ukraine. This suggests that the 
Enlargement Policy’s conditionality mechanism can 
only be partially adopted by European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP). But how can the EU influence 
Ukraine without the carrot of  membership? Con-
cerning the further development of  the Eastern 
Partnership, the EU should not rely too heavily on 
its experiences with its Enlargement Policy. Clearly, 
the EU should not adopt delaying tactics and it 
should not offer unclear prospects for membership. 
It should instead openly confess its failures, rede-
fine its aims, and communicate them in a transpar-
ent manner. Apart from short-term incentives und 
benefits, the EU has to take more long-term meth-
ods into consideration. This text will show that 
socialization is a promising instrument for influenc-
ing Ukraine’s behavior in the long-term.
Socialization
The concept of  “rhetorical action” assumes that 
interests and beliefs can change through interaction 
between actors. It shows a way to achieve socializa-
tion that is primarily focused on informal institu-
tions and describes the strategic use of  arguments 
based on rules and norms and the resulting trans-
formation of  the addressees’ beliefs.90 “[I]t  
postulates that social actors use and exchange 
arguments based on identities, values, and norms 
institutionalized in their environment to defend 
their political claims and to persuade their audience 
and their opponents to accept these claims and to 
act accordingly.“91 Consequently, these actors can 
change their traditional behavior from a rational 
“logic of  consequences” into a “logic of  appro-
priateness.”92 This means attributing an intrinsic 
advantage to the EU’s norms, independent of  any 
material incentive. The adoption of  these norms 
appears as „either the right thing or the smart 
thing to do,“93 and is thus legitimate. This cognitive 
framing-process is called “socialization,” “social 
learning,” or “persuasion,” and it is the main goal 
of  rhetorical action.
With its rhetorical action, the EU aims at strength-
ening a “European identity” in the target countries. 
In theory, as soon as EU norms are established 
as part of  a country’s identity, the EU can use 
these norms as a form of  moral leverage because 
the country has a compulsion to act without 
alternatives. These cognitive change processes 
are independent of  concurrent changes concern-
ing resources, the type of  government, or formal 
institutions.94
Target groups for such socialization processes are 
national decision-makers and opinion formers, 
such as those in bureaucracy, politics, and science 
(top-down approach). In line with bottom-up-
development, actors from civil society are even 
more eligible as change agents, who can themselves 
activate socialization processes supporting the EU’s 
norms on different hierarchical levels.95 But how 
can the European Union apply a smart socializa-
tion policy vis-à-vis Ukraine?
What does Ukraine want?
Balancing its interests between the two poles of  
the EU and Russia—so called “swing politics” or 
“multi-vector-politics”—has been an integral part 
of  Ukrainian foreign policy, and not just since Vic-
tor Yanukovych’s return to power. Ukraine does 
not accept the polarized alternative of  “either the 
EU or Russia.” While indicating its will for closer 
cooperation with Russia, the Ukrainian leadership 
is also trying to convince the EU to come up with 
additional offers.
Obviously, relations between the EU and Ukraine 
cannot be understood without the Russian angle. 
It is important to note that Ukraine is dependent 
on both Russia and the EU. The connection with 
Russia is not only strong with regard to culture and 
history, but also in terms of  economic and energy 
policies. For post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine is still „the 
largest imperial temptation.“96 One example of  
this is the 2010 Russian-Ukrainian agreement that 
Socialization as a Solution to the Conditionality Deadlock with Ukraine?
by Ulrike Stern
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included a reduction of  gas prices for Ukraine in 
exchange for prolonging the Russian military pres-
ence in the Crimea until 2042. Further aims on the 
Russian side are influence over the Ukrainian pipe-
line system for gas while the Ukrainians are con-
cerned with preserving their position as the main 
transit country for Russian gas.
As to the EU, it can offer benefits like free trade 
and visa liberalization. Trade between Ukraine 
and the EU amounts to 29.3 percent of  Ukrainian 
exports, with Ukrainian-Russian trade comprising 
25.4 percent.97 In face of  the global economic cri-
sis, Ukraine’s strategy is clear: Integration into the 
international economic system, preferably without 
any exclusive, one-sided dependencies. Ukraine 
is hoping to advance its own economic situation 
by signing a DCFTA as part of  an Association 
Agreement (AA) with the EU, which would lead to 
additional trade and simplified access to European 
Union credits. In contrast to economic benefits, 
the normative aspects of  EU policy, such as sup-
port for democratic structures and rule of  law, are 
nowhere near as attractive, especially for Ukraine’s 
powerful economic elites.
Ukraine’s need for reform
Ukraine is far from being a functioning democ-
racy that respects civil rights and the rule of  law. 
But still, due to the advanced negotiations and 
increased integration with the EU, the country 
is seen as a prime example of  EU cooperation 
within the group of  the Eastern neighbors. How-
ever, corruption and the weight of  informal struc-
tures remain the country’s main problems, which 
also restrains relations with the EU.98 Additionally, 
Yanukovych immediately focused on recentralizing 
his power upon his return. The Ukrainian con-
stitutional court for instance withdrew a reform 
dating back to 2004 that had transformed a sys-
tem dominated by the president to a system that 
balanced the powers of  the president with those 
of  the parliament.99 Freedom of  the press has 
also been restrained step by step.100 Institutional 
capacity in the public sector remains low, and the 
mechanism of  checks and balances is unsatisfying, 
both in terms of  application and results. The rul-
ing actors are largely disconnected from the rest 
of  society.
At the moment, it is very unlikely that new, pro-
European political forces will come to power. The 
opposition is discordant and sometimes suffers 
repression by the government. Still, the main 
opposition forces see the EU as an important 
partner, and they expect support. Criticism of  the 
government is also widespread among civil society. 
Yet, due to a weak standing within the Ukrainian 
political system and poor revenues from domestic 
donations and membership fees, most NGOs are 
dependent on foreign funding. The Ukrainian lead-
ership is skeptical towards the activities of  people 
like George Soros, who is accused of  showing too 
much external support for opposition groups. In 
addition to civil society, the general public shows 
a significant potential for protest. The latest opin-
ion polls illustrate diminishing support for Yanu-
kovych’s Party of  Regions, which is currently only 
supported by about 15 percent of  the Ukrainian 
population.101 Small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) especially are a group to be reckoned with. 
They were partially successful with their protests 
against the government’s plan to increase taxes 
in the fall of  2010. These protests showed their 
growing disillusionment and their readiness to take 
action.
Diverse social problems and political interests are 
the reason for Ukrainian swing-politics. The major-
ity of  influential economic elites in Ukraine are 
strongly pragmatic and not very ideological. They 
always choose to work with the player who offers 
the most incentives. The economic elites have 
been described by analysts as “highly competent, 
well-educated, market-savvy.”102 Although many 
oligarchs know that the economic system has to 
be reformed, they do not agree that this should be 
accompanied by the development of  functioning 
and transparent democratic structures and rules.103 
With juicy carrots, the economic elites might well 
be tempted to strengthen ties with the EU. Yet they 
are unlikely to accept the EU’s approach which 
only grants stronger cooperation in return for 
democratic reforms.
Public opinion also illustrates the “swing” between 
the EU and Russia. The well-documented divide 
between rather Russophone Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine and rather Ukrainophone, pro-European 
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Western part of  the country is still evident.104 
Ukrainian opinion polls display this split, and over-
all there are slightly more positive attitudes towards 
Russia than towards the EU. Still, this is mainly due 
to the quite widespread lack of  knowledge about 
the EU.105
What does the EU want? Security through 
rapprochement
The EU’s main interest with respect to Ukraine, the 
largest Eastern Partnership country, is security in 
its neighborhood and at its external borders. EU 
member states Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and 
Romania border Ukraine. Among the most impor-
tant security threats are human trafficking, drugs, 
and poverty.106 Perhaps the most important issue is 
security of  energy deliveries. Due to the uncertain 
conditions pertaining to the transit of  Russian gas 
via Ukraine, the EU wants to establish clear prin-
ciples like sustainability and competition to put its 
energy security on stable and predictable grounds. 
To achieve this, the EU aims to support stability 
in Ukraine. For the EU, stability can be reached 
through transformation, i. e. strengthening the rule 
of  law, opening markets, democratization, and ulti-
mately Europeanization—hence, through the adop-
tion of  legislations and norms.
Nevertheless, not all EU institutions and member 
states are equally convinced of  Ukraine’s relevance 
for the EU. EU actors are therefore discordant 
concerning the question of  how far integration 
should go. Austria for instance is opposed to mem-
bership for Ukraine; Germany and France—due 
in large part to their close relationship with Rus-
sia—are undecided, while Poland is in favor of  
membership.107 Germany, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, and France are also skeptical towards the 
issue of  visa liberalization.108 More than any other 
EU institution, the European Parliament is focused 
on criticizing violations of  democratic norms by 
the Ukrainian government.109 The European Com-
mission implicitly treats Ukraine like a membership 
candidate, although the Council will not agree on 
the prospect of  membership.110 These disunities 
are natural in light of  the different historical back-
grounds and interests of  the 27 EU members and 
its institutions, but they weaken the EU’s bargain-
ing position towards Ukraine.
Assessing the EU’s Policies: Output differs 
from outcome
To assess the EU’s policies towards Ukraine, 
one should not only look at the input (the EU’s 
resources and actions) and the output (the formal 
adoption of  norms and rules). The most important 
assessment criterion is indeed the outcome (the 
implementation of  norms and rules). At the same 
time, it is important to note that there are interven-
ing variables on the ground, such as the status of  
democratization, the will to integrate with the EU, 
or economic dependence on Russia.
The EU has not made an adequate effort regard-
ing input, which means that a basic prerequisite for 
a satisfying output and, more importantly, for an 
optimal outcome, goes unfulfilled. The EU claims 
to have a lot of  aims, but does not do enough 
to achieve these aims, often because EU actors 
are not united on different topics.111 Ukraine, on 
the other hand, engages in even more lip service. 
“Signing a document is treated as a crowning suc-
cess and the end of  matters. […] One extremely 
threatening matter in the partner countries is the 
lack of  faith in the ability to carry through reforms 
that would bring the partner countries into line 
with the EU. This kind of  conviction is present 
even among people having pro-European atti-
tudes.”112 In terms of  concluded agreements and 
created institutions, the EU seems to be rather 
successful concerning Ukraine. Unfortunately, the 
outcome is often quite poor.113
One important issue in which the gap between 
input, output and outcome becomes particularly 
evident is visa liberalization. The visa liberaliza-
tion action plan, which was offered by the EU to 
Ukraine during the last EU-Ukraine-Summit in 
November 2010, not only contains technical and 
legal preconditions, but also democratic ones. Still, 
the implementation of  the subsequently adopted 
national action plan has only proceeded slowly.114 
Additionally, this process has been overshadowed 
by the increase of  refugees from North Africa and 
the skeptical mood in EU member states concern-
ing continued visa liberalization.
At the moment, the most promising fields of  
cooperation between the EU and Ukraine are the 
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Association Agreement (AA) and the DCFTA. 
The negotiations about the AA (that include the 
DCFTA) started in 2008 and have recently gath-
ered pace. The DCFTA in particular, which raised 
potential for conflict in areas such as agricultural 
economics and special brand-name goods, has been 
almost entirely negotiated. It is likely that until the 
end of  2011 the AA negotiations will come to a 
closure. Of  course, it remains to be seen whether 
the outcome will be as satisfying as the in- and out-
put have been so far.
At the same time, AA and DCFTA negotiations 
are a good example of  Yanukovych’s swing-politics, 
and a reminder that this method cannot succeed 
in every area. Since April 2011, Russia vehemently 
offered Ukraine membership in a customs union 
with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Russian 
president Dmitry Medvedev even stated that 
Ukraine cannot “sit on two chairs at the same 
time.”115 Indeed, politically and technically, taking 
part in both the DCFTA and the customs union is 
as good as impossible. Nevertheless, Ukraine has 
named the AA a priority while at the same time 
promising closer cooperation with Moscow.
A precondition for success: Not 
“enlargement light,” but honesty and 
socialization
The European Union has to be more honest in 
its policies vis-à-vis Ukraine. And being honest 
means also being honest to oneself: An important 
precondition for the success of  the Eastern Part-
nership is the EU’s relationship with Russia. In the 
post-Soviet space, the EU should not act as a direct 
opponent of  Russia. Instead of  aiming for an 
exclusive partnership with Ukraine, its proximity to 
Russia should be accepted—despite divergent aims 
and beliefs, even though this might be challenging. 
This will help support the EU’s own relationship 
with Russia.
There are other aspects of  an honest EU approach 
towards Ukraine: While the EU’s multilateral 
approach towards the eastern neighbors has been 
strengthened through the Eastern Partnership, the 
EU has to be careful not to forget about the indi-
vidual character of  each partner country in this 
group-to-group-constellation. The EU should also 
continue to respond to individual achievements 
and interests. In the case of  Ukraine, it should be a 
partner at eye level. The EU has to understand the 
relevance of  Ukraine being the biggest neighbor to 
the East by getting better and more detailed knowl-
edge of  Ukraine’s concerns, interests, and specific 
challenges. Information about the Ukrainian elites, 
for instance, is fundamental. One could also imag-
ine establishing different blocs within the Eastern 
Partnership, that means an “Eastern Partnership of  
different speeds.” This could mean differentiating 
between the three Southern Caucasus countries and 
Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine in line with a geo-
graphical divide, or dividing the group among coun-
tries who have shown the strongest will to cooper-
ate with the EU, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Ukraine should be an equal partner not only 
regarding the recognition of  the legitimacy of  its 
interests, demands, and aims, but also regarding 
its duties and commitments. A culture of  demand 
assistance should not be encouraged. Ukraine’s 
self-commitment is a precondition for real change. 
Considering its high structural dependence on 
the EU (and even more so on Russia), only inter-
nal reforms can enable Ukraine to decide freely 
and independently whether it wants to cooperate 
with one or both partners. In terms of  substance, 
sophisticated reforms in the areas of  social and tax 
legislation are essential, particularly pertaining to 
restoring the national budget. Additionally, the fight 
against corruption should continue to be a top pri-
ority. Special emphasis should be put on the imple-
mentation of  pre-existing laws in this area.
Moreover, the EU should make a more sincere 
effort in the relationship rather than continuing to 
pay lip service and build dysfunctional institutions. 
The mere continuation of  negotiations is no guar-
antee for real success. No one should accept the 
halfhearted, wavering attitudes on both sides while 
the aim of  the whole process is still not agreed 
upon.
The EU should use the small incentives it has with 
its conditionality mechanisms—DCFTA and visa 
freedom—granting smaller part-incentives more 
often in exchange for smaller successes on the 
Ukrainian side. The single benefits might be smaller, 
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but in the bigger picture they will help build trust 
and a culture of  cooperation. This is already a 
form of  socialization that the EU should focus on.
Furthermore, the EU should invest in changing the 
spirit of  cooperation. There should not be a mere 
push to adapt norms from the acquis (something 
the European Commission will intuitively focus 
on). Instead, Ukrainian civil servants and broader 
society should have the chance to learn more about 
these rules and adopt and implement them volun-
tarily. A precondition for this approach is foresight 
and sustainability concerning both aims as well as 
instruments. Admittedly, an important precondition 
for convincing others of  the validity of  the EU 
system is to make the EU system perform better 
(e. g. democracy deficit, euro currency crisis, Schen-
gen crisis).
The fact that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) ties its payments for Ukraine to clear-cut 
terms is legitimate and goal-oriented. Nevertheless, 
Ukraine’s relationship with the EU is more com-
plex and entangled. The EU not only focuses on 
economic cooperation, but also on political issues. 
The EU should thus turn its objective of  democra-
tization into an incentive for Ukraine, helping the 
country to understand that democratization has a 
high value in itself, independent of  the usual EU’s 
external benefits.
In this sense, visa liberalization can be seen as 
a possible solution of  the incentive dilemma. It 
exhibits a combination of  conditionality and social-
ization because it is a benefit that favors socializa-
tion processes. In contrast to the classical mecha-
nism of  conditionality, there would be not only a 
reward for responsiveness, but the reward itself  
would induce this responsiveness. The EU could 
make gradual concessions that will still have an 
impact such as further reducing fees or further sim-
plifying the application procedures. In line with the 
socialization mechanism, the idea is to help those 
actors who are most likely to initiate a bottom-up 
democratic turnaround. Particularly in light of  the 
problems in influencing the economic elites (who 
benefit from the non-transparent and undemo-
cratic structures), and because such a turnaround 
will be more sustainable when initiated from the 
bottom-up, the EU should target the broader civil 
society. The Yushchenko period that saw an open-
ing of  the country towards Europe brought about 
quite a few young, well-educated Ukrainians who 
are receptive towards the EU’s values. To them, 
exchange programs are very attractive. The EU 
should make more of  an effort to court this group, 
as well as other possible addressees such as NGOs, 
media, educational institutions, and SMEs. The 
variety of  possible target groups also increases the 
potential EU actors. Cooperation should not be left 
to the EU’s institutions and to the governments of  
its members. NGOs, parties, cities, and municipali-
ties or investors in the EU should make their own 
contributions. On the whole, this will decrease the 
widespread lack of  knowledge concerning the EU 
among Ukrainians and, as a consequence, make 
them more receptive towards the EU system.
Additionally, Ukrainian officials and civil servants 
should be familiarized with the idea of  democratic 
reforms as a path to sustainable stability. This also 
makes it possible to influence socialization in a 
top-down manner. The successful exchange and 
learning programs that were established as part of  
the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument 
(ENPI) and enhanced through the Comprehen-
sive Institution Building Program (CIB), targeted 
at civil servants along with well-tried mechanisms 
like Twinning und TAIEX, are absolutely goal-
oriented.116 Purely adopting norms and rules is 
not enough. These rules have to be adapted and 
implemented by the relevant actors, and they have 
to believe in them.
Admittedly, socialization processes tend not to be 
clearly visible and need time to develop. But all in 
all, putting a greater effort on the tools favoring 
socialization processes will help the EU to over-
come the conditionality deadlock with Ukraine and 
its other partner countries.
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The EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 
Prague in May 2009 due to three main reasons: the 
limited effectiveness of  the European Neighbor-
hood Policy, Russia’s conflicts with Georgia (2008) 
and Ukraine (2009), and as a reaction to the Union 
for the Mediterranean. The Eastern European EaP 
target countries—which include Belarus, Moldova, 
and Ukraine117—all face enormous challenges to 
reform and transformation, and the EU needs to 
reassess its own instruments for these countries to 
ensure relevance and efficiency. Brussels’ Neigh-
borhood Policy can only be successful, if  it takes 
into account the conditions and challenges of  
the target countries and if  it carries out a realistic 
assessment of  its own resources and interests.
As the analyses in this chapter have shown, the 
EU’s relations with Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine 
have developed differently and exhibit varying rela-
tionship patterns: Belarus does not aspire to join 
the EU, its diplomatic relations with the EU are 
minimal, and it greatly depends on Russia. Ukraine 
has, since presidential elections in 2010, pursued a 
classic bargaining policy between the EU and Rus-
sia with the goal of  attaining maximum economic 
benefits with minimal economic and political 
reforms. The Republic of  Moldova, as the third 
and smallest state in the region, has re-defined its 
foreign policy in the last two years: Moldova’s goal 
is EU integration and to disentangle itself  from 
Russia’s sphere of  influence. There has been prog-
ress in negotiations with the EU, but visible steps 
toward reform have not yet occurred.
Despite the differing foreign policy goals of  all 
three states, they share characteristics that impede 
reform:
– The political culture is shaped by a joint Soviet 
history and resembles the Russian system, 
which has not experienced a fundamental trans-
formation to democracy or to a free market 
economy.
– All countries lack economic, social, and political 
reforms. This is a result of  the unwillingness of  
the elites to pursue far-reaching reforms. The 
elites focus on short-term economic gain rather 
than long-term development.
– Decision structures are based on informal net-
works and clientelism. They lack political plural-
ism and competition and freedom of  the press 
is restricted. All three states show deficits in an 
independent judiciary.
– Decisions are decoupled from the interests of  
society, and there is a divide between the elite 
and the rest of  the population. This lack of  
participation and meager prospects for develop-
ment have led to growing frustration among the 
population at large.
These structural characteristics allow Russia to 
maintain its influence in these states and make it 
difficult for the EU to gain access. Russia’s policy 
of  providing economic incentives without inquir-
ing about democratic standards is consistent with 
the interests of  the ruling elites in EaP states. As 
an important distributor of  gas, a prominent trade 
partner, and a provider of  loans, Moscow has 
ample opportunities for influence. The effects of  
the global financial crisis on the three EaP states 
have only strengthened Russia’s influence.
The EU’s offers of  long-term economic and 
transformation support are not attractive to the 
elites of  EaP countries, and their effect on tackling 
the acute economic and social problems in these 
countries has been limited. Knowledge about the 
EU and an understanding of  the EU’s decision-
making processes among the elites is low. However, 
despite these limitations, the EU still has a chance 
to develop ties with the parts of  society in these 
countries that are open to its policies. The eco-
nomic and political standards of  the EU are attrac-
tive to most of  the people in these countries.
Identifying partners and addressees for the EU
In addition to a dialogue with the elites of  EaP 
countries, the EU should identify target groups that 
are open to its approaches and that could be poten-
tial cooperation partners for comprehensive social 
and economic modernization. Four groups could 
provide such support:
Lessons Learned: Recasting the Union’s Eastern Neighborhood Policies
by Marie-Lena May and Stefan Meister
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1. Civil Society
The reform gridlock can only be managed with 
pressure from below. Getting society to partici-
pate in the political process, as well as closing the 
divide between the people and the elites, can only 
take place through the revaluation and further 
development of  civil society. The Civil Society 
Facility introduced in the 2011 ENP review by 
the European Commission118 could be the right 
instrument for that. In addition, the EU should 
further develop the Eastern Partnership’s Civil 
Society Forum (CSF). It should expand the 
CSF’s importance by establishing a CSF Secre-
tariat and by increasing the CSF’s participation in 
decision-making.
Additionally, the current EU system of  funding 
makes it very difficult for non-governmental orga-
nizations to participate in the complex and time-
consuming application process. Most of  the NGOs 
in EaP countries are very small and have limited 
resources for bureaucratic demands. In the 2011 
ENP review, increasing financial support for NGO 
is a priority of  future EU policy. However, NGOs 
in EaP countries need small, unbureaucratic grants 
that allow for a more flexible reaction to current 
political events. This could be organized by a Euro-
pean Endowment for Democracy, which the EU 
Commission wants to establish in the second half  
of  2011.119
2. The Youth
Another core group is today’s youth, who did 
not grow up under the Soviet Union. They are 
increasingly aware of  the fact that their path to 
the West remains closed and that they do not have 
the same opportunities as their EU neighbors. 
The EU attracts them due to its standard of  liv-
ing, economic opportunities, and efficient public 
infrastructure.
In order to appeal more to this group, the EU 
should ease its visa entry regulations and increase 
investment in mutual youth exchange programs. 
Programs like the European Voluntary Service 
from the European Commission or “Weltwärts” 
from the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development could establish a 
new focus on Eastern Partnership countries.
3. Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
All three countries lack the type of  small- and 
medium-sized businesses that are integral 
to forming a solid economic framework. A 
functioning small business sector that is com-
mitted to fair competition and transparent 
structures could allow for the development 
of  constitutionally mandated structures and a 
critical society. This is the nucleus of  a middle-
class, which is an important prerequisite for 
democratization.
SMEs in these countries suffer especially from a 
lack of  due process, administrative hurdles, and 
corruption. This group of  businesses has an inter-
est in more competition, a transfer of  technical 
know-how, and market access. The EU should 
strengthen their position by providing incentives 
to these businesses through small grants provided 
by development agencies, as well as by promoting 
advanced training and easier access to EU markets. 
Although SMEs were the target of  an EaP flagship 
initiative, more has to be done. Programs like East 
Invest, which was launched in 2010, focus on an 
exchange of  best practices and seminars, but do 
not offer loans and thus do not offer the financial 
incentives and flexibility SMEs need. The idea of  
supporting SMEs in EaP partner countries with 
the support of  the European Investment Fund is a 
step in the right direction.120
4. The population at large
In addition to the three specific target groups, the 
EU should appeal more to collective populations. 
All age and population groups have shown increas-
ing frustration with the inept governance of  the 
elites and with their economic situations. Compari-
sons to their neighbors beyond the EU’s border 
make these differences clear.
The EU should use a stronger presence (offices, 
seminars, cooperation with universities) to dis-
seminate its ideas and concepts and to make 
the EU’s economic and political models more 
comprehensible. Increasing people-to-people 
contacts should be a priority for this approach. 
This could be accomplished through, for exam-
ple, an expansion of  cultural exchanges and city 
partnerships.
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Instruments and topics for a successful 
Eastern Neighborhood Policy
In its May 2011 ENP review document, the EU 
reacted to the criticism and deficits of  the ENP and 
announced the establishment of  additional ENP 
instruments such as the European Endowment 
for Democracy and enhanced systems of  credits 
for SMEs. Brussels now has to concentrate on the 
implementation of  the new ENP program by defin-
ing clear priorities, roadmaps, and, last but not least, 
political goals. Therefore it needs the support and 
the will of  EU member states to reform the Neigh-
borhood Policy, to make strategic decisions on the 
implementation of  the medium-term strategy and 
to increase the budget within the EU’s next Multi-
annual Financial Framework (2014–2020). Negotia-
tions over Association Agreements should not take 
place merely for the sake of  going through the pro-
cess, but should be pursued with clear political goals 
in mind. In the case of  the three EaP countries 
covered in this chapter, there is a need for a clear 
message that there is no prospect of  membership 
in the next years, but that stronger economic and 
political integration is a priority of  EU policy.
The EU must be consistent in its actions and can-
not apply double standards if  it wants to maintain 
credibility. For example, the EU harshly sanctions 
the Belarusian leadership for its undemocratic 
behavior against its own population and at the 
same time it has close relationship with the Azer-
baijani leadership, which also takes strong actions 
against regime opponents, but has control over 
natural resources that the EU has an interest in. 
Short-term economic goals in commercially attrac-
tive countries should not take precedence over 
long-term goals such as open markets, transparency, 
democracy, and due process.
Ethnic and territorial conflicts are a vital chal-
lenge to almost all EaP states. The EU could 
make important contributions to solving these 
problems because of  its experiences investigating 
conflicts and its position as a neutral negotiation 
partner. Therefore, it was the right decision to 
include EU involvement in conflict resolution in 
the new ENP strategy. But this key challenge for 
neighboring countries needs much more engage-
ment. Conflict prevention and management should 
be closely coordinated with EU’s neighborhood 
policy, because long-term goals of  the ENP like 
democratization, social and economic development 
are linked to conflict resolution. There is a lack of  
communication and cooperation between the ini-
tiatives of  the European Commission and of  EU 
member states in the framework of  the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. For instance, the Ger-
man Meseberg initiative to solve the Transnistrian 
conflict was only communicated to the Commis-
sion and other member states after the memoran-
dum was signed with Moscow.
EU policies vis-à-vis EaP countries should be 
less influenced by the EU’s relations with Russia. 
Russia’s goals often contradict the EU’s inter-
ests, because Moscow has no interest in conflict 
resolution, economic competition, or transparent 
political and economic structures. Russia only 
has limited intentions to solve the conflicts in its 
neighborhood, because without these conflicts 
it would lose a main instrument to prevent these 
countries from integrating with the EU. Thus, the 
EU cannot avoid conflict with Russia regarding 
its policies towards EaP states. If  the EU makes 
compromises with Russia at the expense of  the 
EaP states, the EU’s policy will not be taken 
seriously.
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In view of  the mass demonstrations and govern-
ment overthrows in Tunisia and Egypt, the violent 
protests in Syria, and the military conflict in Libya, 
European policy in the Mediterranean region has 
been faced with new challenges since the spring 
of  2011. Although the Mediterranean has been an 
important target region of  European foreign policy 
for a long time, European initiatives there have not 
been very successful in the past few decades.
In addition to the heterogeneous nature of  the 
MENA (Middle East North Africa) region and its 
fragmentation and regional conflicts, the reasons 
for this also include internal EU factors such as 
the different geographical focuses the member 
countries set for EU foreign relations. Particularly 
in the EU member countries that do not border on 
the Mediterranean, the general population hardly 
shows any interest in Mediterranean policy. There-
fore, the subject has seldom been a point on the 
public policy agenda until now.
The upheavals in North Africa and the Middle 
East and the extensive media coverage they have 
received have pushed a region that “merely” used 
to be a subject of  European Union foreign and 
security policy into the spotlight of  public atten-
tion. In reaction to the increasing political and eco-
nomic integration at its core, the EU’s interest in 
clearly defining its outermost borders and reinforc-
ing their security has grown in the past two decades. 
Since then, the promotion of  a stable, low-conflict 
neighborhood has emerged as an important issue 
of  the Union’s foreign policy. The changes in 
North Africa are confronting the European Union 
and its members with a completely new situation: 
on the one hand, the revolution could lead to the 
democratization of  the region that would open up 
new prospects for political and economic coopera-
tion with the EU. On the other, North Africa is in 
a phase of  uncertainty that is impacting the neigh-
boring EU and its members. What can the EU 
do to strengthen its chances for a new quality of  
cooperation while minimizing its risks?
Chapter III: The Southern Dimension and the 
Arab Spring
by Claire Demesmay, Carsten Främke, and Katrin Sold
European Ambitions in the Southern Mediterranean
The goals of European Mediterranean policy
In the past several decades, a number of  bilateral 
agreements have provided the formal framework 
for cooperation for the relations between individual 
countries of  today’s European Union and North 
Africa—relations that have long histories. But also 
at EU level the members maintain relations with 
the states of  the southern Mediterranean region 
that are regulated by cooperation and trade agree-
ments. At the normative level, the EU follows 
development policy approaches aimed at promot-
ing democracy and the rule of  law in the Mediter-
ranean region and improving the socio-economic 
situation in its partner countries. At the same time, 
cooperation with the Mediterranean countries is 
based on the goal of  sustainably stabilizing the 
European Union’s Mediterranean neighborhood. 
The underlying rationale is that economic develop-
ment and improving the living conditions in the 
neighboring southern Mediterranean countries will 
limit the migratory movement from the African 
and Arab regions toward Europe in the middle to 
long term. In an effort to fight crime and illegal 
migration in the Mediterranean region,121 the EU 
has relied on cooperation with the governments 
of  the southern Mediterranean countries for 
years—just like it has done in the energy sector. 
The significance of  these types of  “soft risks” has 
been growing and questions about the future of  
the energy supply in addition to demographics and 
migration are becoming more urgent. The EU’s 
Mediterranean policy has become more dynamic 
since the beginning of  the 1990s, which has led 
to the development of  new instruments for EU 
foreign policy. At the beginning of  the upheavals 
in the MENA region in the spring of  2011, the EU 
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could rely on its relations to individual countries 
and a variety of  approaches to regional coopera-
tion.122 It also had two framework concepts avail-
able: the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship (EuroMed Partnership) and the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a bilateral instrument.
Multilateral structures: the EuroMed 
Partnership
With the EuroMed Partnership, also known as the 
Barcelona Process, the European Union established 
the first multilateral cooperation framework in 
Mediterranean policy in 1995.123 It included all of  
the countries that were EU members at the time, 
and 12 Mediterranean partner countries. The intent 
of  EuroMed was to intensify cooperation in the 
areas of  politics and security, business and finance, 
and society and social welfare: a framework of  
three “baskets.” When measured against the target 
of  creating a region of  “peace, stability, and pros-
perity”124—impossibly lofty from the very begin-
ning—the bottom line of  the Barcelona Process 
looked very thin when it reached the 10-year mark 
in 2005. Despite a few minor successes in the area 
of  economic cooperation, the European Union 
had not achieved its main goals—especially in the 
areas of  security and the promotion of  democ-
racy and the rule of  law. At the same time, the 
Mediterranean partner countries were voicing their 
fundamental criticism of  the concept behind the 
EuroMed Partnership, which they considered both 
Euro-centric and asymmetric.
Nicolas Sarkozy, then-candidate for the French 
presidency, seized on the demands for change and 
called for new drive for Europe’s Mediterranean 
policy in reaction to the weaknesses of  the Bar-
celona Process. With his initiative for a “Mediter-
ranean Union,” the former Minister of  the Interior 
Sarkozy probably wanted to position himself  as 
a statesman with ambitions in foreign affairs for 
the French presidential election. At the same time, 
Sarkozy was attempting to counter the shift in the 
ENP’s focus toward the East that especially the 
southern EU member countries feared might result 
from the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Other 
countries, in particular Germany, protested loudly 
against the initial French concept of  a union lim-
ited to the Mediterranean countries. The idea was 
then modified in favor of  a cooperation framework 
encompassing all of  the 27 EU member countries 
and 16 Mediterranean countries —among them 
EU accession candidates Croatia and Turkey. By 
means of  several structural changes, including the 
establishment of  a new institutional framework and 
the installation of  a co-presidency, the new Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM) tried to accommodate 
the Mediterranean partner states’ criticism that the 
Barcelona Process is too asymmetric. Unlike the 
Barcelona Process, the UfM was to be consciously 
designed as a “union of  projects,” the aim which 
was to strengthen regional cooperation by initiating 
concrete, joint projects that would trigger long-
term reform processes in the MEAN region. Since 
the UfM was established, the members have come 
up with initiatives for cleaning up the Mediter-
ranean Sea and developing shipping lanes, and for 
cooperating in the renewable energy sector.
Bilateral structures: the European 
Neighborhood Policy
In addition to the Union for the Mediterranean, 
which was officially established as the successor 
to the Barcelona Process on July 13, 2008, the 
European Union has developed one other instru-
ment for Mediterranean cooperation: the European 
Neighborhood Policy launched in 2004. In addition 
to six Eastern European countries, this bilateral 
mechanism for cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union and each respective partner country 
encompasses ten MENA-region countries. Unlike 
the multilateral initiatives that are part of  the 
EuroMed Partnership, its Action Plans are custom 
designed for the respective partner country and 
typically develop existing partnership and coopera-
tion agreements further. The bilateral agreements 
exist parallel to the association agreements which 
are concluded with countries of  the same country 
group as part of  the EuroMed Partnership.125
Does the parallel nature of  multilateral and bilateral 
instruments lead to overlaps or even contradic-
tions between the EU initiatives in the region126 or, 
on the contrary, does the complementary nature 
of  the two approaches represent significant added 
value for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
71
Mediterranean partner country 
heterogeneity
The southern dimension of  the European Union’s 
neighborhood policy includes the countries of  the 
southern and southeastern Mediterranean area, 
which are extremely heterogeneous when it comes 
to geography and politics. The entire region is char-
acterized by far-reaching fragmentation. MENA 
countries have significant areas of  difference rang-
ing from their form of  government—the region 
has monarchies like Morocco, authoritarian regimes 
like Syria and Libya, and countries with democratic 
components like Lebanon—and economic perfor-
mance to their levels of  industrialization and edu-
cation. In Jordan, an illiteracy rate of  7.8 percent 
clearly differentiates it from Yemen, where the rate 
is 39.1 percent.127 Unlike the multilateral approach, 
bilateral cooperation instruments facilitate the indi-
vidual adaptation of  European aid programs to the 
needs and circumstances in each individual country. 
They are therefore better suited to take the politi-
cal and economic context of  the respective partner 
country into consideration. In this way, the exist-
ing sensitive areas and special cultural features of  
individual countries can be added to the equation. 
The principle of  multilateral cooperation within 
the framework of  the EuroMed Partnership, on 
the other hand, underestimates the fragmentation 
of  the region and the existence of  international 
conflicts, which has led to blockades in cooperation 
time and time again.
Regional conflicts
The developments in Lebanon, the Western Sahara, 
Cyprus, and above all, the conflict between Israel 
and the Palestinians are all charged with a potential 
for political conflict that is preventing sustainable 
political cooperation and that leads to weak intra-
regional cooperation. And now add the regional 
shifts caused by the upheavals in North Africa, 
which not only bring prospects for democratization, 
but also the potential for new regional conflicts, to 
the list. While the EU’s bilateral approach is hardly 
able to take this regional context into consideration, 
the multilateral approach provides the opportunity 
to establish a forum for dialog in a region in which 
the revolutionary process in the spring of  2011 
created even more divergence. At the same time, 
the conflict-laden and increasingly heterogeneous 
surroundings of  the region provide fertile ground 
for the threat of  recurring and (probably) more 
frequent blockades during multilateral negotiations. 
The cumbersome process of  answering organiza-
tional and institutional questions within the frame-
work of  the UfM is to a great extent a result of  
inadequate south-south integration. For example, in 
2010 a planned UfM summit was initially resched-
uled and later cancelled, because the Arab countries 
threatened to boycott it, if  Israeli foreign minister 
Avigdor Liebermann participated in the meeting in 
Barcelona. Appointing the managing board of  the 
UfM also proved to be a difficult process. A Pales-
tinian and an Israeli were jointly nominated as dep-
uties to the secretary general, which, if  it did not 
shut them down entirely, clearly hampered coop-
eration in the areas of  security and defence. The 
resignation of  Secretary General Ahmed Massade 
in February 2011 can be interpreted as another 
setback for a possible dialog forum in the region 
and an indication of  continuous friction within the 
UfM’s structures.128
Intra-regional cooperation in the southern 
Mediterranean
Despite the existing regionalization initiatives, 
which include the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb 
Union, and the trade cooperation resulting from 
the Agadir Agreement between Morocco, Tuni-
sia, Egypt and Jordan, regional integration in the 
MENA region remains weak at the political and 
economic level.129 While the neighboring southern 
countries’ business dealings with the EU amount 
to more than half  of  their total trade volume, the 
share of  intra-regional trade ends up being less 
than 15 percent.130 The creation of  a multilateral 
cooperation framework that includes the southern 
Mediterranean region would counter this situation. 
On this note, the inclusion of  the Arab League as 
an observer in the Union for the Mediterranean 
should be viewed as a chance for the realization of  
Is There an Opportunity in Diversity? Complementary Multilateralism and 
Bilateralism in the Southern Neighborhood
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political and economic integration at the regional 
level. In contrast, the bilateral approach makes 
a very small contribution to strengthening intra-
regional cooperation.
Relations between the EU and its 
Mediterranean  partner countries
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is a Euro-centric 
project based on the EU’s interests and its grasp of  
geopolitics. It was initiated by the European Union 
and is still financed with EU funds. As a result, the 
bilateral and multilateral approaches both harbor 
the same basic weakness: a potential asymmetry 
between the EU and the partner country or the 
group of  partner countries in the southern Medi-
terranean region. In reaction to the deficits of  the 
Barcelona Process—marked by a strong European 
Commission position that dominated the agenda 
setting and the negotiations on the institutional 
framework—the design process for the Union for 
the Mediterranean set out to include new options 
for cooperation between the countries of  the 
north and the south. For example, the UfM created 
stronger options for Mediterranean partner country 
participation in the framework of  new institutions, 
including a “North/South tandem” to head the 
board and a co-presidency that mirrors the parity 
between the Mediterranean neighbors in the north 
and the south. Despite these structural differences 
to the Barcelona Process, the Union for the Medi-
terranean has not been able to achieve cooperation 
in which the northern and southern Mediterranean 
neighbors stand eye to eye.
Varied geographical focuses within the EU
The EU member countries have different geo-
graphical focuses. This impacts both the UfM and 
the ENP approach and makes it difficult to set up 
effective cooperation in the Union’s neighborhood. 
A more or less openly fought contest between its 
eastern and southern dimensions has marked the 
neighborhood policy since its inception. Estab-
lished international relations and traditional reflexes 
inclined to protect national trade flows play roles 
in the contest, as do conflicts over the distribution 
of  limited EU budgets and the personal ambitions 
of  the respective heads of  state and government 
involved. Especially within the framework of  the 
bilateral ENP approach, different historical and 
political relations between individual EU countries 
and partner countries have a significant influence—
highlighting possible divergences of  interest within 
the EU as a result. These different geographical 
focuses also play a significant role when it comes 
to medium-term strategy decisions. An example of  
this from the energy policy sector: long-term com-
petitors DESERTEC and Transgreen, the German 
and French initiatives for obtaining solar electricity 
from the Sahara region.131
But the organization of  the multilateral EuroMed 
Partnership is also a source of  conflicts like the one 
between Germany and France prior to the estab-
lishment of  the UfM. In times of  crisis, a similar 
pattern emerges and the EU countries’ split over 
the approach to Libya is one recent example. At a 
special summit meeting in Brussels in March 2011, 
the French and British heads of  state and govern-
ment declared their countries willing to take military 
action to support the rebels in the Libyan civil war. 
The German government reacted with skepticism. 
Furthermore, in regard to the question of  whether 
or not the rebels should be recognized as represen-
tatives of  the Libyan people, there was no sign of  a 
unified position after EU member country France 
took the initiative. One day before the EU summit, 
a representative from the French president’s office 
declared that France would dispatch an ambassador 
to rebel stronghold Benghazi and receive an envoy 
from the rebel national council.
How can the EU and its members avoid these 
types of  solitary actions in the future and create 
synergies for a more efficient Mediterranean policy? 
In view of  the heterogeneity and further fragmen-
tation of  the MENA region, which measures are 
required for the future of  the ENP neighborhood 
policy in the Mediterranean region? And what sig-
nificance do the upheavals in the Arab region have 
for the further development of  this cooperation?
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A new framework for Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation
The upheavals in the Arab region have brought 
significant changes to the basic conditions for 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. With the chang-
ing of  the guard in several MENA-region countries 
new expectations are raised toward the European 
Union, and at the same time, the efficiency of  
the European Union’s existing instruments and 
strategies is under scrutiny. The arrival of  the first 
migrants from Tunisia in Europe in April 2011 
revealed the frustration of  many young people 
from the region—as well as the perplexity of  the 
EU member countries when faced with the new 
challenges. The EU has to respond quickly to the 
historic changes in its southern neighborhood. 
The medium-term adaptation of  the ENP and the 
development of  new options for cooperation are 
coming, but it seems that some short-term mea-
sures are desperately required now.
Agreeing that the political changes would require 
financial support, at the end of  May 2011 the 
European Commission added 1.2 billion euro to 
the ENP funds for the affected regions for the 
period.132 Yet qualitative support is just as essential 
as quantitative EU support for the region. The 
EU is attempting to meet this challenge with the 
re-orientation strategy for its neighborhood policy 
that was outlined in a joint Communication of  
the European Commission and Catherine Ashton, 
High Representative of  the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, at the end of  May 
2011.133 The main cause of  suffering in the diverse 
societies of  the southern Mediterranean region is 
mass unemployment,134 therefore, political stabili-
zation there depends heavily upon shoring up the 
economies. The development of  infrastructure and 
the support of  small- and medium-sized enter-
prises should be given top priority.135 If  the indus-
trialized countries do not increase their investment 
in this area, sustainable socio-economic growth as 
a precondition for political stability will be almost 
impossible to achieve. And a solution must also 
be found to the issue of  work visas. In addition to 
direct and indirect financial support, the further 
development of  a common EU migration policy 
and increased trade integration in the Euro-Medi-
terranean area play central roles.
For decades, the heads of  state and government 
of  the EU countries have ignored the social and 
political situation of  the Arab countries. This is 
why the upheavals found them unprepared. Now 
they are sitting down with completely new repre-
sentatives from the opposition movements, and 
the urgent questions of  the increased involvement 
of  civil societies in the southern countries as well 
as the (re-)establishment of  Euro-Mediterranean 
networks are on the table. In reality, platforms 
for international dialog from civil society make 
an important contribution to exchanges on issues 
involving a common future—including how to deal 
with religion in public—and to clearing up misun-
derstandings and defusing hostilities. Furthermore, 
they provide an opportunity for European NGOs 
and bodies of  experts to apply their competencies 
in supporting democracy and market economies in 
the region. A variety of  formats are ideal for this 
type of  exchange, including training courses for 
journalists, Erasmus programs for students in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region, or, as the French for-
eign minister proposed,136 a “Mediterranean Youth 
Office” similar to the successful Franco-German 
Youth Office established in 1963.
From competition to complementarity
The framework conditions of  EuroMed coopera-
tion are not the only aspect that has dramatically 
changed since the beginning of  2011—the way the 
EU countries perceive their southern neighbor-
hood policy has also been affected. The transfor-
mation processes in the MENA region have made 
the weaknesses and contradictions in the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy, which experts have been 
pointing out since the 1990s, even more obvious. 
In addition to a short term reaction to the upheav-
als, adjustments and reforms to the existing neigh-
borhood instruments are required in the medium 
term. The Arab Spring provides an opportunity to 
Lessons Learned: Recommendations for the Future of the European 
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re-think the southern dimension of  the Union’s 
neighborhood policies in favor of  more coherence 
and efficiency.
From the very beginning, the Union’s neighbor-
hood policies have been marked by competition 
in the south. The MENA region countries are 
rivals for power, territory and funding—and the 
EU members also compete among themselves to 
a certain extent; above all when it comes to retain-
ing their national influence in the partner countries. 
These conflicts of  interests among the actors are 
accompanied by competition at the instrument 
level. All too often, the multilateral and bilateral 
approaches of  the European Neighborhood Policy 
are applied parallel to each other in order to achieve 
the same or similar aims. On the one hand, this 
adds a certain degree of  complexity to the mea-
sures being carried out; on the other, it can lead 
to mutual impediment. But the range of  national 
interests and instruments can also be applied as 
complements to each other. In such a complex 
region as the MENA, conflicts and tensions will 
not disappear quickly. On the contrary, the Arab 
Spring might make the region even more prone 
to conflict. Nevertheless, because of  the common 
goals the EU members set out in their neighbor-
hood policy and their culture of  compromise, at 
the very least they should be able to improve the 
coordination of  their respective initiatives and 
make sure the funds at their disposal work together.
This is why the diversity of  interests and networks 
of  EU countries in the MENA region should 
be considered a chance rather than a hindrance. 
Having the EU speak with one voice on the inter-
national stage is desirable, but will take years to 
achieve. Until that day—and parallel to the expan-
sion of  the European External Action Service—
the European Union and its members should use 
their differences to their own advantage. Several 
EU countries have their own networks targeting 
different groups in the neighboring countries, for 
example the political foundations from Germany 
and the local French communities or the Arab 
diaspora in France. The point is not to unite these 
relatively independent communication networks, 
but instead to link them in order to reach the right 
population groups and/or to make it easier for the 
EU to present a united front. And as regards their 
own traditions and political cultures, EU members 
could complement each other and end up with 
a global EU approach—to military deployment 
or energy policy, for example. The Libya mission 
could have been a case of  division of  labor with 
simultaneous coordination at EU level, but quickly 
became a counter-example: in order to be efficient, 
this type of  complementarity requires precise coor-
dination between the participants and above all, the 
will to override national egoism.
When multilateralism and bilateralism 
 cooperate
Applying the principle of  complementarity would 
lead to the development of  a more coherent and 
efficient Mediterranean policy—not only in regard 
to cooperation between the different EU actors, 
but also to the use of  existing instruments. Since 
both the multilateral and bilateral approaches have 
their specific, individual strengths, the answer is not 
an either/or choice. But in order to avoid creating 
the same counterproductive, competitive situation 
between the two framework concepts that exist 
today, a needs-oriented, targeted application of  
each individual approach is needed.
Multilateral instruments should be preferred for 
promoting economic policy cooperation and 
joint measures against “soft security risks” in the 
entire region. In view of  the weak nature of  the 
intra-regional cooperation in the southern Medi-
terranean region and the difficulties inherent in 
the exchange between the northern and southern 
Mediterranean neighboring countries—especially 
when it comes to trade issues—a multilateral 
approach is the best way to nurture interdepen-
dency and support the convergence of  societies 
at the same time. A joint discussion of  global 
themes such as migration and energy policy would 
also advance this development because all of  the 
countries involved perceive themes like these as 
common challenges. This could make a real con-
tribution to the emergence of  a community based 
on mutual solidarity.
However: the international conflicts in the MENA 
region, which could become more pointed as a 
result of  the heightened differentiation in the 
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region resulting from the upheavals in the spring 
of  2011, set definite limits to multilateralism. This 
is why a bilateral, country-related approach (as 
implemented within the framework of  the ENP) is 
preferable in the area of  political cooperation. This 
is the only way to avoid blockades arising from 
regional conflicts. At the same time, bilateral coop-
eration should focus more on civil society because 
the relationships between societies are deeply 
anchored in the history of  the individual countries. 
They also exhibit a clearly political dimension, as 
the Arab Spring has demonstrated: Movements 
in civil society in the southern Mediterranean can 
have a major impact on political developments in 
the respective countries.
There are certain areas in which multilateralism 
and bilateralism must work together much bet-
ter than in the past. Priority should be given as 
regards the design and implementation of  financ-
ing mechanisms. The Mediterranean policy of  the 
European Union has long been accused of  hav-
ing too little conditionality.137 The criteria for EU 
aid programs to partner countries as part of  the 
bilateral ENP are ambiguous and also vary from 
country to country, which only serves to fuel a 
certain degree of  clientelism. In order to regain 
credibility—which should be an urgent priority in 
view of  the way Europe has reacted to the events 
in North Africa until now—the EU will instead 
have to specify transparent conditions for coopera-
tion within a multilateral framework. On this note, 
the European Commission announced in May 
2011 that it intends to make its aid criteria more 
precise while reducing the number of  priorities 
for cooperation. Parallel to this, however, it should 
also implement stronger control mechanisms in 
order to guarantee that the agreed reforms are 
implemented and the flow of  funds is transpar-
ent. These points are barely touched upon or only 
mentioned vaguely in the Commission’s Commu-
nication. At the same time, the diverse economic 
profiles and political developments in the partner 
countries will have to be taken into account within 
the framework of  the ENP. To be able to meet 
these divergences head on and react quickly to 
reforms, the Europeans will have to be able to 
design the options and intensity of  cooperation 
individually, depending on the progress or spirit of  
cooperation of  the individual countries, and adjust 
them quickly.
Since the joint Communication of  the European 
Commission and the High Representative in May 
2011, concrete signs of  a re-orientation of  the 
neighborhood policy that satisfy these aims have 
become visible—although they exhibit an obvi-
ous preference for bilateral instruments. As early 
as March 2011, the European Commission and 
the High Representative also presented first ideas 
on a new “Partnership for Democracy and Joint 
Prosperity” with Mediterranean region coun-
tries. The main element of  the new strategy is a 
performance-related approach (“more for more”). 
The EU is promising more political and financial 
support to the southern neighboring countries that 
progress more rapidly on the path to economic 
and social reforms. Democracy, the rule of  law, 
and growth benefiting to North African societies 
as a whole are the criteria for evaluation and for 
stronger cooperation. This is the right approach 
for accompanying the shifting power structures in 
the Arab region. By asking the new governments to 
take responsibility, the EU is implementing a pro-
cess that could finally lead to “eye to eye” coopera-
tion. Whether or not this chance becomes a reality 
depends not only on the will and influence of  the 
European Union and its members, but just as much 
on the progress of  the political developments in 
North Africa and the Middle East.
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Despite the euro currency regime taking most of  
the attention in the European Union at the moment, 
2011 also brought the neighborhood policies back 
on the agenda. This is only in part due to an ambi-
tious Polish EU Presidency that wants to give the 
wilting Eastern Partnership a boost in the second 
half  of  2011. The process is indeed less driven 
from the inside, but from the outside, making the 
Union react rather than act: The European Union 
and its members are being confronted with historic 
shifts of  power in its southern neighborhood that 
will bring about a new political landscape in the 
MENA region. This development clearly challenges 
the EU’s approach towards the MENA of  the past, 
and it requires a strategic answer by the EU to what 
is likely to become a region—at least in the short- 
to medium-term—of  even greater insecurity.
The European Union’s neighborhood is therefore 
becoming even more complex. So too are the 
instruments and policies that the Union and its 
member states have developed since the mid-1990s, 
starting with the Barcelona Process in the south 
and followed by the neighborhood policy respond-
ing to the eastern and south-eastern enlargements 
of  2004/2007. In an ideal world, one answer to 
the challenge of  complexity might be to reduce it: 
“Keep it simple, give your policies focus, and put 
the money where your priorities are.” Needless to 
say, a Union of  27 members—as the authors of  
these papers showed both with regard to the south-
ern and eastern dimensions—has a level of  com-
plexity that makes it difficult to come up with some 
kind of  “magic bullet.” In that sense, the neighbor-
hood policies are as much a reflection of  the state 
of  the European Union as they are a reaction to 
what are often challenging neighbors.
To pour more water in the wine: The Arab Spring 
has just revealed the failure of  the EU’s lofty idea 
of  promoting democratic change in its southern 
neighborhood. The eastern dimension also looks 
bleak in terms of  EU achievements, with EaP 
countries currently facing setbacks with regard 
to democratization (Moldova is a notable excep-
tion). Even the hitherto successful Enlargement 
Policy seems to be losing its clout. Against this 
background it is fair to get back to a very simple 
question: Why cooperate at all, and to what end? 
Should the EU now admit the limits of  its trans-
formative power in the neighborhood and follow 
a more realistic, short-term, and interest-driven 
policy (as it does, for instance, with regard to Azer-
baijan and its natural resources)—or on the con-
trary, should it take the bull by the horns, choose 
its priorities and take an active, targeted approach 
of  democracy promotion vis-à-vis Tunisia and 
Egypt to help the countries become more like EU 
member countries (forgetting for a moment the 
other neighbors)?
While the answers to such a question in reality will 
never be a choice of  black or white, it is still worth 
rethinking the objectives of  the EU’s neighbor-
hood approaches from time to time. Objectives 
may indeed shift over time, the enlargement dis-
course over Turkey being a good example. Today, it 
makes greater sense to discuss Turkey as a potential 
powerhouse for the EU’s internal market and its 
aging populations as much as for the EU’s broader 
foreign policy or its energy needs—something 
unthinkable a decade ago, when Turkey’s economy 
was developing more modestly and the idea of  
creating a “real” political Union was still a much 
stronger argument in the enlargement debate (and 
in this case, an argument made against Turkish EU 
accession). Today, it is fair to discuss why the main 
focus of  the EU’s neighborhood policies should 
not be first and foremost about expanding the 
European Union’s internal market in reaction to 
the pressure felt by the EU from emerging econo-
mies. This argument that can be made vis-à-vis 
Chapter IV: Recommendations for 
Strengthening the Union’s Neighborhood 
Policies
by Cornelius Adebahr and Almut Möller
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both the eastern and the southern neighborhoods. 
Such economic enlargement could support the 
ongoing democratic transitions, which are faced 
with the enormous challenge of  creating jobs for 
growing numbers of  young Tunisians and Egyp-
tians: jobs that the EU might have. Because of  the 
EU’s demography, it faces the prospect of  a grow-
ing lack of  a skilled workforce.
As the first years of  neighborhood policies have 
shown, their success also depends on the neigh-
bors behaving like partners. But what if  a country 
chooses to violate the custom of  good neighborli-
ness? Does this mean that the European Union 
must wait for a behavioral change in order for its 
policies to succeed? The last decade of  neighbor-
hood policies proved that there are countries that 
actually do cooperate when faced with a reward, 
and some are even willing to pursue fundamental 
reform. The prospect of  accession helps—as the 
case of  Croatia shows—, but the example of  Tur-
key shows it is no longer a guarantee. On the other 
hand, a country like Moldova that finds itself  under 
the ENP umbrella has shown a strong interest in 
getting more involved with the Union, but has 
apparently not adequately implemented the EU’s 
legal rules, and is struggling with the EU’s techno-
cratic approach to modernization. Does this really 
mean that the Union is failing in Moldova? Apart 
from failures on the Moldovan side, it might also 
suggest that the EU’s instruments have not been 
well calibrated so far.
The EU and its members have often taken a nar-
row approach in the past, focusing on ENP and its 
acquis driven approach. A major reason for adopt-
ing this narrow focus is the institutional set-up of  
the ENP: It is carried forward by the European 
Commission, which until now always had an eye 
to the enlargement model and its focus on the 
acquis; and this approach has a path dependency. 
In the absence of  a distinctly political approach to 
flank either the ENP or enlargement negotiations, 
EU neighborhood policies tend to look like mere 
bureaucratic number crunching. Turkey again is an 
example here: for many years, the European Union 
gave the impression that Enlargement Policy was 
the only game in town with Turkey—and suddenly 
found itself  “without” a Turkey policy when the 
enlargement process with its increasingly confident 
neighbor started to stutter. In the meantime, this 
problem has been addressed and the European 
Union and Turkey are discussing other forms of  
cooperation. In that regard, one lesson the neigh-
borhood policies have shown so far is: “Provide for 
alternative instruments beyond the acquis approach 
if  you do not want to lose your neighbor.”
Taking this argument further, the EU has to recon-
sider its understanding of  “borders,” both in the 
geographical and the politico-institutional sense. 
Through enlargement and integration, its external 
borders have become more and more difficult to 
permeate—the hurdles for Croatia, expected to 
join in 2013, are immensely higher than they were 
for Greece, which the EU welcomed to the club 
in 1981. On a different note, with Croatia joining, 
the now porous border between it and neighbor-
ing Bosnia will become solid, making it even more 
difficult for the latter to prosper—another reason 
why, at least looking towards the Southeast, there 
are no reasonable prospects for enlargement within 
the coming years. There are also borders to be over-
come with regard to the EU’s institutional setting, 
be it between different Commission directorates or 
between the Commission as a whole (being respon-
sible for both Enlargement and ENP) and the new 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Lastly, 
member states have to shed the traditional thinking 
of  enlargement as merely foreign policy, given the 
effects that expansion and the ongoing processes of  
Europeanization have on various domestic policies.
While the historic shifts following the Arab Spring 
suggest that there is a need for a fundamental 
rethinking of  the EU’s neighborhood policies, the 
ongoing review of  the ENP with the European 
Commission’s Communications dating from March 
and May 2011 is likely to produce only moder-
ate reform. Priorities simply lie elsewhere at the 
moment (the future of  the euro and of  EU coun-
tries that struggle to be economically competitive). 
But even without a more fundamental overhaul 
of  its neighborhood policies, the European Union 
should seize the opportunity to rethink the underly-
ing rationale of  external relations with its neighbors 
and further develop the 2005 European Commis-
sion concept of  the “Three Cs for enlargement” 
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(Consolidation, Conditionality, and Communication) 
into a new concept for the whole neighborhood. 
Drawing on the findings of  the wide range of  
papers in this publication, the three Cs for the 2011 
neighborhood reform should thus be: (1) Concep-
tion; (2) Communication; and (3) Cooperation.
1) Conception
Fundamentally, the EU has to decide what kind 
of  vision will inspire future cooperation with its 
neighbors. The Arab Spring has created a new situ-
ation in the southern Mediterranean that urges the 
EU and its members to come up with new strategic 
answers. If  the EU’s strategic answer to the fall 
of  the Iron Curtain was Enlargement Policy, what 
then is the European Union’s strategic response to 
the Arab Spring? This claim does not imply that 
the events in 1989 and 2011 can be easily com-
pared, nor does it mean that the EU comes up with 
new accession promises—a prospect that would 
simply be unrealistic at the moment. Rather, it 
means that the EU needs to develop a response of  
similar strategic depth as Enlargement Policy, fol-
lowing the historic changes in its eastern neighbor-
hood two decades ago.
In a nutshell, the Union and its members will have 
to decide whether to embrace their neighbors, try-
ing to amplify change both in its southern and 
eastern neighborhoods while contributing to mak-
ing their neighbors more “European,” or whether 
they want to keep the neighboring countries at 
arms’ length. The ways the EU and its members 
have reacted so far to the changes in the southern 
Mediterranean suggest that the EU chooses to do 
the latter for now: The hysteric reaction of  EU 
members to a few thousand people fleeing North 
Africa towards the northern shores of  the Medi-
terranean ending up on Lampedusa island or the 
modest reform proposals of  the European Com-
mission and the High Representative for the ENP 
of  March and May 2011 are signs that the EU is 
neither willing nor internally able to formulate 
great responses to its changing neighborhood. Yet 
this will not be enough.
Because of  its geography, the EU has to live and 
cooperate with its neighbors. The “fortress of  
Europe” is not a sustainable model for the Euro-
pean Union in the longer term. Regional as well as 
global trends suggest that the future for the Union 
in a more interconnected and more competitive 
world lies in continuing to tear down borders, or 
at least to make them more permeable. This is a 
difficult message for the European Union’s citi-
zens, as they see many EU countries struggling in 
the global economic, financial, and sovereign debt 
crises and their human reflex is to close up rather 
than to be open towards greater engagement with 
their neighbors. Forces within EU countries that 
advocate nationalistic and anti-EU views are on the 
rise, and the handling of  the debt crisis in some of  
the members of  the euro zone has shown over the 
past year and a half  that, despite so many decades 
of  working with each other, cooperation in the EU 
cannot be taken for granted. It will require a great 
deal of  foresight and leadership to convince the 
Union’s citizens that some of  the solutions to its 
current problems might well lie beyond its current 
borders and even in its immediate neighborhood. 
Increased labor migration or better access to the 
EU’s often protectionist internal market could be 
helpful measures that many EU citizens would cur-
rently object to.
However, the kind of  leadership needed to cross 
borders and build bridges is certainly not some-
thing to be expected in European capitals at the 
moment, as it would also require that the EU and 
its members develop a different idea of  “them-
selves.” As Marcel Viëtor pointed out in his chapter, 
the EU has long attempted to create a clear cut 
identity of  “us” and “them” reflected in the notion 
of  the “acquis communautaire,” an idea that simply 
does not reflect the state of  today’s EU: The EU 
is much less a monolithic bloc, with the euro cur-
rency being one example of  the “differentiated EU” 
and the Schengen Agreement another. Indeed, the 
Union of  27 members is likely to adopt even more 
differentiated focal points in the future, as the first 
cases of  “enhanced cooperation” have recently 
demonstrated. This means that in dealing with its 
neighbourhood, the EU and its members should 
re-think their own understanding of  what it means 
to be “in” or “out.” Or more precisely: how non-
members can be “in” without taking over the full 
acquis. This exercise might entail some refreshing 
new perspectives.
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Let us assume for a moment there was something 
between Enlargement and ENP, as Lucas Lypp is 
suggesting in his chapter, something for which 
we would have to find better—less denigrating—
expressions than “membership light” or “privileged 
partnership” (which is not a negative phrase per se, 
but the debate within Germany and the EU on the 
concept gave it a negative twist). Out of  the exist-
ing 35 negotiation chapters, the EU could carve 
out distinct policy fields, as it did with visa liberal-
ization in the Western Balkans. In exchange—be 
it in the sphere of  economic integration, energy 
policy, justice and home affairs, CFSP, or human 
rights and the rule of  law—the participating coun-
tries would gain access to the EU: to its respective 
funds and instruments, its market, or even some of  
its institutions. Moreover, the EU could use these 
partnerships to promote new or stronger forms 
of  regional cooperation by making the agreements 
conditional on multilateral arrangements among 
the countries of  the Western Balkans, Eastern 
Europe, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, or 
the Maghreb. A more daring approach of  selective 
areas of  functional and regional integration with its 
neighbors might be the key to overcome the chal-
lenges the EU is facing in its neighborhood and the 
stalemate of  the approaches it has developed so far.
On a less ambitious note, the authors acknowledge 
that while the EU’s toolbox for its neighborhood 
has become quite complex, it is possible to continue 
working to simplify it, and to make the different 
strands of  neighborhood, enlargement, foreign, and 
security policies complement each other better. The 
Western Balkans holds lessons for better coopera-
tion between the EU’s pre-accession instruments and 
CFSP, a nexus that will also become more relevant to 
the ENP and its southern dimension, where the EU 
should prepare for more CSFP engagement. The EU 
should also avoid confusing the purpose of  its tools, 
as the Western Balkans again demonstrated: As Nata-
sha Wunsch points out, “both in the cases of  Mace-
donia and Serbia an SAA was signed not because the 
two countries had met the pre-established criteria, 
but in order to defuse a politically sensitive situation,” 
using an enlargement tool to compensate for a lack 
of  political clout. If  CFSP “borrows” from Enlarge-
ment Policy as in this case and criteria are watered 
down, Enlargement Policy loses its credibility.
As Claire Demesmay, Carsten Främke, and Katrin Sold 
demonstrated in their chapter on the southern 
dimension, the EU can also achieve more to make 
multilateralism and bilateralism work together bet-
ter. They suggest the EU uses multilateral frame-
works when it comes to economic cooperation, 
while political cooperation should be reserved 
to bilateral frameworks for now. In the southern 
Mediterranean, it certainly makes sense to keep 
up a level of  ambition for multilateral forums 
that perhaps does not always respond with the 
results—but while the region is becoming more 
diverse, and bilateral components will be strength-
ened as a result, there is still an enormous value in 
keeping up channels for cross- and intra-regional 
cooperation. The EU should therefore not aban-
don its ambition. Yet multilateral cooperation in 
the Mediterranean should not focus exclusively on 
the Union for the Mediterranean; it can also mean 
that the EU decides to work with a limited group 
of  partners in the south (for example by creating 
a multilateral working relationship with reforming 
countries in North Africa to strengthen regional 
cooperation regarding the rule of  law). As the ENP 
has in the meantime become the umbrella for both 
the Eastern Partnership and the UfM, the UfM can 
become the umbrella for different sub-types of  
intensified multilateral cooperation between the EU 
and a group of  selected partner countries. It goes 
without saying that for such cooperation mecha-
nisms to succeed, the EU and its members will 
have to increasingly speak with one voice.
2) Communication
Working together as neighbors means being able 
to communicate with each other. It is at this very 
basic level that both the EU and its neighbors 
can improve. Even amongst EU members, these 
last months have shown that communication is 
essential yet tricky, even between long-standing 
members of  the club—with the German govern-
ment getting a lot of  criticism by its EU partners 
for not communicating enough about its handling 
of  the debt crises in EU member states and the 
German energy transition. It is thus not surpris-
ing that communication with third countries in 
the EU’s neighborhood, many of  which are not 
democratic, is indeed challenging. The asymmetry 
between the EU and its neighbors is a real problem 
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here, as is the EU’s very distinct set-up: A particu-
larity of  both Enlargement Policy and the ENP is 
that they speak an “acquis language,” a language that 
is quite foreign to third countries. This is especially 
the case for political systems, as Stefan Meister illus-
trated in his chapter on Moldova, that are “largely 
defined by informal rules and a lack of  functioning 
institutions.” In the southern neighborhood, this 
aspect is also very relevant.
Proper communication also means being clear in 
one’s promises and expectations as well as demands. 
This of  course goes both ways: In the case of  the 
EU, it is not helpful, if  the Union gives a country 
the prospect of  accession without really meaning 
it, as has always been the question regarding Turkey. 
Giving clear accession prospects by granting candi-
date status creates expectations that, if  not fulfilled 
in a reasonable amount of  time, will become an 
obstacle to cooperation. On the other hand, cred-
ible accession prospects can become a real incen-
tive for change, if  they are communicated well. For 
instance, as Natasha Wunsch suggested, by granting 
candidate status to each country in the Western 
Balkans “the EU would achieve much by doing lit-
tle. Although candidate status opens up new areas 
for EU funding, it does not imply an increase of  
overall funding made available to the candidate. But 
the symbolic value of  such a step would be huge, 
as it reaffirms the EU’s commitment to accession 
and thus reinforces the credibility and leverage of  
the EU in the region.”
Still, proper communication does not stop at reaf-
firming the commitment of  membership; it also 
extends to the negotiation process itself. The EU 
can work on the way it communicates with aspiring 
countries in its screening reports and Action Plans, 
whose quality leaves a lot of  room for improve-
ment. Clear to-do lists and comprehensive lists of  
priorities with guiding principles for implementa-
tion can help countries aspiring to EU membership 
or to partial integration into the acquis to respond 
better to the EU’s demands and make it easier for 
civil society to hold their governments accountable. 
The progress reports drafted by the Commission 
in both Enlargement Policy and ENP should also 
follow this example. In its contribution to the ENP 
review, the German Foreign Office suggested that 
the Foreign Affairs Council regularly discusses 
progress reports—a measure that can help make 
member state governments more accountable for 
their promises for integration or cooperation with 
neighboring countries.
Hence, the EU should use its screening reports as a 
transparent communication measure—to the gov-
ernments and civil society actors in both member 
and applicant countries—of  where in the enlarge-
ment process a particular country stands, how far 
it has to go, and what benefits it can expect on 
the way. In this way, the EU could also tackle the 
tricky question of  the date, i. e. the year by which it 
expects a candidate country to be ready to join the 
club. Given the experiences of  Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, which where manifestly unfit for membership 
on the date of  their entry into the Union, the EU 
has—understandably—shied away from “giving a 
date,” thereby suggesting that the date itself  was 
the cause for Romania and Bulgaria’s reform lag 
and not the overall process.
This way, the date becomes less of  an obsession 
(or fear) and more of  a useful reference point. By 
clearly communicating that any date for the poten-
tial closure of  negotiations is preliminary—“based 
on the current assessment, we expect country XYZ 
to be ready for membership by, say, 2018”—the 
EU should revise this given year with each progress 
report moving it up or back, if  necessary. After all, 
accession is a moving target, not least because the 
EU that accession countries want to enter is likely 
to be a different one on the day of  application than 
on the day of  eventual entry—a lesson that Tur-
key has been learning the hard way over the past 
few decades. What the “ins” have to understand is, 
naturally, that the Turkey of  tomorrow will be very 
different from the one we see today—or that we 
think we know from the past.
On the other hand, the ball is also in the neighbors’ 
court: They should be clearer in communicating 
to the EU what their expectations and fields of  
interest are and what they wish the EU to bring 
to the table, be it in the form of  membership or 
close inter-regional cooperation. In the case of  the 
transition countries of  the southern Mediterranean, 
Tunisia and Egypt for instance, it is crucial that 
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apart from the new leadership, other stakeholders 
start communicating with the EU about what they 
think the EU can contribute to the transition pro-
cesses their countries and societies are facing.
Communication is particularly difficult when it 
involves conflict, as the conflict between Israel and 
the Palestinians, which too often prevented com-
munication from even starting, has demonstrated. 
To the frustration of  both the EU and partner 
countries, this problem was not addressed when 
France decided to give the moribund Barcelona 
Process a new boost with the Union for the Medi-
terranean in 2008. Instead, the blocking potential 
of  the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab confrontation con-
tinued, which impeded progress in the multilateral 
dimension of  ENP. As Claire Demesmay, Carsten 
Främke, and Katrin Sold pointed out in their chapter, 
the EU has to confront this problem with greater 
determination if  it wants to succeed with its mul-
tilateral forums, which are needed now more than 
ever. With the procedures and routines that the EU 
and its members have developed over time to get 
on with their internal blockades as well as with pre-
vious accession countries, it is hard to believe that 
the EU cannot come up with more creative solu-
tions to address this problem.
It is in these very basic areas of  communication 
and information that the EU and its members, as 
well as neighbors that want to be partners with the 
EU, can succeed in boosting their credibility and 
commitment.
3) Cooperation
The notion of  “cooperation” has proven to be a 
very challenging concept for the Union’s neighbor-
hood policies so far. Obviously, the EU’s relations 
with its neighbors depend on the goodwill of  the 
neighbors to engage with the Union. Ideally, for 
the EU this has meant so far that the neighbors 
meet the EU’s expectations. Quite naturally, there 
is an inherent asymmetry in both Enlargement 
Policy and ENP, as described by Lucas Lypp, as it is 
the EU that sets the (acquis-driven) framework for 
cooperation. The EU demands a lot from its neigh-
boring governments, many of  which are neither 
able nor willing to respond to the EU’s demands 
the way the EU and its members expect.
Over the last few years, the EU tried to level out 
these asymmetries, such as by setting up the Union 
for the Mediterranean, which aimed at creating a 
joint framework for cooperation at eye-level by 
setting up a co-presidency and joint institutions. 
This, however, can only paint over the persist-
ing differences both in terms of  political weight, 
structural cohesion, and unity of  purpose. Not that 
these are abundant within the EU, but compared 
with the typically loose and diverse settings on the 
other side, it must appear as the monolithic block 
that some feared and others hoped for. In addi-
tion, while the idea of  “positive conditionality,” re-
framed as“ mutual accountability” in the Commis-
sion’s May 2011 ENP review, has not quite worked 
out yet, the EU is now also being confronted with 
the criticism that it has chosen the wrong partners 
to work with: “Partners” whose autocratic rule the 
EU hitherto helped to solidify.
From the beginning of  its neighborhood policies, 
the EU understood this problem and decided to 
work with different kinds of  partners. Apart from 
governments, and having identified civil society as 
an “agent of  change,” the European Union aimed 
at cooperating with civil society in its neighbor-
hood. As the Arab Spring demonstrated—much to 
the surprise of  foreign observers—, civil society 
in the southern Mediterranean only recently had 
a major impact on the internal political develop-
ments of  the respective countries, a lesson that 
should encourage the EU to foster its civil society 
engagement. However, the EU has not always 
been efficient in cooperating with civil society in 
the past, and indeed has contributed to excluding 
it in some areas, for instance in the Union for the 
Mediterranean, which has a strong focus on state 
executives.
The authors of  this publication suggested that the 
EU intensify its engagement with civil society for 
both the eastern and the southern dimensions—
an approach that has become common sense in 
theory. In practice, however, the authors point out 
that there are still many obstacles to cooperation. 
Fundamentally, governments or quasi-state institu-
tions like the EU are not natural partners for civil 
society anyway, as their intuition is to work with 
partners that are more like itself. And even the 
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notion of  civil society can be quite different in the 
EU’s neighborhood. In the southern Mediterranean, 
for instance, “civil society” means something dif-
ferent than on its northern shores—but the EU 
has mostly worked with the (smaller) parts of  civil 
society that are English-speaking, educated in EU 
countries or the United States, and secular. Now 
the EU and its members have to overcome their 
fear of  contact with religious groups that often 
play a pivotal role in MENA civil societies. And 
they have to show they are willing to learn some 
very basic things about their neighbors, something 
they often failed to do in the past. The EU has to 
identify and establish relations with new partners —
a process that will take time and trust. But the EU 
does not have to start from scratch. In organizing 
a more systematic exchange with civil society in the 
MENA region, for instance, the EU can make use 
of  its experience with the Civil Society Forum of  
the Eastern Partnership.
Another area for improvement is funding mecha-
nisms. As Marie-Lena May and Stefan Meister pointed 
out, “the current system of  funding makes it very 
difficult for non-governmental organizations to 
participate in the European Commission’s complex 
and time-consuming application processes. Look-
ing at the EaP countries, most NGOs are very 
small and have limited resources for bureaucratic 
demands. […] NGOs in EaP countries need small, 
unbureaucratic grants that allow for a more flex-
ible reaction to current political events.” And finally, 
visa liberalization that is focused on civil society 
and the youth will entail benefits, as all authors 
argue in their papers, to strengthen people-to-peo-
ple contacts and socialization.
In addition, the EU should not only look abroad 
when it thinks of  civil society, but also aim at its 
domestic audiences. The enlargement debate in 
particular (which can potentially extend to coun-
tries like Ukraine anyway), as well as discussions 
about how to react to the Arab Spring, deserve to 
be led by EU citizens themselves. That is why—
beyond more clearly communicating its own poli-
cies to its people—the EU and its member states 
should encourage transnational and trans-regional 
debates and a stronger role for the Union’s 
citizens.
In terms of  cooperating with governments, the 
European Union should have a particular focus—
as Stefan Meister suggested in his chapter on Mol-
dova—on those countries that are willing to be 
partners and that demonstrate a real interest in 
cooperating with the EU. In the southern neigh-
borhood, the EU could for instance explore the 
impact that focusing on Tunisia and Egypt—rather 
than on the entire region—can have: A more dem-
ocratic and socially sustainable Tunisia would not 
only be a success story of  the EU’s transformative 
power, it might also serve as an incentive and a 
beacon for other countries in the region and make 
them more open and active vis-à-vis the EU. Hav-
ing said that, the ball is as much in the court of  the 
EU’s neighbors as it is with the EU, and there is a 
hope that more open societies in Tunisia and Egypt 
will be better at formulating their own intentions 
with regard to the neighboring EU.
“More for more,” the new formula crafted by the 
European Commission and the High Representa-
tive in the May 2011 neighborhood review, is a 
promising start in this regard, as is the German 
Foreign Office’s suggestion to the High Represen-
tative to allocate only half  of  the ENPI budget 
according to country quotas, a system that rewards 
cooperation and might even trigger more competi-
tiveness among recipients of  EU funding. Claire 
Demesmay, Carsten Främke, and Katrin Sold pointed 
out another problem in this context: “The criteria 
for EU aid programs to partner countries as part 
of  the bilateral ENP are ambiguous and also vary 
from country to country, which only serves to fuel 
a certain degree of  clientelism.” The European 
Commission’s May 2011 announcement to make its 
criteria more precise, to reduce the number of  pri-
orities for cooperation, and to be more transparent 
in its funding is an important task that the EU still 
has to do.
Finally, what about countries that do not want 
to be partners with the EU? The assessments on 
how to deal with Russia, for instance, differ in this 
publication. Marie-Lena May, Stefan Meister, and Irene 
Hahn suggest that the EU needs to be more hard-
nosed regarding Russia, risking conflict over what 
Russia quite naturally considers “her” neighbor-
hood and sphere of  influence, while Ulrike Stern 
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takes a more cautious approach in her chapter on 
Ukraine. The EU should accept Ukraine’s proximity 
to Russia instead of  aiming for an exclusive part-
nership with Ukraine, as this will help support the 
EU’s own relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, 
the door for cooperation should never be entirely 
shut for any of  the EU’s neighbors, not even for 
Belarus, as Marie-Lena May argues. The EU should 
consider cooperation a value in itself  and continue 
to keep up channels of  communication even with 
its most challenging neighbors.
Together with new ways of  communicating with 
each other, a new approach to cooperation might 
indeed evolve from the EU’s proven willingness 
to learn about its (new) partners, to acknowledge 
their views, and to accept that not every potential 
partner is actually willing to become a real partner 
of  the EU—a case in which the EU should not 
shy away from confrontation. There is still a lot 
of  work to be done in the sense of  a new overall 
concept as described above. Strategically speak-
ing, the European Union will lose its clout if  it 
decides to cement clear cut boundaries between 
the “ins” and the “outs,” as it currently does. In an 
increasingly interconnected world, the European 
Union will be a lot more successful if  it manages 
to blur the boundaries on the European continent 
by creating overlapping spheres of  partial integra-
tion with its neighbors. By “crossing borders”—as 
the title of  this publication suggests—the Union 
will strengthen its ability to function as a network; 
a quality that will be a major asset in an intercon-
nected and competitive world.
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
85
Dr. Cornelius Adebahr is a political scientist and 
entrepreneur, focusing on European foreign policy 
issues, transatlantic relations, and Southeastern 
Europe. He is also a program officer at the Alfred 
von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Stud-
ies at the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP), where he supervises a project supporting 
think tanks in the Western Balkans. He is a lecturer 
at the Willy Brandt School of  Public Policy at 
Erfurt University, and a member of  Team Europe 
of  the European Commission. In 2002/2003, he 
was a fellow of  the Robert Bosch Foundation’s 
Post-Graduate Program in International Affairs. 
Prior to this, he served as project assistant at the 
Aspen Institute Berlin and as an election supervi-
sor with the OSCE Bosnia and Herzegovina. He 
studied political science (international relations), 
philosophy, public law, and international economics 
in Tübingen, Paris, and at the Free University Ber-
lin, where he graduated in 2001 before receiving his 
PhD (Dr. rer. pol.) in 2008. Publications include: 
Learning and Change in European Foreign Policy: The 
Case of  the EU Special Representatives, Baden-Baden 
2009.
Dr. Claire Demesmay runs the Franco-German 
Relations Program. Before she joined DGAP’s 
research institute, she was a resident fellow at the 
Study Committee for Franco-German Relations 
(Cerfa) at the Institut français des relations inter-
nationales (Ifri) in Paris and was employed at the 
chair for French Studies at Dresden University of  
Technology. She studied political philosophy at 
the Universities of  Dijon and at Paris Sorbonne 
University (Paris IV). She did a doctorate within 
the framework of  a French-German co-tutelle on 
“Political Liberalism and the Future of  the Nation-
State” at the Paris Sorbonne University (Paris IV) 
and at the Center for French Studies at Technische 
Universität Berlin. Her research focuses on Franco-
German relations, French domestic and European 
politics, migration and integration policy in France 
and Germany, and citizenship and identity debates 
in Europe. Publications include: La France et l’Alle-
magne face aux crises européennes (ed.), Bordeaux 2010 
(with Andreas Marchetti); “Gute Idee, schlechte 
Umsetzung – Zwei Jahre Union für das Mittelmeer” 
(Good Idea, Poor Implementation—Two Years 
into the Union for the Mediterranean, DGAP-
standpunkt Nr. 9), Berlin, July 2010 (with Katrin 
Sold).
Carsten Främke works as a program officer in the 
Franco-German Relations Program at the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). He studied 
French Studies at the Free University, Berlin and at 
Paris Sorbonne University (Paris IV). His research 
focuses on Franco-German relations with a special 
focus on domestic discourses on European integra-
tion in both countries. Publications include: “Hüter 
der Menschenrechte? Zur französischen Debatte 
um den EU-Beitritt der Türkei” (Guardians of  
Human Rights? The French debate on Turkey’s EU 
accession), in: Dokumente. Zeitschrift für den deutsch-
französischen Dialog 2/2011; „Rien ne va plus? Tra-
ditionen und Brüche in der französischen Türkei-
Politik“ (Rien ne va plus? Traditions and Failures 
in France’s Policies Towards Turkey. DGAPana-
lyse Frankreich), Berlin 2011 (with Katrin Sold, 
forthcoming).
A trained political scientist, Irene Hahn is an expert 
on EU integration, enlargement, neighborhood, 
and foreign policy, democracy promotion, as well 
as institutional developments. Her regional exper-
tise lies in Eastern Europe and East-West relations. 
Irene Hahn works on EU neighborhood policy 
with a special focus on its eastern dimension as 
program officer at the Center for Central and East-
ern Europe of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung at the 
DGAP. She is responsible for the project “Expert 
group on the Eastern Partnership.” Previously, she 
worked as a political advisor on European poli-
cies and chief  of  staff  to a member of  the Ger-
man Bundestag. She also worked at the Institute 
for European Politics (IEP) on capacity-building 
programs fostering EU Accession and Associa-
tion. Irene Hahn is currently participating in a 
research project on „External democracy promo-
tion and civil society in post-socialist Europe“ at 
the European University Viadrina and the ETH 
Zürich. Her research concentrates on the EU as 
an external actor. Publications include: „Polen und 
‘Europa’ – Europabilder und nationale Identität im 
About the Authors
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
86
Beitrittsprozess zur Europäischen Union“ (Poland 
and “Europe”—Images of  Europe and national 
identity in the EU accession process), Willi Brandt 
Zentrum für Deutschland- und Europa Studien 
(Hrsg.), No. 8, Breslau 2007.
Dr. Lucas Lypp is online editor and research fel-
low at the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP). He is responsible for the DGAP’s web 
site, dgap.org, as well as for aussenpolitik.net, the 
issue-oriented Internet portal of  the DGAP. At 
the DGAP Research Institute, he focuses on EU 
foreign policy and on European Neighborhood 
Policy. Lucas Lypp studied history, French, Euro-
pean studies and political science in Hamburg, Ber-
lin, Paris, and Washington, DC, and holds an M.A. 
(Magister Artium), M.E.S. (Master of  European 
Studies), and PhD (Dr. phil.).
Marie-Lena May works at the Center for Central and 
Eastern Europe of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung at 
the DGAP. Her research focuses on the Eastern 
Dimension of  European Neighborhood Policy, 
particularly Belarus. Before she joined the DGAP, 
she worked at the Institute for Foreign Cultural 
Relations (ifa), Stuttgart, with a focus on minor-
ity politics in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
CIS countries. While studying she lived for over 
two years in Central and Eastern Europe (in Rus-
sia and Belarus). She studied political science and 
public policy at the University of  Konstanz and at 
Charles University Prague, as well as Czech history, 
culture, and language (Bohemicum) at the Univer-
sity of  Regensburg. Publications include: “How to 
deal with Belarus? New Approaches in EU-Belarus 
Relations” (DGAPanalyse kompakt, No. 2), Berlin 
2011; “Reforms or Maintaining Power? Belarus 
before the Presidential Elections 2010” (DGAP-
analyse, No. 5), Berlin, December 2010; “The EU’s 
Eastern Partnership—a Misunderstood Offer of  
Cooperation” (with Stefan Meister—DGAPstand-
punkt 7), Berlin, September 2009.
Dr. Stefan Meister works at the Center for Central 
and Eastern Europe of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung 
at the DGAP and is currently responsible for a 
research project on “Russia’s policy towards post-
Soviet countries” financed by the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung. He was previously research assistant and 
lecturer at the faculty of  international relations 
at Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, and was a 
visiting fellow at the Center for International Rela-
tions in Warsaw. His current research focuses on 
Russian foreign and security policy, Russian policy 
towards post-Soviet countries, conflict resolution in 
the South Caucasus, as well as EU-Russia relations. 
Publications include: “Recalibrating Germany’s 
and EU’s Policy in the South Caucasus” (DGAP-
analyse, No. 2) Berlin, July 2010; “Russland: Die 
verhinderte regionale Ordnungsmacht” (Russia: 
The Would-Be Regional Hegemon), in: Josef  Braml 
[et al.] (ed.), Einsatz für den Frieden. Sicherheit und 
Entwicklung in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit, Jahr-
buch Internationale Politik, Band 28, Berlin 2010, 
pp. 216–222; “Problem state. The Russian state’s 
stranglehold on science and innovation is the great-
est obstacle to modernization,” in Research Europe, 
London, February 25, 2010.
Almut Möller is head of  the Alfred von Oppenheim 
Center for European Policy Studies at the Ger-
man Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her 
research focuses on the institutional development 
of  the European Union as well as the EU’s foreign 
policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
Prior to joining the DGAP in 2010, she worked as 
an independent political analyst in London and at 
the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) in 
Munich. Almut Möller was guest researcher at Ren-
min University of  China in Bejing, Al Ahram Cen-
ter for Political and Security Studies in Cairo, and 
the American Institute for Contemporary German 
Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University in 
Washington, DC. Publications include: What the EU 
did next: Short Essays for a Longer Life, essay series on the 
future of  the European Union (co-editor, with Roderick 
Parkes), Berlin 2011; “Nahost- und Mittelmeer-
politik,” in Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2011 
(ed. Werner Weidenfeld, Wolfgang Wessels), Baden-
Baden (forthcoming); Bound to Cooperate: Europe and 
the Middle East II (co-editor, with Christian-Peter 
Hanelt), Gütersloh 2008.
Katrin Sold works as program officer for the 
Franco-German Relations Program at the Ger-
man Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her 
research focuses on Franco-German relations with 
a particular interest in both countries’ Mediterra-
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
87
nean policies and relations with Turkey. She studied 
political science (European integration) and Ger-
man literature at the Humboldt University in Berlin 
and at Science Po Toulouse in France. Publications 
include: “Zustimmung und Ablehnung. Frank-
reich und die Beitrittskandidatur der Türkei zur 
EU” (Agreement and Denial: France and Turkey’s 
Candidacy for the EU), in: Dokumente, Zeitschrift für 
den deutsch-französischen Dialog 2/2011; “Gute Idee, 
schlechte Umsetzung – Zwei Jahre Union für das 
Mittelmeer” (Good Idea, Poor Implementation—
Two Years into the Union for the Mediterranean, 
DGAPstandpunkt, No. 9), Berlin, July 2010 (with 
Claire Demesmay); “Rien ne va plus? Traditionen 
und Brüche in der französischen Türkei-Politik” 
(Rien ne va plus? Traditions and Failures in France’s 
Policies Towards Turkey. DGAPanalyse Frankreich), 
Berlin 2011 (with Carsten Främke, forthcoming).
Marek Souček works on European affairs at the 
office of  the prime minister in Prague, Czech 
Republic. He was part of  the working team that 
prepared and oversaw the Czech presidency in the 
European Council in the first half  of  2009. He was 
a guest researcher at the Alfred von Oppenheim 
Center for European Policy Studies at the DGAP 
in 2011. Marek Souček studied law at Charles Uni-
versity Prague.
Ulrike Stern is assistant to the Otto Wolff  Director 
of  the DGAP Research Institute and program offi-
cer at the Center for Central and Eastern Europe 
of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung at the German Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her areas of  spe-
cialization are EU foreign policy towards Eastern 
Europe (with a focus on Ukraine) and transforma-
tion processes in Central and Eastern Europe (with 
a focus on Estonia and Lithuania). She studied 
political science, communication science, sociology, 
and European Studies in Düsseldorf, Vilnius, and 
Berlin. Publications include: “Estland und der Euro 
– nicht Blender, sondern Vorbild” (Estonia and 
Euro –A Paradigm, not a Dazzler, DGAPstand-
punkt No. 2), March 2011.
Political and cultural scientist Marcel Viëtor joined 
the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 
in January 2009 after working briefly for the Euro-
pean Commission’s delegation to Moscow. His 
work at the DGAP has focused on energy politics 
as well as the topic of  “European identity.” In 
addition, he has been an associate for the project 
“Resource Strategy” at the Stiftung Neue Verant-
wortung (snv) since November 2010. Publications 
include: “Europa und die Frage nach seinen Gren-
zen im Osten: Zur Konstruktion ‘europäischer 
Identität’” (Europe and Its Eastern Boundaries: 
The Construction of  a “European Identity” in the 
Past and Present) in: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and 
Society 93, Stuttgart 2010, 152 pp.; Osteuropa heute: 
Entwicklungen – Gemeinsamkeiten – Unterschiede 
(Eastern Europe Today: Developments—Com-
monalities—Differences), in: Osteuropa: Geschichte, 
Wirtschaft, Politik 43, Hamburg 2007, pp. 328 (co-
editor, with Jule Böhmer); Energiesicherheit für Europa: 
Kernenergie und Erdgas als Brückentechnologien (Energy 
Security for Europe: Nuclear Energy and Natural 
Gas as Bridging Solutions), DGAP-Schriften zur 
Internationalen Politik, Baden-Baden 2011, 134 pp.
Natasha Wunsch is program officer at the Alfred von 
Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies at 
the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
Her research concentrates on EU enlargement, 
with a particular focus upon the strategic chal-
lenges presented by the Western Balkans region 
and the role of  civil society in the Europeanization 
process. Prior to joining the DGAP in 2010, she 
completed a double Master’s degree at Free Uni-
versity Berlin and Sciences Po Paris and worked 
as a seminar assistant for the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation’s EU Office in Brussels. Publications 
include: “EU Enlargement Policy in the Western 
Balkans: Between Stabilization and Integration,” in: 
Sicherheit und Frieden (forthcoming), and “Stabilisa-
tion et association dans les Balkans occidentaux: les 
défis du double objectif  européen” (with Theresia 
Toeglhofer), in: Balkanologie 1/2010, mis en ligne le 
2 avril 2010.

DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
89
1 Cf. European Council, Conclusions of  the Presidency, SN 
180/1/93 REV 1, EN, Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993, 
here p. 13.
2 European Parliament, “Briefing No 23: Legal questions 
of  enlargement,” May 19, 1998, <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm#F7> 
(retrieved June 11, 2011).
3 That “Europeanness” is not a simple question of  geo-
graphical assessment is shown by a map composed by 
Hans-Dietrich Schultz, which comprises a multitude of  
“Eastern borders of  Europe” as have been proposed by 
different geographers, each referring to allegedly objective 
geographical criteria, <http://www.deuframat.de/parser/
parser.php?file=/deuframat/deutsch/1/1_2/schultz/
kap_23.htm> (retrieved June 11, 2011).
4 For a more detailed account of  this concept of  differen-
tiation and the adherent valuation cum alienation refer to 
Marcel Viëtor, “Europa und die Frage nach seinen Gren-
zen im Osten: Zur Konstruktion ‘europäischer Identität’ 
in Geschichte und Gegenwart” (Europe and its Eastern 
Boundaries: The Construction of  “European Identity” in 
the Past and Present), in: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics 
and Society 93, Stuttgart 2010, especially pages 41–56 and 
107–120.
5 Timothy Garton Ash, “Does Central Europe Exist?” (first 
published in 1986), republished in “The Uses of  Adversity: 
Essays on the Fate of  Central Europe,” Cambridge, MA 
1989, pp. 161–191, here p. 166.
6 On the EU’s “rhetorical self-entrapment” refer to Frank 
Schimmelfennig, “The EU, NATO, and the Integration of  
Europe: Rules and Rhetoric,” Cambridge 2003.
7 European Commission, “Wider Europe—Neighbour-
hood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours,” COM(2003) 104 final, March 
11, 2003, p. 5, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com03_104_en.pdf> (retrieved June 11, 2011).
8 Of  course, accession candidates have to be European in 
the Treaty sense already when applying for membership.
9 European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2008–2009,” COM(2008) 674 final, Brussels, 
November 5, 2008.
10 All survey data is taken from the Gallup Balkans Monitor, 
2006 and 2010.
11 Cf., for instance, then High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch on Bosnia “In Bosnia, An ‘Entry Strategy,’” in: 
Washington Post, July 2, 2002. Or then EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Olli Rehn on Kosovo: “We have no exit 
strategy, only an entry strategy,” “The future of  Kosovo 
and the role of  the European Union,” speech before the 
European Parliament, Brussels, March 28, 2007.
12 Cf. Barbara Lippert, “The EU Enlargement: In Search of  
A New Momentum,” in: Adam Balcer (ed.), “Poland and 
the Czech Republic: Advocates of  the EU Enlargement?” 
(Demos Europa), Warsaw 2010, p. 57–76.
13 European Commission, “Commission Opinion on Alba-
nia’s application for membership of  the European Union,” 
COM(2010) 680, Brussels, November 9, 2010.
14 Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus and Daniel Korski, 
“Beyond wait-and-see: the way forward for EU Balkan pol-
icy,” (European Council on Foreign Relations), May 2010.
15 “Four chapters opened and two closed at the launch of  
substantive accession negotiations between Iceland and 
the EU,” June 27, 2011, <http://europe.mfa.is/sidemenu/
latest-news/nr/6357>.
16 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Out-
look—Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: Ice-
land,” April 2011, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2006&e
y=2014&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1
&pr1.x=66&pr1.y=11&c=176&s=NGDPD%2CNGD
PDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CLUR%2CGGX
WDG_NGDP&grp=0&a=>.
17 European Commission, “Commission Opinion on 
Iceland’s application for membership of  the European 
Union,” COM(2010) 62 final, Brussels, February 24, 2010.
18 European Commission, “Iceland 2010 Progress Report,” 
COM(2010) 660 final, Brussels, November 9, 2010.
19 Art. 17/5 of  the Treaty on European Union.
20 This is an estimation based on projected Gross National 
Income (GNI) of  Iceland in the next years. Yet it is impor-
tant to emphasize that the performance of  a member state 
is influenced also by other factors than just the GNI. That 
means in the case of  Iceland, without knowing the results 
of  the accession negotiations in areas such as agriculture 
policy or regional policy, one cannot fully assess the future 
Icelandic budgetary position as an EU member yet.
21 The last election in Iceland took place in April 2009. The 
SDA won with 29.79 percent (which means 20 out of  63 
seats in the Althingi), the Independence Party was second 
with 23.70 percent (16 seats), the Left-Green Movement 
(LGM) was third with 21.68 percent (14 seats), the fourth 
one, the Progressive Party, got 14.80 percent (9 seats) and 
the Citizen’s Movement ended up with 7.22 percent (4 
seats). The ruling coalition of  the SDA and the LGM is 
supported by 34 Members of  Parliament.
22 Capacent Gallup Organization, regular survey for 
the Federation of  Icelandic Industries, July 9, 2007, 
<http://www.si.is/malaflokkar/althjodlegt-samstarf/
frettir-og-greinar-um-althjodamal/nr/3037>.
Notes
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
90
23 Capacent Gallup Organization, regular survey for the Fed-
eration of  Icelandic Industries, February 2011, <http://
www.si.is/media/althjodlegt-samstarf/Evropukonnun-
feb2011.pdf>.
24 The Official Web Site of  the Icelandic  Ministry for For-
eign Affairs, <http://europe.mfa.is/phase-2—-negotiation- 
process/>.
25 Euractiv.com, “Most Icelanders want EU member-
ship talks,” September 30, 2010, <http://www.euractiv.
com/en/enlargement/most-icelanders-want-eu-mem-
bership-talks-news-498266>. And: mbl.is, “Meiri-
hluti vill halda viðræðum áfram,” January 24, 2011, 
<http://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2011/01/24/
meirihluti_vill_halda_vidraedum_afram/>.
26 Committee Report on a Proposal for a Parliamentary Res-
olution on Application for Membership of  the European 
Union, ch. VII. ii. Fisheries, July 9, 2009, p. 18–20.
27 General EU position, Ministerial meeting opening the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of  Ice-
land to the EU, Brussels, July 27, 2010, p. 23.
28 General position of  the Government of  Iceland, Ministe-
rial meeting opening the Intergovernmental Conference 
on the Accession of  Iceland to the EU, Brussels, July 27, 
2010, p. 17.
29 Statement to the international Media by the President of  
Iceland Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson on the Result of  the 
Icesave Referendum, April 10, 2011, <http://forseti.is/
media/PDF/2011_04_10_Statement1.pdf>.
30 Leigh Philipps, “Netherlands: ‘No way now for Iceland to 
join EU’,” in: EU Observer, April 12, 2011, <http://euob 
server.com/15/32160>.
31 Over the same time period, all 35 negotiation chapters 
have been opened with Croatia, and the three on which 
negotiations were still ongoing were formally closed at the 
European Council at the end of  June 2011.
32 European Stability Initiative, “A very special relationship: 
Why Turkey’s EU Accession Process Will Continue,” Ber-
lin/Istanbul, 2010.
33 EC screening reports on chapters 5, 8, and 19, via 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/
turkey/screening_reports_en.htm>.
34 Valentina Pop, “Turkey allies speak out after EU accession 
talks stall,” in: EU Observer, December 15, 2010.
35 Die Welt, “Erdogan attackiert EU wegen Türkei-Beitritt,” 
April 14, 2011.
36 Hugh Pope, “The key to restarting Turkey’s EU engine,” 
in: Hürriyet Daily News, March 3, 2011.
37 Heather Grabbe and Sinan Ülgen, “The Way Forward for 
Turkey and the EU: A Strategic Dialogue on Foreign Pol-
icy” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 2010.
38 Cf. also Kerstin Linke and Marcel Vietor (eds.), “Prospects 
of  a Triangular Relationship? Energy Relations between 
the EU, Russia and Turkey” (FES International Policy 
Analysis), Berlin 2010.
39 Cf. Ivan Krastev and Marc Leonard, “The Spectre of  a 
Multipolar Europe” (European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions), 2010.
40 Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams, “Europe’s External Energy 
Policy and Turkey’s Accession Process,” (Center for Euro-
pean Studies Working Paper Series, no. 170), 2009.
41 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council laying down gen-
eral provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument,” COM(2004) 628 final, Brus-
sels, September 29, 2004.
42 European Commission, “Wider Europe – Neighbour-
hood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours” COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 
March 11, 2003, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com03_104_en.pdf> (retrieved August 11, 2011).
43 For this cf. Chapter III by Claire Demesmay, Carsten 
Främke, and Katrin Sold.
44 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the 
Regions. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood,” 
COM(2011) 303, Brussels, May 25, 2011.
45 Council of  the European Union, “Conclusions of  the 
3101st Council meeting on Foreign Affairs,” Luxembourg, 
June 20, 2011, p. 16.
46 For a further discussion of  the relationship between 
enlargement and neighborhood policy, as well as Europe-
anness cf. the chapters of  Marcel Viëtor and Lucas Lypp.
47 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the 
Regions. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood,” 
COM(2011) 303, Brussels, May 25, 2011.
48 This paper has been published as DGAPanalyse kompakt 
in May 2011 with the title: A turning point for Moldova? A 
challenge for the EU and Moldova.
49 “Integration” means in this context the partial adoption of  
the “acquis communautaire” and economic integration (like a 
free trade agreement), but does not include membership.
50 Witold Rodkiewicz, “From virtual to European democ-
racy—the origins and consequences of  the political 
breakthrough in Moldova,” in: OSW Studies 12/2009, 
pp. 50–54.
51 Ibid, p. 45.
52 Institute for Public Policy, Barometer of  Public Opinion, 
November 2009, p. 6, 73, <http://ipp.md/public/files/
Barometru/2009/BOP_noiembrie_2009_Englsih.pdf> 
[sic] (retrieved May 17, 2011).
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
91
53 National Bureau of  Statistic of  the Republic of  Moldova, 
“Age structure of  population, 1980–2010,” <http://www.
statistica.md/public/files/Piramida/Moldova_E.html> 
(retrieved May 17, 2011).
54 Valeriu Prohnitchi and Alex Oprunenco, “Moldova 
Report 2009: State of  the country report,” Chisinau 2010, 
pp. 23–24, 48.
55 Cf. World Bank Doing business in 2009, 2008, <http://
www.doingbusiness.org/reports/doing-business/doing-
business-2009> (retrieved May 17, 2011).
56 Witold Rodkiewicz, “From virtual to European democ-
racy—the origins and consequences of  the political break-
through in Moldova,” in: OSW Studies 12/2009, p. 75.
57 An example is the progress report of  2008: Commission 
of  the European Communities, “Implementation of  the 
European Neighborhood Policy in 2008, Progress Report 
Moldova,” April 23, 2009, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_514_en.pdf> (retrieved May 
17, 2011).
58 Amanda Akcakoca [u.a.], “After Georgia: conflict resolu-
tion in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood” (EPC Paper No. 
57), April 2009, p.13.
59 Russian Draft Memorandum on the basic principles of  the 
state structure of  a united state in Moldova (Kozak Mem-
orandum), November 17, 2003, <http://www.stefanwolff.
com/files/Kozak-Memorandum.pdf> (retrieved April 20, 
2011).
60 Export Republic of  Moldova, 2005–2010, <http://www.
statistica.md/category.php?l=en&idc=336&> (retrieved 
May 16, 2011).
61 Government of  Moldova, “Activity Program of  the Gov-
ernment of  the Republic of  Moldova ‘European Integra-
tion: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare 2009–2013,’” Chisinau 
2009, <http://www.gov.md/download.php?file=cHVibG
ljL3B1YmxpY2F0aW9ucy8yNjkyNDQ1X2VuX3Byb2dy
YW1fZGVfZ3V2LnBkZg%3D%3D> (retrieved April 20, 
2011).
62 Commission of  the European Communities, “Implementa-
tion of  the European Neighborhood Policy in 2009, Prog-
ress Report Moldova,” May 12, 2010, <http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_523_en.pdf> 
(retrieved April 20, 2011).
63 On the basis of  the coalition program, the Moldovan gov-
ernment prepared a medium term reform, Government of  
Moldova, “Rethink Moldova. Priorities for medium term 
development,” March 24, 2010, <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTMOLDOVA/Resources/Rethink-Mol 
dova-2010-2013-Final-edit-110310.pdf> (retrieved April 
20, 2011).
64 In the latest “ENP-National Indication Programme, 
EU support in capacity building is one key element of  
cooperation, European Commission, ENPI, Republic of  
Moldova, ‘National Indicative Programme 2011–2013’,” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enp_
nip_moldova_en.pdf> (retrieved May 6, 2011).
65 Memorandum, Meeting between Federal Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and President Dmitri Medvedev, June 4/5, 
2010 in Meseberg, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/nsc_
true/Content/DE/__Anlagen/2010/2010-06-07-mese 
berg-memorandum-deutsch,property=publicationFile.
pdf/2010-06-07-meseberg-memorandum-deutsch> 
(retrieved May 17, 2011).
66 Cf. Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz, “Integration or imita-
tion? EU policy towards its Eastern Neighbors,” in: OSW 
Studies, 36, Warsaw, 2011, p. 56–57, <http://www.osw.
waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_36_en.pdf> (retrieved 
May 17, 2011).
67 Parts of  this paper were published in Marie-Lena May, 
“How to deal with Belarus? New Approaches in EU-
Belarus Relations” (DGAPanalyse Kompakt, No. 2), Berlin, 
May 2011.
68 National Bank of  Belarus, “Official Exchange Rate of  the 
Belarusian Ruble Versus Foreign Currencies Set by the 
National Bank of  the Republic Belarus,” <http://www.
nbrb.by/engl/statistics/Rates/RatesDaily.asp> (retrieved 
June 16, 2011), and Elena Ribakova and Natalia Novikova, 
“Citibank, Belarus Macro View, Market is Under-Pricing 
Belarus Risk—Trip Notes,” June 23–24, 2011, June 30, 
2011, p. 3.
69 Informationsportal Interfax Belarus, “Из-за проблем на 
валютном рынке 600 тыс. работников приостановили 
свою деятельность – Белстат“ (Due to problems on the 
currency market 600,000 workers were suspended from 
their work—Belstat [Belarusian Statistic Committee]), 
<http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/91626> (retrieved 
June 20, 2011).
70 Folkert Garbe and Rainer Lindner, “Wahlfarce in Belarus. 
Inszenierter Urnengang und neuer Widerstand” (Farce of  
elections in Belarus. Staged poll and new resistance – FG 5 
2006/03, SWP discussion paper), Berlin 2006.
71 Cf. also: Marie-Lena May, “Zwischen Reform und 
Machterhalt. Belarus vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2010” 
(Reforms or Maintaining Power? Belarus Before the Presi-
dential Elections 2010 – DGAPanalyse kompakt No. 5), 
Berlin 2010.
72 Official Journal of  the European Union, “Council Deci-
sion 2011/357/CFSP,” L 161/25, June 20, 2011.
73 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2010,” 
<http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html> 
(retrieved April 5, 2011).
74 CIA’s World Fact Book, <https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bo.html> 
(retrieved April 26, 2011).
75 Stefan Meister, “The Economization of  Russian Foreign 
Policy” (DGAPstandpunkt 10), Berlin 2010.
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
92
76 Standard and Poors, “Sovereigns Ratings List,” <http://
www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratings-
list/en/us/?sectorName=Governments&subSectorCode=
39&start=100&range=50> (retrieved April 20, 2011).
77 International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/exter 
nal/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1134.htm> (retrieved April 18, 
2011) and Statement by the IMF Mission to the Republic 
of  Belarus, Press Release No. 11/229.
78 National Bank of  Belarus, “Official Exchange Rate of  the 
Belarusian Ruble Versus Foreign Currencies Set by the 
National Bank of  the Republic Belarus,” <http://www.
nbrb.by/engl/statistics/Rates/RatesDaily.asp> (retrieved 
June 16, 2011) and Elena Ribakova and Natalia Novikova, 
“Citibank, Belarus Macro View, Market is Under-Pricing 
Belarus Risk—Trip Notes,” June 23–24, 2011, June 30, 
2011, p. 3.
79 Informationsportal Interfax Belarus, “Из-за проблем на 
валютном рынке 600 тыс. работников приостановили 
свою деятельность – Белстат“ (Due to problems on the 
currency market 600,000 workers were suspended from 
their work – Belstat [Belarusian Statistic Committee]), 
<http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/91626> (retrieved 
June 20, 2011).
80 National Statistical Committee of  the Republic of  Belarus, 
“Социально-экономическое положение Республики 
Беларусь в январе-июне 2011 г.” (Socio-economic Situa-
tion of  Belarus from January-June 2001), <http://belstat.
gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/doclad/2011_6/13.pdf> 
(retrieved July 15, 2011).
81 Belarus Telegraph Agency (Belta), “Minekonomiki Belarusi 
pereschityvaet prognoz infljatsii na 2011 god” (Ministry of  
Economy of  Belarus re-calculates the forecast for inflation 
for 2011), April 26, 2011, <http://www.belta.by/ru/all_
news/economics/Minekonomiki-Belarusi-pereschityvaet-
prognoz-infljatsii-na-2011-god_i_552176.html> (retrieved 
April 26, 2011).
82 Independent Institute of  Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies (IISEPS), “Бюллетень ‘Новости НИСЭПИ’” 
(Bulletin “News IISEPS”), No. 2 (60) 2011, <http://www.
iiseps.org/bullet11-2.html> (retrieved July 15, 2011).
83 Belapan, “Акция ‘Революция через социальную сеть’ 
собрала тысячи людей в разных городах Беларуси“ 
(Action „Revolution through social Networks“ made 
thousands of  people gather in different cities of  Belarus), 
<http://belapan.com/archive/2011/06/15/478090/> 
(retrieved June 16, 2011), and: Libereco Newsletter July 
2011, “Anhaltende Verfolgung friedlicher Proteste in 
Belarus” (Continuing prosecution of  peaceful protests 
in Belarus), <http://www.lphr.org/news/news-details/
article/anhaltende-verfolgung-friedlicher-proteste-in-
belarus//3/> (retrieved July 15, 2011).
84 Alexander Rahr, “Wer rettet die belarussische Wirtschaft?” 
(Who saves the Belarusian economy?), in: BelarusAnalysen 
1/2011, p.11.
85 IISEPS “The Most Important Results of  the Nationwide 
Public Opinion Poll,” March 2011, <http://www.iiseps.
org/epress15.html> (retrieved July 21, 2011).
86 Silja Schultheis, “Lukaschenko hat sich in die Ecke 
gedrängt: Interview mit dem Oppositionellen Alexander 
Michalewitsch” (Lukashenko has driven himself  into a cor-
ner: Interview with the oppositionist Ales Mikhalevitch), 
n-ost, April 19, 2011.
87 Cf. note 85.
88 Press Release by the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  
Germany, “Bundesregierung stockt Unterstützung für 
belarussische Zivilgesellschaft auf ” (The German Federal 
Government increases the support for the Belarusian civil 
society), , February 2, 2011, <http://www.minsk.diplo.de/
Vertretung/minsk/de/03/zivil__gesellschaft__de.html> 
(retrieved April 27, 2011).
89 European Commission, “European Commission confirms 
strong support to the Belarusian population,” IP/10/330, 
Brussels, March 21, 2011.
90 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal norms, rhetorical action 
and the eastern enlargement of  the European Union,” in: 
Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier (ed.), “The 
Politics of  European Union Enlargement–Theoretical 
Approaches,” New York, NY 2005, p. 142–171, here 
p. 142.
91 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The EU, NATO and the Integra-
tion of  Europe : Rules and Rhetorics,” Cambridge 2003, 
p. 193.
92 Thijs Rommens, “The Impact of  the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy on Democratization in the South Cau-
casus,” in: Sabine Fischer and Heiko Pleines, “The EU 
and Central & Eastern Europe–Successes and Failures of  
Europeanization in Politics and Society,” Stuttgart 2009, 
pp. 155–164, here p. 157 f.
93 Wade Jacoby, “The Enlargement of  the European Union 
and NATO–Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe,” 
Cambridge 2004, p. 185.
94 Benjamin E. Goldsmith, “Imitation in International Rela-
tions—Observational Learning, Analogies, and Foreign 
Policy in Russia and Ukraine,” New York, NY 2005, p. 2.
95 Elena Baracani and Roberto Di Quirico, “Introduction” in: 
Roberto Di Quirico (ed.), “Europeanisation and Democra-
tisation–Institutional Adaption, Conditionality and Democ-
ratisation in European Union´s Neighbour Countries,” 
Florence 2005, p. 11–24, here p. 23.
96 Andreas Umland, “Courting Little Russia,” in: Internatio-
nale Politik (IP) Global Edition, May/June 2011, p. 28–34, 
here p. 31.
97 European Commission, “Ukraine–Main Economic Indi-
cators,” <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006 /
september/tradoc_113459.pdf>, numbers from 2009, 
(retrieved May 19, 2011).
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
93
98 In the Global Corruption Index 2010 prepared by Trans-
parency International, Ukraine is ranked 134 out of  178 
countries, cf. Transparency International, <http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
/2010/results> (retrieved 20 May, 2011).
99 Pavel Korduban, “Ukraine returns to 1996 constitution, 
strengthening president Yanukovych,” in: Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 186, Oktober 15, 2010, <http://
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews 
[tt_news]=37037> (retrieved May 19, 2011).
100 Jean-François Julliard and Elsa Vidal, “Press Freedom in 
Ukraine–Temptation to Control,” (Reporters without bor-
ders) <http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/filead 
min/rte/docs/2010/100901_Engl_Ukraine-Bericht.pdf>, 
August 2010 (retrieved May 17, 2011).
101 Razumkov Centre, “If  parliamentary elections were held 
next Sunday how would you vote?” (recurrent), <http://
www.uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=115> (retrieved 
May 11, 2011).
102 Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, “The Hey to 
Kiew: Ukraine’s Security Means Europe’s Stability,” in: For-
eign Affairs, May / June 2009, p. 106–120, here p. 119.
103 Grzegorz Gromadzki, “A Challenging Opportunity–The 
EU plus six–the Eastern Partnership,” (Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung Study), 2010, p. 8.
104 Andreas Umland, “Courting Little Russia,” in: op. cit. (note 
96), here p. 31.
105 Razumkov Centre, “Sociological Call—Evaluate your atti-
tude towards the countries and international organizations,” 
<http://www.uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=227> 
(retrieved May 19, 2011).
106 Europol, “EU Organised crime threat assessment 2011,” 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Euro-
pean_ Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/
OCTA_2011.pdf>, April 28, 2011 (retrieved May 16, 
2011).
107 Martin Dangerfield, “Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine: In 
or Out of  European Regional International Society?,” in: 
European Integration, March 2011, p. 215–233, here 
p. 228.
108 Marta Jaroszewicz, “The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on 
Visa Liberalisation: an assessment of  Ukraine’s readi-
ness,” Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), January 17, 2011, 
<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2011-01-17/eu-ukraine-action-plan-visa-liberalisation-
assessment-ukraine-s> (retrieved May 15, 2011).
109 European Parliament, “European Parliament resolu-
tion of  25 November 2010 on Ukraine,” <http://www.
europarl. europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0444+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN> (retrieved May 11, 2011).
110 Michael Emerson, “Rendez-vous with Eastern Europe” 
(Centre for European Policy Studies—CEPS, CEPS Com-
mentary), Brussels, November 2, 2010, <http://www.ceps.
eu/book/rendez-vous-eastern-europe> (retrieved May 11, 
2011).
111 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), “Euro-
pean foreign policy scorecard 2010”, London 2011, p. 89.
112 Grzegorz Gromadzki, “A Challenging Opportunity–The 
EU plus six–the Eastern Partnership” (Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung Study), Berlin 2010, p. 8.
113 One example is the European Energy Community (EEC) 
that Ukraine joined in February 2011. As things stand, it 
is quite unlikely that the EEC’s laws and regulations will 
be implemented to a satisfactory level and establish a truly 
competitive energy market in Ukraine. Cf. Andriy Chubyk, 
“Ukraine and the European Energy Community, Eastern 
Partnership Community,” April 12, 2011, <http://www. 
easternpartnership.org/publication/politics/2011-04-12/
ukraine-and-european-energy-community> (retrieved May 
11, 2011).
114 Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), “Europol’s accusations 
towards Ukraine,” May 11, 2011, <http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-05-11/europol-s-accusa-
tions-towards-ukraine> (retrieved May 16, 2011).
115 Ria Novosti, “Ukrainian integration with Europe could 
hamper ties with costums union—Medvedev,” May 18, 
2011, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20110518/164092502.
html> (retrieved May 19, 2011).
116 European Commission, “Ukraine National Indicative Pro-
gramme 2011–2013,” September 2009, <http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/ pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_
en.pdf> (retrieved May 20, 2011).
117 The other three addressees of  the EaP—Armenia, Azer-
baijan, and Georgia—are not a focus of  this publication.
118 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the 
Regions. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood,“ 
COM(2011) 303, May 25, 2011, p. 4.
119 European Commission and the High Representative of  
the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy, “A 
medium term program for a renewed European Neigh-
borhood Policy (2011–2014),” May 25, 2011, <http://
ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2011/medium_
term_prog_2011_13_en.pdf> (retrieved June 21, 2011).
120 Ibid.
121 Cf. European Commission, “A Secure Europe in a Better 
World. European Security Strategy,” Brussels, December 
12, 2003.
122 Additional approaches to multilateral cooperation in a 
Euro-Mediterranean context are the OSCE Mediterranean 
contact group, the 5+5 Dialog between the Arab Maghreb 
Union and five southern EU member countries and the 
Mediterranean Forum as an informal dialog framework of  
Mediterranean neighboring countries.
DGAPanalyse 2 | August 2011
94
123 Cf. the Barcelona Declaration on Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership of  November 27/28, 1995, <http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf>.
124 ibid.
125 All 10 ENP partner countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, 
Syria, and Tunisia) are also EU partner countries as part of  
the EuroMed Partnership.
126 Cf. Isabel Schäfer, “Die EU, der Nahe Osten und Nord-
afrika: Vom Regionalismus zurück zum Bilateralismus?,” 
in: Annegret Bendiek and Heinz Kramer (ed.), “Globale 
Außenpolitik der Europäischen Union,” Baden-Baden 
2009, S. 76.
127 United Nations Development Program, “Rapport sur le 
développement humain 2010. La vraie richesse des nations: 
Les chemins du développement humain,” New York, NY 
2010, S. 218 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_
FR_Complete_reprint.pdf>.
128 The new secretary general of  the Union for the Mediter-
ranean, Moroccan Youssef  Amrani, took office on July 1, 
2011. A former secretary general in the foreign ministry 
of  the Kingdom of  Morocco, Amrani was active in the 
development of  the Arab Maghreb Union, cf. <http://
www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/youssef-amrani-new-secretary-
general-of-the-secretariat-of-the-union-for-the-mediterran 
ean/>.
129 Cf. Claire Demesmay and Katrin Sold, “Gute Idee, 
schlechte Umsetzung: Zwei Jahre Union für das Mittel-
meer” (DGAPstandpunkt Nr. 9), Juli 2010.
130 Cf. Jean-François Jamet, “Intégration régionale: Processus 
de Barcelone et Union pour la Méditerranée, quels scéna-
rios d’avenir?” (Fondation Robert Schumann, Question 
d’Europe n° 105), Juli 2008.
131 The competition between the two initiatives has been 
resolved in that Transgreen has specialized in developing 
the transmission infrastructure for the electricity harvested 
under the DESERTEC project.
132 Cf. European Commission, “Press release of  May 25, 
2011,” <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?r
eference=IP/11/643&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en>.
133 European Commission and High Representative of  the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Com-
munication: A New Response to a Changing Neighbour-
hood,” May 25, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf>.
134 As early as 2005, the World Bank estimated that 100 mil-
lion jobs would need to be created in the region in the 
next 20 years. Cf. Middle East and North Africa Economic 
Developments and Prospects 2005, <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/MENA-EDP2005.
pdf>.
135 Cf. Rym Ayadi, “Supporting the challenges of  democratic 
transition in Tunisia. A call for prompt action from the 
G8” (CEPS Commentary), May 26, 2011.
136 Cf. Alain Juppé, “Intervention à l’Assemblée nationale sur 
‘L’Europe et la Méditerranée,’” March 30, 2011, <www.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/europe_828/union-europeenne-
monde_13399/relations-exterieures_853/union-pour-medi 
terranee_17975/europe-mediterranee-intervention-alain-
juppe-assemblee-nationale-30.03.11_91226.html>.
137 Cf. Claire Demesmay and Stephan Martens, “Nachbar-
schaft und Erweiterung: ein Dauerkonflikt?,” in: Eine neue 
Agenda für die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen (Gens-
hagener Papiere Nr. 1), Januar 2010, pp. 20–22 .



Herausgeber: Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V. | 
Rauchstraße 17/18 | 10787 Berlin | Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0 | Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16 |  
info@dgap.org | www.dgap.org | www.aussenpolitik.net | ISSN 1611-7034 | © 2011 DGAP
